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SUMMARY 
 
This study focuses on the use of Social Network Sites (SNSs) and certain 
personality rights (specifically the right to privacy and the right to identity) that may 
be infringed by this use. The study also discusses data protection law as the 
protection of the rights to privacy and identity are interlinked with data protection in 
that data protection assumes importance when there is processing of personal 
information on SNSs.  
The study seeks to determine whether South African law provides adequate 
protection for the interests that form the object of these personality rights, and 
highlights certain shortcomings, particularly in the context of SNSs. It also suggests 
solutions where there are shortcomings by learning from other jurisdictions. Related 
issues investigated are: who should be held responsible for the user-generated 
content uploaded on SNSs; the role of the Internet Service Provider (ISP); and how 
to deal with anonymous defendants.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
In this study I focus on the use of Social Network Sites (SNSs)1 and certain 
personality rights (specifically the right to privacy and the right to identity) that may 
be infringed through the use of SNSs.  
SNSs are easy to use and enable one to meet old and new friends online. They are 
often free. Williams2 highlights the following reasons why people use SNSs: for 
social interaction; for information seeking and sharing; to pass the time; for 
entertainment and relaxation; as a convenient and easy means of communication; 
for the expression of opinion; for surveillance of others; or to or obtain knowledge 
about others. SNSs are arguably the cheapest3 and most widely used of the 
electronic forms of communication.4 Since their inception, SNSs have narrowed the 
distance between people – it has become possible to communicate with friends, 
family, and even strangers from around the world as frequently as one wishes.  
Technological innovation often brings convenience or improvement to life; on the 
other hand, that very convenience and improvement may herald a minefield of legal 
consequences. Therefore, if it is adequate to protect society’s needs, the law needs 
to adapt to technological developments.5 The South African courts, like other courts 
worldwide, have already pronounced on SNSs in a number of cases.6  
                                                            
1  Social Network Sites are defined in para 2.3 below. The concept of SNSs, their development 
and their functionality are explained in ch 2. 
2  Williams 2013 Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal 364-5. 
3  Ibid 363. 
4  The Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, s 1 defines ‘electronic communication’ 
to mean any text, voice, sound or image message sent over an electronic communications 
network which is stored in the network or in the recipient’s terminal equipment until it is 
collected by the recipient. 
5  Roos (2012) SALJ 375. 
6  Dutch Reformed Church Vergesig Johannesburg Congregation and Another v Rayan 
Soknunan t/a GloryDivinee World Ministries 2012 (6) SA 201 (GSJ); [2012] 3 All SA 322 
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My study is based on the following assumptions: that the Internet is an important 
medium of communication; that people retain their personality rights when using the 
Internet (and specifically SNSs); and that the law must protect the right of those 
using the Internet and SNSs. If this is the case, it follows that where the personality 
rights of users or non-users have been infringed on an SNS, liability should follow.  
I have limited the study to the protection of the right to privacy and the right to 
identity in the context of SNSs. The delictual perspective is the focal point of this 
discussion. I focus on delicts that cause injury to personality (iniuria) on SNSs.7 An 
iniuria to personality occurs where there is an intentional and wrongful infringement 
of a personality right. These personality rights are protected under the actio 
iniuriarum. Therefore, a person may sue for personality-right infringement relying on 
the actio iniuriarum. The actio iniuriarum protects injury to the corpus (bodily 
integrity), fama (good name or reputation), and dignitas (all personality interests 
apart from the corpus or fama). The rights to privacy and identity are therefore part of 
the wider concept of dignitas. Both natural and juristic persons have personality 
rights.8 I have, however, limited my study to the personality rights of natural persons 
and refer only briefly to the position of juristic persons.  
Protection of the rights to privacy and identity may be interlinked with data 
protection.9 Data protection enters the picture when there is processing of personal 
information on SNSs. Both the user of an SNS and the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) which provides the platform on which the SNS operates, may process personal 
information. I therefore also refer to data protection in the context of SNSs where it is 
relevant to do so.  
As the study focusses on the private-law protection of the two mentioned personality 
rights, identity theft will not be investigated. Identity theft falls outside the scope of 
private law and it is dealt with under public law (specifically criminal law). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
(GSJ); Heroldt v Wills 2013 (2) SA 530; 2013 (5) BCLR 554 (GSJ); [2013] 2 All SA 218 (GSJ); 
Isparta v Richter and Another 2013 (6) SA 529 (GNP); CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) 
Ltd v Pieter Odendaal Kitchens 2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD); M v B 2015 (1) SA 270 (KZP); Harvey 
v Niland and Others 2016 (2) SA 436 (ECG). 
7  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict 5. 
8  See para 3.4 below. 
9  See Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 270-1. 
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1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
The rights to privacy and identity are affected when users communicate or share 
personal information on SNSs. Often users post large amounts of information about 
themselves or others on SNSs;10 this may lead to the infringement of person’s right 
to privacy or to identity. The right to a good name (fama) is often also involved but 
will, for purposes of this dissertation, not be considered in detail. My research is 
limited to actions for infringement of the rights to privacy and the right to identity. 
In this study I seek to establish whether South African law provides adequate 
protection for the interests that form the object of the rights to privacy and identity, 
and to highlight shortcomings, particularly in the context of SNSs. I also aim to 
suggest solutions for the shortcomings identified by drawing on the experience of 
other jurisdictions. Other related questions that I investigate are: who should be held 
responsible for the user-generated content uploaded on SNSs? the role of the ISP; 
and how to deal with anonymous defendants.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This dissertation takes the form of a literature study, based largely on legislation, 
books, journal articles, case law, and Internet sources. I also consider the historical 
background, development, and current issues relating to SNSs to provide a basis for 
the study.  
 
I adopted comparative approach as comparative law is helpful in gaining a better 
understanding of our own national (South African) law and may provide pointers to 
improve it.11 Furthermore, the goals of legal comparison as a science are to identify 
the differences between legal models and to contribute to the knowledge of these 
models.12 The Internet is intrinsically international in nature. One cannot analyse the 
                                                            
10  Kosta, Kalloniatis & Gritzalis 2010 Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy 
194. 
11  David & Brierley Major Legal Systems 6. 
12  Samuel Comparative Law Theory and Method 45. 
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position in South Africa without taking note of the international situation – especially 
the position in the USA where SNSs originated and where many of their 
headquarters are located. When dealing with data protection, one cannot ignore the 
position in the European Union (EU).13 With this in mind, I have elected to consider 
the following legal systems: the United States of America (United States); the 
European Union; and the UK as an example of a European country subject to the EU 
data protection regime. I also consider various international instruments. 
 
1.4 PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
 
In this section I provide preliminary definitions of certain of the key terms frequently 
used in the dissertation. Certain of these terms are addressed in greater detail in the 
body of the dissertation.  
Social Network Sites:  According to Boyed, these are “web-based services that 
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded 
system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and 
(3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to 
site.” 14 
Social Media: “Includes the various online technology tools and forms of electronic 
communication via the Internet, which include websites for social networking and 
micro blogging through which users create online communities to share information, 
ideas, personal messages, and other content”.15 
Internet Service Provider: “A company that provides subscribers with access to the 
Internet”.16 
Personal information: “Information relating to an identifiable, living, natural person, 
and, where applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic person, including, but not 
limited to: information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
                                                            
13  Abdulrauf Data Privacy in Nigeria12. 
14  Boyd & Ellison 2007 J Comput-Mediat Comm 11. 
15  Films and Publications Amendment Bill [B 37- 2015] s 1. 
16  https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ (date of use: 28 September 2016). 
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national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental 
health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth 
of the person; information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal 
or employment history of the person; any identifying number, symbol, e-mail 
address, physical address, telephone number, location information, online identifier, 
or other particular assignment to the person; the biometric information of the person; 
the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person; correspondence sent by 
the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, or further 
correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence; the 
views or opinions of another individual about the person; and the name of the person 
if it appears with other personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure 
of the name itself would reveal information about the person”.17 
Processing: “Any operation or activity, or any set of operations, whether by 
automatic means or not, which concerns personal information, including: the 
collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, updating or 
modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; dissemination by means of 
transmission, distribution or making available in any other form; or merging, linking, 
as well as restriction, degradation, erasure or destruction of information”. 18 
Data controller: Means “any person who by electronic means requests, collects, 
collates, processes, or stores personal information from or in respect of a data 
subject”.19 (Also referred to as the responsible party.)20 
Data subject: Means “any natural person from or in respect of whom personal 
information has been requested, collected, collated, processed or stored”.21 (Data 
subjects include both users and non-users of SNSs if their personal information is 
processed by the data controller.) 
Internet: Means “the interconnected system of networks that connects computers 
around the world using the TCP/IP and includes future versions thereof”. 22  
                                                            
17  Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 s 1. 
18  Act 4 of 2013 s 1. 
19  Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s 1.  
20  Act 4 of 2013 s 1. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Act 25 of 2002 s 1. 
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Third party: In relation to a service provider, a third party means “a subscriber to the 
service provider's services, any other user of the service provider's services, or a 
user of information systems”. 23 
Web page: Means “a single, usually hypertext, document on the World Wide Web 
that can incorporate text, graphics, sounds, etc”.24 
Web site: Means “any location on the Internet containing a home page or web 
page”.25 
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
In Chapter 2 I discuss SNSs as a concept and explain their functionality. I also 
provide a brief historical background to the development of SNSs and describe a few 
of them. I also highlight that not only users of SNSs are affected by the challenges 
and threats they pose, but that non-users too may fall prey to the negative aspects of 
SNSs. 
Chapter 3 focuses on South African law regarding the personality rights to privacy 
and identity. In the chapter I consider the historical backgrounds of these two 
personality rights, and examine how they are recognised and protected under South 
African law. Common law, constitutional law, and legislation are also discussed. I 
further examine the possible grounds of justification which exclude the wrongfulness 
of infringing conduct, and explore the infringement of these personality rights in the 
context of SNSs and possible grounds of justification applicable in this regard. The 
procedural challenges where either privacy or identity has been infringed in the 
context of SNSs are also addressed. Finally, I consider the possible remedies 
available to the plaintiff whose personality rights have been infringed on an SNS. 
 
In Chapter 4 I offer a comparative analysis by discussing the legal system of the 
United States of America. My focus is on the recognition, protection, and regulation 
of rights to privacy and identity in the United States. I examine various sources at 
                                                            
23  Ibid s 1. 
24  http://www.dictionary.com/browse/web--page?s=t (date of use: 28 September 2016). 
25  Ibid s 1. 
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both Federal and State levels – specifically, constitutional law, legislation, common 
law, and case law.  
 
In Chapter 5 I discuss some of the important documents relating to the protection of 
the rights to privacy and identity in the context of SNSs issued by international 
organisations and the European Union (EU). The chapter is presented in three parts. 
The first deals with documents issued by international organisations which have 
contributed to the development and protection of the right to privacy and data 
protection. The second part focuses on EU legal instruments in this area. Lastly, the 
chapter explores the legal position in the United Kingdom (UK) as an example of the 
application of EU law in a particular EU member state. Some of these documents are 
human rights documents which treat the right to privacy and the right to dignity 
(encompassing the right to identity) as fundamental human rights. However the 
majority of the legal instruments that I discuss deal with data protection. Data 
protection law regulates the protection of personal information when that information 
is processed and, therefore, in essence protects a person’s right to privacy and to 
identity.  
In Chapter 6 I present my conclusions and offer recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
Social Network Sites (SNSs) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I discuss the concept of Social Network Sites (SNSs) and explain 
what they are and how they function. The following framework is used: a brief 
historical background to the development of SNSs; the nature of SNSs is explained 
and a description is given of SNSs in general; the use of SNSs is examined; finally, a 
description of the functionality and usage of specific SNSs is given. 
 
2.2 A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SNSs 
 
The first SNS to be developed was SixDegrees.com which was launched in 1997. It 
was located in New York and was based on the current Web 2.0 format.1 It was 
named after the concept known as ‘six degrees of separation’2 and allowed users to 
list friends, family members, and acquaintances both on the site and externally. In 
addition, it invited external contacts to join the site. Its main purpose was to create a 
charitable social network and inspire participants to donate to charities online. The 
popularity of SNSs increased dramatically with the launch of Friendster.com in 
2002.3 Friendster was used for dating and discovering new events, bands, and 
hobbies. This website was created to compete with Match.com and other dating 
sites.4  
 
                                                            
1  Boyd & Ellison 2007 J Comput-Mediat Comm 214. For an explanation of the concept Web 2.0 
see para 2.3 below. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Grimmelmann 2009 Lowa Law Review 1144. 
4  Boyd “Friendster and Publicly Articulated Social Networking” 2004 (Vienna, Austria) available 
at http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/990000/986043/p1279-boyd (date of use: 20 September 
2016). 
9 
 
Today there are many recognised SNSs, both nationally and internationally. 
Amongst the leading SNS are Facebook, WhatsApp, QQ, Facebook Messenger, Q 
Zone, We Chat, Instagram, Twitter, Google+, Linkedin, Pinterest, BBM, Skype, and 
many more.5 Facebook is predominantly referred to in this study as an example. 
According to the ‘Digital in 2016’ report,6 WhatsApp, a rapidly expanding cross-
platform mobile messaging company, was the top active social platform in South 
Africa, followed by Facebook. In 2014 Facebook announced that it had reached a 
definitive agreement to acquire WhatsApp for approximately $16 billion, including $4 
billion in cash and approximately $12 billion in Facebook shares.7 
 
Facebook was launched in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, Eduardo Saverin, Dustin 
Moskovitz, and Chris Hughes. It was originally termed ‘The Facebook.com’.8 
Membership was initially restricted to students at Harvard College, but was later 
extended to include anybody with a valid e-mail address.9 The website is free of 
charge to users and generates revenue from advertising, such as banner 
advertisements (banner ads).10 Facebook created public search listings on Google 
and Bing in 2007 to enable users to find other friends or users using public search 
engines.11  
                                                            
5  Kemp “Digital in 2016” available at http://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016 
(date of use: 6 August 2016). 
6  Ibid. 
7  “Facebook to acquire WhatsApp” available at //newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/02/facebook-to-
acquire-whatsapp/ (date of use: 10 August 2016). 
8  Colleges and Universities in the United States often publish official and unofficial books listing 
their students, faculty, or staff, together with pictures and limited biographical data. Mark 
Zuckerberg, while a sophomore at Harvard University, created an unofficial online face book 
on the website ‘thefacebook.com’, this used photos taken from Harvard house-based face 
books, using the photos [student faces] in a system to rate the attractiveness of students. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Face_book (date of use: 6 August 2016). 
9  Boyd & Hargittai 2010 First Monday available at http://firstmonday.org/ (date of use: 8 August 
2016).  
10  Banner ads refer to a form of advertising on the World Wide Web (WWW). They function in 
the same way as traditional advertisements: notifying consumers of a product or service; and 
presenting reasons why the consumer should choose the product in question. Web banners 
differ from regular advertisements in that the results of advertisement campaigns may be 
monitored in real-time and may be targeted to the viewer's interests. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web (date of use: 06 August 2016). Facebook generates most of 
its income through targeted advertising. 
11  Sullivan “Facebook Opens Profiles To Tap Into Google Traffic, While Google Grabs Facebook’s 
News Feed Idea” available at http://searchengineland.com/facebook-opens-profiles-to-tap-into-
google-traffic-while-google-grabs-facebooks-news-feed-idea-12096 (date of use: 08 September 
2016). 
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Facebook had 1,71 billion monthly active users as of June 2016.12 It is estimated that 
somet 84,5 per cent of Facebook users are outside the United States and Canada.13 
There are 1,03 billion people accessing Facebook through their mobile devices.14  
In 2016 there were close on thirteen million active Facebook users in South Africa.15 
In this context ‘active registered user’ means a user who has logged into Facebook 
at least once in the previous 30 days (the so-called ‘monthly active user’).16 An 
analysis of the demographics of South Africa reflects that 20 to 29 year olds form the 
largest group of users on Facebook, namely 41 per cent; followed by 30 to 39 year 
olds who make up 21 per cent of all SA users on Facebook.17 According to the 
executive summaries in the South African ‘Social Media Landscape’ reports, the 
number of active users in South Africa has risen to thirteen million, up from twelve 
million active users in 2015.18 
MySpace became the most popular social networking site in the United States, a 
position that it held throughout 2007 and for part of 2008. In April 2008, according to 
comScore,19 MySpace was overtaken internationally by its main competitor, 
Facebook.20 Amongst the first users of MySpace included musicians and bands, who 
may have heard about it in the first place from the website's founders, who were 
active in the Los Angeles area.21 Musicians used it to establish a free online 
                                                            
12  See http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (date of use: 20 September 2016). 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
15  “South African Social Media Landscape 2016: Executive summary” available at 
16  www.facebook.com/editaccount (date of use: 08 September 2016). People who access or use 
Facebook on their mobile devices are reported to be twice as active on Facebook than non-
mobile users. 
17  Kemp “Digital in 2016” available at http://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2016 
(date of use: 21 December 2016). 
18  “South African Social Media Landscape 2015 & 2016: Executive summary” available at 
19  http://www.comscore.com/About_comScore (date of use: 10 September 2016). comScore is a 
global leader in measuring the digital world and the preferred source of digital marketing 
information. 
20  This is based on the monthly number of unique visitors. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myspace (date of use: 10 September 2016). 
21  Weaver & Morrison Social Networking 98. The authors note that the idea of ‘sharing media’ is 
at the core of MySpace, which later extended to the sharing of music. 
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presence, to post performance dates, and to communicate with their fans.22 
MySpace was created by Tom Anderson and Chris De Wolfe.23 
In South Africa, Mxit (pronounced as ‘mix it’) was the leading SNS. It has been 
overtaken by 2Go which boasted 10,5 million active users in August 2013.24 Mxit is a 
free instant messaging25 application developed by the South African based Mxit 
Lifestyle (Pty) Limited. Mxit runs on devices including feature phones, Android, 
BlackBerry, IPhone, iPad, Windows phone, and tablets.26 Launched in 2006, it 
operates through Internet protocol to exchange messages.27 MXit is primarily a Java-
based28 mobile application which gives users the functionality to exchange instant 
messages; it is thus light of data.29 In March 2012, Mxit had almost 45 million 
registered users and an average of ten million active users. This made Mxit the 
largest SNS in South Africa at that time.30 In 2014, it was reported that Mxit had 7,4 
million monthly active users of which 6,3 million were in South Africa.31 Although it 
was launched in South Africa, Mxit also has an international following. The 
international demographics show that the site has 5,5 million registered users 
internationally, with an average of 633 373 active international users.32 It operates in 
many African and international markets. African markets include Kenya, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Nigeria and Swaziland. International markets in which Mxit operates 
include Malaysia, India, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.33  
                                                            
22  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myspace (date of use: 10/09/2016). 
23  Chatfield Myspace.com Handbook 39. 
24  “South African Social Media Landscape 2014: Executive summary” available at 
www.worldwideworx.com (date of use: 20 December 2016). 
25  Wikipedia defines ‘instant messaging’ as a form of real-time direct text-based communication 
between two or more people using personal computers or other devices, along with shared 
clients. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant_messaging (date of use: 10 September 16). 
26  See www.wikipedia.org/wiki/MXit (date of use: 12 September 2016). 
27  Chicona & Chicana 2008 Southern African Journal of Information and Communication 43. 
28  Java is a programming language and computing platform first released by Sun Microsystems 
in 1995. There are many applications and websites that will not work unless Java has been 
installed, and more are created every day. Java is fast, secure, and reliable. See 
https://java.com/en/download/faq/whatis_java.xml (date of use: 16 September 16). 
29  See http://get.mxit.com/about/ (date of use: 16 September 2016). 
30  Ibid. 
31  “South Africa Social Media Landscape 2014: Executive summary” available at 
www.worldwideworx.com (date of use: 20 December 2016).  
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
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2.3 DEFINING, ANALYSING AND DESCRIBING SNSs 
 
The internet is a fast-growing industry and has provided ample opportunities for 
subsidiary industries linked to Internet usage or development.34 The development of 
the Internet started from the so-called Web 1.035 technology, and currently uses Web 
2.036 technology. With regard to Web 1.0 technology, users played a passive role, in 
that it allowed them only to view and retrieve information. The current Web 2.0 is 
more interactive and also allows users to become contributors to the user-generated 
content.37 
 
The focus of this study is on the current Web 2.0 technology. The term Web 2.0 is an 
umbrella term for web-based software such as blogs, wikis, social networking, and 
media-sharing sites.38 Tim O’Reilly was the first to coin the term ‘Web 2.0’. Web 2.0 
laid a foundation for the development of Social Network Services (SNSs).39  
 
The evolution of the Internet has changed the way people communicate and 
socialise. Advances in technology during the past decade have made it possible to 
use electronic communication tools to create social network applications.40 
Socialising is, and has always been, part of most people’s lives. Therefore, social 
networking existed long before the dawn of computers and the Internet. It has always 
                                                            
34  Brown Success Secrets 14 gives an account of the impact of social media on the Internet 
industry and other related fields. See www.books.google.co.za (date of use: 16 September 
2016).  
35  Web 1.0 refers to the first stage of the World Wide Web (WWW) linking web pages with 
hyperlinks. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_1.0 (date of use: 16 September 2016). 
36  Davies & Merchant Learning and Social Participation 3. The term Web 2.0 does not refer to 
anything as specific as new hardware or a reconfiguration of the Internet, it is a term that 
attempts to highlight a new wave and the increased volume of users who have developed 
new ways of using digital technology to interact with others. 
37  Graham & Balachander 2008 First Monday available at 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2125/1972 (date of use: 20 September 2016). 
38  Seppa “The future of social networking” available at www.cse.tkk.fi/en (date of use: 20 
September 2016); Wellman 2001 Computer and Science 2031, notes that this concept is not 
entirely foreign as computer networks in their nature are inherently social networks. Available 
at http://www.sciencemag.org (date of use: 20 September 2016). 
39  Anderson “What is Web 2.0? Ideas, technologies and implications for education” available at 
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/whatwedo/topics/web2.aspx (date of use: 20 September 2016). 
40  Miltiadis & Patricia Social Web Evolution 57.  
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been a term used in a social, political, or business context. Weaver and Morrison 
express this idea as follows: 
Social networking is a concept that has been around much longer than the Internet or 
even mass communication. People have always been social creatures; our ability to 
work together in groups, creating value that is greater than the sum of its parts, is one 
of our greatest assets.41 
Papadopoulos42 defines ‘online social networking’ sites as websites the main 
purpose of which is to act as a link between users through the use of computer 
software to build online social networks. Boyd and Ellison43 define social network 
sites as “web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those made 
by others within the system”. This definition is widely accepted by scholars.44  
 
It is trite that the nature and purpose of each SNS may vary from site to site. 
Grimmelmann points out that Boyd and Ellison’s definition highlights three important 
aspects of SNSs: the creation of identity; of relationships; and of community.45 
Morrison and Weaver highlight the following characteristics of MySpace and 
Facebook:  
 
MySpace is a peer and media-based SNS where members can create their own mini 
websites containing pictures and profile information such as age and interests. 
                                                            
41  Weaver & Morrison Social Networking 97; also see Seppa “The future of social 
networking” Seminar on Internetworking 2008 available at 
cse.tkk.fi/en/publications/B/1/papers (date of use: 21 December 2016).  
42  Papadopoulos 2009 Obiter 32. 
43  Boyd & Ellison 2008 J Comput-Mediat Comm 211; Roos 2012 SALJ 383-5. 
44  Roos 2012 SALJ 383; Papadopoulos 2009 Obiter 33; Beer 2008 J Comput-Mediat Comm 
518. 
45  Grimmelmann 2009 Iowa Law Review 1143. He further notes the links between these 
aspects: the first prong, ‘profiles’ emphasises identity – users create profiles that represent 
them. The second prong, ‘contacts’ emphasises relationships – users establish one-to-one 
connections with others. The third prong, ‘traversing lists of contacts’ emphasises community 
– users occupy a specific place among their peers. Beer 2008 J Comput-Mediat Comm 518, 
520, disagrees with the proposal by Boyd and Ellison that researchers should use the term 
‘social network sites’ rather than ‘social networking sites’. He argues, first of all, that the 
former is too broad and means too many things and would lose the fine distinction that 
separates sites like YouTube from Facebook. Second, he argues against what he sees as 
Boyd and Ellison’s artificial segregation of online and offline life, especially with respect to 
social interactions and friends. With SNS in the cultural mainstream, this distinction is, 
according to him, unrealistic. 
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Facebook is a peer-relationship-based SNS that allows users to create personal 
profiles describing their real-world selves and then establish connections with other 
users.46 
 
Boyd and Ellison hold that while most SNSs may differ in their culture, they evidence 
a common element, namely, consistency in their technological features.47 Roos48 
deduces three characteristics from Boyd and Ellison’s definition of SNSs. The user is 
able to do the following three things: create a profile; add friends or build 
relationships; and visit other users’ sites and leave private or public messages. In 
other words, it enables a user to create an online identity, to form relationships with 
other users, to be part of a community, and to interact with other users. It may 
consequently be accepted that most SNSs have the same basic features. The 
technical features of SNSs can be categorised as: basic features; and additional 
features.49  
 
The basic features include the creation of a personal profile (also known as digital 
persona or virtual identity) by the user where his or her personal information is 
stored; an inbox; and a public communication forum. The personal information 
includes the user’s name, e-mail address, gender, and date of birth.50 It is not 
compulsory for a user to provide a real name, although Facebook does recommend 
that users use their real names and users can more easily connect with old 
acquaintances when they provide their real names. The Applications (Apps) of SNSs 
allow users to interact with other users. The possibility of sharing photographs is 
another basic feature. SNSs have privacy settings which allow users to control their 
visibility to the general public. The role and function of privacy settings is dealt with in 
greater detail below. 
 
                                                            
46  Weaver & Morrison 2008 Computer 98-9.  
47  Boyd & Ellison 2008 J Comput-Mediat Commu 210; Beer 2008 J Comput-Mediat Commu 
519. Beer first disagrees with Boyd and Ellison’s proposal that researchers use the term 
‘social network sites’ in preference to ‘social networking sites’, arguing that the former is too 
broad and means too many things, and would lose the nuance that separates sites like 
YouTube from Facebook. Secondly, he argues against what he sees as Boyd and Ellison’s 
artificial segregation of online and offline life, especially with respect to social interactions and 
friends. With SNS in the mainstream, this distinction is unrealistic. 
48  Beer 2008 J Comput-Mediat Comm 519; Roos 2012 SALJ 383-5.  
49  Individual features are discussed later in the chapter. 
50  A profile is generated by completing a series of questions and filling in relevant information. 
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2.4 USES OF SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 
 
SNSs play an important role in all social strata. The 2014 South African ‘Social 
Media Landscape’ report notes that the use of SNSs has crossed the age barrier, the 
urban and rural divide, and even the relationship gap.51 The use of SNSs varies in 
nature, it is therefore not certain that these sites are merely used for entertainment.52 
The South African ‘Social Media Landscape’ highlights the intensified use of SNSs 
by South African corporations; the report indicates that 93 per cent of major brands 
use Facebook, while 79 per cent use Twitter, 58 per cent use YouTube, 46 per cent 
use LinkedIn, and 28 per cent Pinterest.53  
SNSs forge a communicative relationship between the users, third parties,54 the 
public, and the private sector. This was demonstrated, for example, by the South 
African President’s 2011 State of the Nation Address, when the President Zuma 
quoted from users’ comments on the Presidency’s Facebook page: 
Bongokuhle Miya wrote on the Presidency’s Facebook page that his hometown 
Umzimkhulu is in an appalling condition, with burst sewerage pipes everywhere, no 
drainage system and domestic animals roaming around town. He writes: If the 
Government, which is doing very well, could just pay much more attention, with a bit of 
urgency to such areas.55 
There are various reasons why people use SNSs, and these may include both 
personal and commercial purposes. However, according to Boyd and Ellison, there 
is currently no reliable information on why people use SNSs.56 Most users view these 
                                                            
51  “South Africa Social Media Landscape 2014: Executive summary” available at 
www.worldwideworx.com (date of use: 20 December 2016). 
52  Also see Williams 2013 Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal 364-5. 
53  “South Africa Social Media Landscape 2014: Executive summary”. 
54  Act 25 of 2002. Section 1 defines ‘third party’ in relation to a service provider, as meaning “a 
subscriber to the service provider’s services or any other user of the service provider’s 
services or a user of information systems” 
55  See “The State of the Nation 2011” available at www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble (date of 
use: 23 February 2011); also see Bozo & Mfeketha Skawara News (local newspaper in 
Confimvaba in the rural Transkei in the Eastern Cape) which has adopted Facebook as a 
strategy to increase readership and to encourage public participation. This is also a platform 
for diverse voices and to communicate the citizens’ needs and concerns to government.  
56  Boyd & Ellison 2008 J Comput-Mediat Comm 219. 
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sites as an informal space, where they can vent their feeling and share thoughts. In 
most cases users prefer to communicate anonymously.57  
 
Companies use SNSs to reach out to current and potential customers through 
advertising.58 SNSs also assist companies in analysing recent trends in their target 
markets. SNSs are used for ‘targeted advertising’ (also known as behavioural 
advertising), a very effective form of advertising.59 Since users provide information 
that also relates to their interests, through SNSs companies are able to direct their 
advertising to relevant persons.60 
 
Social networking sites allow users to share ideas, activities, events, and interests 
within their individual networks. Users generally share a common interest, but in 
some cases their desire is simply to meet new people. For this reason we find 
different classifications of social media (used as a general, overarching term) in 
accordance with different interests, purposes, or usage. SNSs may focus only on 
professionals or business users, for example Linkedln, Visible Path Classroom 2.0, 
Nurse Connect, SQL Monster, and Xing. Multimedia sharing interests include 
YouTube, Flickr, Picasa, Twitter and others. Social connections include Facebook, 
MySpace, Twitter, Google+ and Mxit, to mention but a few. The majority of people 
use these SNSs to communicate real-life activities such as sharing personal news, 
sharing forthcoming events that may be of interest to other users, sharing names of 
books or movies they have enjoyed, or making arrangements to meet up for 
business or socially.  
On the other hand, SNSs may be used by employers to spy on current and 
prospective employees who are users of SNSs. Others who may benefit from the 
                                                            
57  Rosenblum 2007 IEEE Security & Privacy 40. The author mentions that users post their 
opinions and live their daily lives online, but warns of the complacency which can prove 
embarrassing or even dangerous in future. This is further highlighted below in the section 
dealing with the challenges of SNS’s. 
58  See para 2.5.1.3 below. 
59  “Online behavioural advertising … describes a broad set of activities companies engage in to 
collect information about your online activity (like webpages you visit) and use it to show you 
ads or content they believe to be more relevant to you.” See “TRUSTe What is online 
behavioral advertising?” available at http://www.truste.com/consumer-privacy/about-oba/ 
(date of use: 28 August 2014). 
60  Roos 2012 SALJ 383. 
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use of SNSs include recruitment consultants, insurance companies, and the police 
who they may use SNSs for background checks or for any law-enforcement-related 
activities. 
SNSs have also played a role in recent political unrest. Protesters in countries such 
as the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Syria, and 
Bangladesh, used SNSs to mobilise marches or for other political reasons.61 As a 
result, the governments of these countries have on occasion blocked user access to 
Facebook. In early 2011 access was also blocked in Egypt as the security forces 
attempted to suppress the anti-government activists who used both Facebook and 
Twitter to mobilise and plan mass strike action.62 In this context SNSs have become 
useful platforms for citizens to assemble, demonstrate, picket, and petition,63 whilst 
they can also be used to promote freedom of association.64 These actions are 
protected as fundamental rights, for example, in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, (the Constitution). Blocking citizens’ access to SNSs can be 
seen as a curtailment of fundamental rights. 
In a democratic society SNSs can promote public participation by citizens65 and 
support freedom of expression, which is protected under section 16 of the 
Constitution.66 On the negative side, SNSs may be used as a conduit to promote 
hate speech.67 
 
                                                            
61  See www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (date of use: 10 September 2016). 
62  See http://mashable.com/2011/01/26/facebook-blocked-in-egypt (date of use: 30 August 
2016). 
63  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 17. 
64  Ibid s 18. 
65  See para 2.4 above. 
66  Constitution s 16. 
67  Marx 2011 Obiter 322-3. 
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2.5 THE FEATURES OF A SPECIFIC SNS: FACEBOOK 
2.5.1 General features 
 
In order for users to register or acquire an account on Facebook, they are required to 
have an active e-mail address. Users must agree to the SNS’s ‘terms of service’ and 
‘privacy policies’. Only once they have agreed to these terms, may they use the SNS 
and create a profile.68  
Once registered on Facebook, users are required to create a profile by supplying 
certain of their personal information. On most Facebook profiles, it is a common 
trend for users to provide their real names and information. Facebook also 
encourages their users to use real names in order to assist in providing account 
security. Whilst there is no explicit requirement to provide a facial image, the majority 
of users do provide a photo of themselves. A photo makes it easier for others 
searching the site to find a particular user; if there is more than one user with the 
same name it may be difficult to distinguish between users. Facebook allows people 
who are not yet registered to search for a user’s profile. A user’s privacy settings will 
determine how much personal information can be accessed by other users on the 
same SNS.69 Users can update their profiles regularly. Automatic notifications are 
sent to other friends when users update their profiles. This updates are reflected in a 
user’s ‘Newsfeed’ feature. 
After creating a profile, the next step is to create a network of friends by accepting or 
adding certain persons or contacts as ‘friends’. Facebook offers multiple tools for 
users to search out and add potential contacts. Depending on the user’s privacy 
settings, these friends may have access to information about that user which is not 
generally accessible to non-friends.  
A user is able to send messages to friends, either in a private message space or by 
posting a message on a message board accessible to all friends. On Facebook this 
used to be called a user’s ‘Wall’. The Wall feature is currently called ‘Timeline’ and is 
                                                            
68  Hodge 2006 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 98; also see Roos 2012 SALJ 383-4. 
69  Privacy settings are discussed below. 
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discussed in detail below. A private message may also be sent to other users without 
it being displayed publicly on the Timeline. 
Facebook also allows users to post pictures, songs, web links, and other content on 
their Timeline for invited friends to comment on. Users may join groups that share a 
particular characteristic, for example, the same interests or hobbies.70 The ‘News 
Feed’ feature of Facebook shows all the information posted by friends or groups to 
which a user’s profile is connected. The News Feed feature is a user’s homepage 
and is displayed first when a user logs on to Facebook. 
A user who registers on Facebook makes certain commitments relating to registering 
and maintaining the security of his or her account.71 Facebook encourages its users 
to provide only accurate personal information and to create an account for 
themselves only.72 
On Facebook a user is not permitted to create more than one personal profile. If 
Facebook disables a user’s account, the user cannot create another one without 
Facebook’s permission. Facebook also has certain restrictions on who may register 
as a user. It prohibits people under the age of thirteen and convicted sexual offenders 
from registering or using the site. It is not clear how Facebook verifies the information 
provided by users. The terms of use clearly list content and conduct that are not 
permitted together with the consequences of engagement in prohibited behaviour.73 
2.5.2 Privacy policy and privacy settings on Facebook  
 
Facebook allows a user to determine who may view the profile or other information 
posted by the user by changing privacy settings provided by Facebook. Facebook’s 
privacy settings have evolved over the years. Initially, when Facebook was restricted 
to university students with the same e-mail domain, the user’s profile was visible to all 
other students on the same network or e-mail domain.74 Today, a user can limit who 
may see his or her profile, and when posting information on his or her Timeline the 
                                                            
70  See www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook (date of use: 30 August 2016). 
71  www.facebook.com/terms (date of use: 10 June 2016) 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid. 
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user may further limit the visibility of the information to only certain of his or her 
friends.  
On Facebook a user must accept the data protection policy when creating a profile.75 
The terms of use and the data protection policy are on hand on the SNSs homepage; 
however, there is no guarantee that users read or understand these policies.76  
Facebook’s default settings allow for users’ profiles to be viewed only by registered 
users of the same network.77 Facebook allows its users to block their profile 
information from other users and third parties.78 Users are also able to prevent 
certain friends from seeing updates about particular types of activity, including profile 
changes, Timeline posts, and newly added friends.79 Once a user blocks someone 
completely (as opposed to only blocking them from certain information), that person 
can no longer be the user’s friend on the network or interact with the user.80 
It is, therefore, imperative that users review the SNSs’ privacy policy regularly to 
ensure they are informed of any changes. Users should also make the necessary 
changes to their individual privacy settings. With regard to data protection practices, 
Facebook states that it shall notify users before it make changes to its data 
protection policy and allow the user an opportunity to review and comment on the 
revised policy before continuing to use Facebook services.81 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
74  Roos 2012 SALJ 386-7 where the author notes that on Facebook there are three privacy 
settings for users to choose from, this allows a user to make information available to 
‘everyone’, or to ‘friends of friends’, or to ‘friends only’. 
75  See www.facebook.com/policy.php (date of use: 16 September 2016); also see Hodge 2006 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 97. 
76  See http://www.facebook.com/ (date of use: 16 September 2016). 
77  Hodge 2006 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 98; also see Zheleva & Getoor “To join 
or not to join: The illusion of privacy in social networks with mixed public and private user 
profiles” 531 available at //linqs.cs.umd.edu/basilic/web/Publications/2009/zheleva:www09/ 
(date of use: 21 September 2016). 
78  See www.facebook.com/help/?page=419#!/settings/?tab=privacy (date of use: 10 September 
2016); Rosenblum 2007 IEEE Security & Privacy 40, opines that with the Internet as a 
preferred mode of communication, users’ private lives will increasingly be lived out in the 
public domain with the loss of a reasonable expectation of privacy protection for personal 
information. 
79  See para 2.5.1.3 (a) below. 
80  See https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=timeline (date of use: 10 September 2016). 
81  See https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy (date of use: 22 September 2016).  
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2.5.3 Noteworthy features on Facebook 
2.5.3.1 Timeline and News Feed  
The Timeline feature was introduced in 201182 to replace the Wall feature. The 
Timeline gives a user space for all the stories they wish to share. Users may post 
updates or share content with their friends on their Timeline. This is then displayed 
on the Timeline, but also in their friends’ News Feeds. In the CMC Woodworking 
case,83 Steyn J opined that “wall postings are basically public conversations”.  
 
Users may, however, restrict access to their Timelines to some extent. They may 
classify their contacts by using their privacy settings to determine who may see 
messages or content that appears on the Timeline.84 It is also possible for a user to 
allow access to messages or content on the Timeline only to family, or close friends 
(who will include family), or all friends (who will include the previous two groupings), 
or friends but not acquaintances, or acquaintances, or specific groups, or the public.  
 
A notification will automatically be sent to the user’s friends if he or she updates 
information on the Timeline. This notification message is sent through the News 
Feed feature. Facebook introduced the News Feed feature in 2006; it appears on 
every user's homepage and highlights activities and other information on a user’s 
profile, for example, any profile changes made, upcoming events that are listed, and 
birthdays of the user's friends.85 Unless a user has changed the default privacy 
settings, the News Feed feature on Facebook displays every action a user makes on 
his or her site to their friends –  for example, it will inform them of who the user has 
accepted as a new friend, or if a user has updated his or her status. This normally 
prompts other users to view that user’s profile and possibly to add comments on their 
status. The introduction of the News Feed feature generated an uproar over its 
privacy implications,86 as this feature notifies the users’ friends of all recent activities. 
                                                            
82  Ibid. 
83  2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD); [2012] 4 All SA 195 (KZD). 
84  Roos 2012 SALJ 386-7 notes that the privacy settings, including the visibility of the ‘Wall’ 
feature have evolved over the years; also see Grimmelmann Saving Facebook 1150. 
85  Mann 2008 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 4; also see Rosenblum 
2007 IEEE Security & Privacy 44. 
86  Grimmelmann 2009 Iowa Law Review 1146. 
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Users are able to control who can see their News Feed, however, by clicking on the 
relevant tabs on the privacy settings. 
The Timeline and News Feed features allow a user to be kept informed of what is 
happening in the lives of his or her friends. It is no longer necessary to phone or talk 
to a friend in person to remain up to date on his or her life. 
2.5.3.2 ‘Social plugins’ on Facebook 
Another Facebook feature is ‘social plugins’.87 Social plugins result in the integration 
of other websites with Facebook. The main social plugins are: the ‘Like’ button (once 
clicked a user publicly shares and connects with content from within Facebook or 
other Websites that a user finds interesting); the ‘Send’ button (this may be used to 
share a link and an optional note as a private Facebook message, Facebook group 
post, or e-mail); the ‘Comment’ box (this may be used to comment publicly on 
Facebook or another Website using a Facebook account); and ‘Recommendations’ 
(which informs a user of the most liked content among their friends on a site).88  
                                                            
87  ‘Social plugins’ are tools that other websites can use to provide people with personalised and 
social experiences. See https://www.facebook.com/help/103828869708800 (date of use: 10 
August 2016). 
88  Ibid. 
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2.5.3.3 ‘Tagging’ on Facebook 
Facebook has an application or feature that allows a user to ‘tag’ a photograph of 
another user or non-user.89 Tagging implies that the user associates a name of 
another person with someone in the photograph. If a user uploads and tags a 
photograph, it documents what a particular user or non-user looks like, and may also 
document the place where the person has been. Grimmelmann points out that the 
tagging application also reveals certain personal information about the tagger, such 
as that the tagger knows the person being tagged on the photograph, which might be 
a user or non-user, and a reasonable inference can be drawn that the tagger was the 
photographer.90  
Facebook allows users to choose tagging settings. They may choose to review tags 
people have added to their post before the tags appear on Facebook. The tagging 
feature is not without limits. Users have control over their tagged photographs, for 
example, on Facebook a user who has been tagged against his or her will has two 
options. Firstly, he or she may choose to ‘untag’ the tagged image. Secondly, a user 
may send a request to Facebook that the photographs be removed. A user can also 
control who may see the photographs and videos tagged on his or her profile by 
means of the privacy settings.91 A non-user is not able to send such a request to 
Facebook. 
When Facebook users add photographs to their pages, facial-recognition software is 
used by Facebook to suggest names for the people in the photographs (this is 
referred to as the ‘tag-suggestion’ feature). This software compares the photographs 
with other photographs previously uploaded in which the same people have already 
been identified. 
 
                                                            
89  Grimmelmann 2009 Iowa Law Review 1146, the tags can be place on a particular area of the 
photograph; the tag creates a hyperlink to the profile of the user tagged. If the person in a 
photograph is not a Facebook user, the tag will not create a hyperlink but show plain text with 
the person’s name. 
90  Ibid 1146, 1150. 
91  See www.facebook.com/about/privacy (date of use: 22 September 2016), a user may put 
settings to receive any notifications regarding the tagging of a user’s photograph either tagged 
by anyone or only photographs tagged by close acquaintances.  
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2.6 SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter I have provided an historical background of the development of SNSs. 
The concept Web 2.0 is explained and it is shown how Web 2.0 contributed to the 
development of SNSs. I have also provided some definitions of SNSs and explained 
how academics have analysed the elements of SNSs. I further described selected 
SNSs and the different types of SNS. Thereafter I considered some of the features of 
SNSs; these may differ depending on particular SNSs and may also be determined 
by the target group of the SNSs. 
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Chapter 3 
Privacy and identity: A South African perspective 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter gave an overview of the development, nature, and use of 
SNSs. In this chapter I focus on specific personality rights that may be infringed 
through the use of SNSs.  
Personality rights are, first of all, protected under the law of delict. The intentional, 
wrongful infringement of a personality right results in an iniuria. A person1 may sue 
for infringement of a personality right using a delictual remedy – the actio iniuriarum 
– which protects injury to the corpus (bodily integrity), fama (good name or 
reputation), and dignitas (all personality interests apart from the corpus or fama).  
This discussion focuses specifically on the right to privacy and identity, since it is 
argued that it is these two rights which are affected when users share or 
communicate information, either about themselves or others, on SNSs.2 These two 
rights form part of the wider concept of dignitas. In this chapter I seek to determine 
whether South African law provides adequate protection to the interests that form the 
object of these personality rights and to highlight certain shortcomings – particularly 
in the context of SNSs.  
Privacy is also protected by section 14 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, and 
identity is indirectly protected by section 10 of the Bill of Rights as part of the right to 
human dignity.3 Although the focus of this dissertation is on private law, the influence 
of the Constitution on these concepts cannot be ignored, and I therefore briefly 
consider their meaning under the Constitution. Sections 10 and 14, however, do not 
                                                            
1  This includes a natural person and juristic person, see par 3.4 for a discussion of juristic 
persons and personality rights. 
2  The right to a good name (fama) is also often implicated, but will is not a focus in this 
dissertation. 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (the Constitution) s 10; Neethling, Potgieter 
& Visser Law of Personality 76; Burchell Delict 14. 
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aim to provide litigants a basis on which to litigate for compensation. Case law 
involving the constitutional right to privacy, for example, has focussed primarily on 
the validity of laws.4 In NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus 
Curiae),5 the plaintiffs approached the Constitutional Court “with a view to vindicate 
their constitutional rights to privacy, dignity and psychological integrity” which, they 
alleged, had been violated by the respondents. The plaintiffs’ claim was based on 
the actio iniuriarum, but the Constitutional Court decided that the dispute was worthy 
of constitutional adjudication in that it involved “a nuanced and sensitive approach to 
balancing the interests of the media, in advocating freedom of expression, privacy 
and dignity of the applicants irrespective of whether it is based on the constitutional 
law or the common law”.6 Although the plaintiffs claim was to be dealt with under the 
actio iniuriarum, “the precepts of the Constitution must inform the application of the 
common law.” 7 
 
In this chapter I also explore the recognition and protection of these personality 
rights in case law. I approach an analysis of the case law irrespective of whether or 
not the actio iniuriarum and other applicable remedies are capable of fully protecting 
a person’s dignitas on SNSs. Further, I focus on the procedural aspects which 
dictate who may institute an action and who may be held liable for the infringement 
of personality rights on SNSs. Privacy is also recognised and protected in several 
pieces of legislation, and these are considered briefly in so far as they are relevant to 
SNSs.8 
 
                                                            
4  Loubser et al Law of Delict 322. The right to identity has as yet not been considered from a 
constitutional perspective. 
5   NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) paras 
98 - 99, 182. 
6   Ibid para 31. 
7   Ibid para 28. 
8  Examples of laws in which a person’s right to privacy is recognised and protected are: the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000; the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communications-Related Information Act 70 of 2002; the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 the National Health Act 61 of 
2003; the National Credit Act 34 of 2005; the Children’s Act 38 of 200; the Protected 
Disclosures Act 26 of 2000; Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011; and the Protection of 
Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
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3.2  THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
3.2.1 Development and recognition 
3.2.1.1  Common law 
The origin of the right to privacy in South African law can be traced back to Roman 
law, Roman-Dutch law, and case law. In Roman law, the homeowner was granted 
the actio iniuriarum if his peace was disturbed, or if someone came into his house 
without permission.9 Publication of confidential information, for example, the reading 
of the will of a testator by the depositarius, could also result in an action under the 
actio inuriarium.10 Roman-Dutch law took over the iniuira concept from Roman law 
and also protected the privacy of a person under the dignitas concept.11 As I have 
indicated, dignitas is a collective term for all personality rights, apart from the right to 
a good name (fama) and the right to bodily integrity (corpus).12 
Initially, South African law protected the right to privacy under the wider concept of 
dignitas.13 However, case law later recognised that the common-law right to privacy 
is an independent personality right within the wider concept of dignitas.14 Privacy, 
being a personality interest, is of a non-patrimonial nature. It has already been 
mentioned that an infringement of the right to privacy is considered a delict in the 
form of an iniuria and is actionable in terms of the actio iniuriarum. 
The recognition of the right to privacy in South African law can be traced back to the 
1950s and the case of O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd.15 According 
                                                            
9   Van der Merwe & Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad  448-9.  
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 50.  
13  Ibid. See also R v Holliday 1927 CPD 395; S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T). 
14   Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T); Universiteit 
van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 441 (A) 455H-456H; National 
Media v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A); Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA para 68. Neethling 
“Personality infringement” in Joubert & Faris 1999 LAWSA para 431; Neethling, Potgieter & 
Visser Law of Personality 217; Burchell 2009 EJ Comp L 3, who holds that the argument in 
favour of recognising privacy as an independent right really only acquires significance when 
the concept of impairment of dignity is given a narrow focus linked to insulting behaviour.  
15  1954 (3) SA 224 (C). The decision demonstrates the influence of US legal jurisprudence with 
regard to the concept of privacy in SA law. A proper analysis of the case reveals that the 
personality right infringed as actually the right to identity (particularly the appropriation of a 
person’s identity) and not privacy, as was decided with reference to US legal jurisprudence. 
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to Neethling, O’Keeffe is the locus classicus for the recognition of an independent 
right to privacy in South African case law.16 In this case, the Cape Argus newspaper 
(the defendant) published an advertisement for guns that contained a photograph of 
the plaintiff. The photograph was published without the plaintiff’s consent.17 The 
plaintiff alleged that such a publication constituted an intentional infringement of her 
right to personal privacy, that it was an unjustified aggression upon her dignity, and 
that she was, in fact, much aggrieved and humiliated as a result.18 The court held 
that the unauthorised publication of a person’s photograph and name for advertising 
purposes is capable of “constituting an aggression upon that person’s dignitas”.19 
3.2.1.2  Constitutional law 
As I have pointed out, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa20 also 
recognises the right to privacy in the Bill of Rights. Section 14 provides as follows:  
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have  
a. their person or home searched;  
b. their property searched;  
c. their possessions seized; or  
d. the privacy of their communications infringed.  
The constitutional right to privacy is seen as “part of a web of mutually supporting 
rights” promoting human dignity and social transformation.21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Watermeyer AJ (245), with reference to the American Restatement of Law, Torts s 867, 
stated that in the US legal system, the principle of privacy was well established and 
actionable. See Neethling “Personality infringement” in Joubert & Faris 1999 LAWSA para 
339; see also  Roos 2012 SALJ 376; Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 56 
(June 2011). 
16  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 217. See also Universiteit van Pretoria v 
Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T); National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) 
SA 262 (A); 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC).  
17  1954 (3) SA 224 (C) 246D-247B. The photograph had been taken by the first defendant's 
employee with the plaintiff’s consent, but only for the purpose of illustrating an article to be 
printed in the news column of the first defendant's newspaper. 
18  Ibid. Watermeyer AJ (246, 248) correctly rejected the idea that contumelia or insult is the 
essence of an iniuria.  
19  Ibid.  
20  Constitution s 14.  
21  Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 27; Jordan v State 2002 (6) 
SA 642 (CC) para 81. 
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3.2.2  Definition and content of the right to privacy 
3.2.2.1 Common law 
Privacy is not a stagnant concept which means that its definition may change over 
time. Its meaning and content are also influenced by the particular jurisdiction and 
cultural background involved. Therefore, the concept of privacy is not an easy one to 
define.22 In South African common law, Neethling’s definition of privacy has been 
accepted by the courts.23 Neethling24 defines privacy as 
an individual condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity. 
This condition embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has 
himself determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of 
which he has the will that they be kept private.  
 
In other words, “privacy consists of the sum total of information or facts that relate to 
the individual in his or her state of withdrawal from publicity, which facts are excluded 
from the knowledge of outsiders.” 25 It is important to take note of the fact that a 
person’s privacy only encompasses personal information that is truthful.26 
 
In National Media Ltd v Jooste,27 Harms J interpreted Neethling’s concept of privacy. 
He held that this definition should not be interpreted to mean that the boundary of the 
individual's right to privacy is determined solely by that individual's wishes or will, 
because that is not what Neethling intended.28 He pointed out that the boundary of a 
right or its infringement remains an objective question. All that this means is that 
“absent a will to keep a fact private, absent an interest (or a right) that can be 
protected”.29 The right to privacy encompasses, according to Harms J, “the 
                                                            
22   Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) paras 65, 73; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of 
Personality 30. 
23  Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) 384; 
National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271; Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 
(CC) 789; Swanepoel v Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 4 SA 549 (T) 533; Greeff v 
Protection 4U h/a Protect International 2012 (6) SA 393 (GNP) para 406.  
24   Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 32. See also Rautenbach 2001 TSAR 116. . 
25   Roos Data (Privacy) Protection 555-6.  
26  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 37; De Antrade “The right to privacy” 34.  
27   National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271. 
28   Ibid. 
29  Ibid. Roos Data (Privacy) Protection 556 agrees that “the individual himself or herself 
determines which information is private, couples with the will or desire to keep the particular 
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competence to determine the destiny of private facts.”30 It also means that “the 
individual concerned is entitled to dictate the ambit of disclosure, for example a circle 
of friends, a professional adviser or the public.”31 The individual may also prescribe 
the purpose and method of the disclosure, and may decide when and under what 
conditions private facts may be made public. 32 
In a similar vein, Roos 33 emphasises that the essence of an individual’s interest in 
privacy is his or her power of self-determination over the scope of the information to 
be excluded from the knowledge of others. She argues that a person’s right to 
privacy entails that he or she should have control over his or her personal 
information.34 
Although a person may determine the scope of the information that should be 
excluded from others, the boundary of the right to privacy, and whether or not it has 
been infringed, remains an objective one, as pointed out by Harms J in National 
Media Ltd v Jooste.35 In other words, in terms of South African delictual principles, a 
right to privacy exists where a person’s subjective determination of the extent of his 
or her privacy is recognised by the boni mores (legal convictions of the community) 
as reasonable.36 
 
3.2.2.2 Constitutional law 
The constitutional right to privacy has a broader content than that of the common 
law.37 It protects the right of individuals to decide who may enter their homes, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
facts private. If the will to keep facts private (privaathoudingswil) is lacking, the individual’s 
interest in privacy is also lacking”. 
30   Ibid. 
31   Ibid. 
32   Ibid.  
33   Roos 2007 SALJ 400. 
34   Ibid. 
35   National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271. 
36   Ibid. See also Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 31 n 328, who point out that in 
other instances “the individual’s right of privacy cannot (always) be fixed with reference to [an 
individual’s] own determination” for example, “when the privacy of an insane or unconscious 
person or a young child has to be considered”; see also Roos Data (Privacy) Protection 575-
79. 
37  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 220. 
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protects them against unauthorised intrusions;38 it also protects personal autonomy 
to make decisions about family relationships and private life;39 and limits the ability of 
the state and other persons to gain access to personal information of others and to 
use and disclose such information (so-called ‘informational privacy’).40 Section 14 of 
the Constitution also places an obligation upon the state to enact legislation which 
directly protects the privacy of personal information.41 The interpretation given to 
(constitutional) informational privacy can inform the discussion on the protection of 
privacy of individuals when using SNSs.  
 
In NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae),42 the 
Constitutional Court defined ‘private facts’ as “those matters the disclosure of which 
will cause mental distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and 
intelligence in the same circumstances and in respect of which there is a will to keep 
them private”.43 The court held that the disclosure of a patient’s HIV status in the 
biography of a well-known politician breached the patient’s right to privacy. The fact 
that this information had previously been published in an official document (the 
Strauss Report) did not mean that the sensitive medical information should become 
part of the public domain. The court said the following44  
[t]the assumption that others are allowed access to private medical information once it 
has left the hands of authorised physicians and other personnel involved in the 
facilitation of medical care is fundamentally flawed. It fails to take into account an 
individual’s desire to control information about him or herself and to keep it confidential 
from others. 
 
In terms of the constitutional right to privacy, a person also has the ability to decide 
what information he or she wishes to disclose to the public, provided that the 
                                                            
38  S v Madiba 1988 (1) SA BCLR 38 (D); Loubser et al Law of Delict 334. 
39  Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR (CC). 
40  Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 
292 (T); Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 
1127 (CC). 
41  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 272. 
42   NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC).  
43   Ibid para 34. 
44   Ibid para 44.  
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person’s expectation that such a decision will be respected, is reasonable.45 In other 
words, the right extends to those aspects of a person’s life with regard to which he or 
she has “a legitimate expectation of privacy”.46   
 
In Bernstein v Bester47 Ackermann J explained the scope of the constitutional right to 
privacy as follows: 
The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to 
another citizen. In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner 
sanctum of a person, such as his or her family life, sexual preference and home 
environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This 
implies that community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding 
obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards 
identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged in the truly 
personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as 
business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly. 
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd,48 Langa DP indicated that one should not interpret Ackermann 
J’s statement to mean that a person does not have a right to privacy when he or she 
interacts in a social capacity with others. People retain a right to privacy even when 
they are in their offices or on mobile telephones. According to the court: 
Wherever a person has the ability to decide what he or she wishes to disclose to the 
public and the expectation that such a decision will be respected is reasonable, the 
right to privacy will come into play.49  
Privacy should be seen as existing in a continuum where the ‘inner sanctum’ of a 
person’s life is more rigorously protected than when he or she is moving outside the 
inner core of privacy to the outer fringes of the right, 50 for example, when he or she 
is interacting with other people in a social setting. 
                                                            
45   Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 
2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) 557. 
46   Bernstein v Bester  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 789.  
47  Ibid para 67. 
48  2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) 557. 
49  Ibid. 
50  De Vos & Freedman Constitutional Law 463.  
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A number of factors are considered in distinguishing the core of privacy from its 
penumbra, such as the nature of the relationship that is invaded, 51 or whether it is a 
natural or a juristic person whose right to privacy is involved. 52  
The applicability of personality rights in the context of SNSs is discussed below.53 
 
3.2.3  Infringement of privacy 
3.2.3.1 Common law 
(a) Introduction 
As previously stated, the right to privacy will be protected when a person has a 
subjective expectation of privacy which society considers objectively reasonable. 
The plaintiff, who alleges that his or her personality has been infringed, bears the 
onus of proving the infringement.54 In order to succeed with the actio iniuriarum, 
there must have been a factual infringement of privacy which is considered to be 
wrongful by the boni mores, and there must have been fault in the form of intention 
(animus iniuriandi). 
A person’s privacy may be infringed in different ways or through different acts. 
Privacy is factually infringed when outsiders become aware of true personal facts 
about the individual against his or her will.55 An infringement can take place in one of 
two ways: either by an act of intrusion; or by an act of disclosure.56 While intrusion 
                                                            
51  If the relationship that is invaded is one between parent and child or intimate partners, it is a 
strong indication that the inner sanctum of privacy has been violated - De Vos & Freedman 
Constitutional Law 463. 
52  Although juristic persons also have a right to privacy, their privacy rights are considered to be 
less intense than those of individuals - Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences 
v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd  2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) para 18; De Vos & Freedman 
Constitutional Law 463. 
53  See para 3.4 below. 
54  Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC).  
55  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 37. See also Loubser et al Law of Delict 326. 
56  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 221. See also Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd and 
Others v Sage Holdings Ltd and Another 1993 (2) SA 451 (A); Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 
751 (CC) para 68.  
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denotes that the third party obtained this knowledge him- or herself, an act of 
disclosure occurs when somebody else reveals the information to the third party. 57 
Examples of privacy infringement by means of intrusion are: gaining entry to a 
private residence; 58 reading private documents; listening to private conversations; 
shadowing a person;59 searching a person or his or her possessions; and conducting 
unauthorised medical examinations.60 More relevant examples for this study, include 
reading someone’s private e-mail, or hacking into another person’s social network 
profile.61 
Examples of privacy infringement through disclosure are the disclosure of private 
facts which have been acquired by a wrongful act of intrusion,62 and the disclosure of 
private facts in violation of a confidential relationship.63 One example of this is when 
a user (wrongdoer) gains unauthorised access to another’s (plaintiff) social network 
profile and obtains private facts which have already been shared with a limited 
number of people (friends of the user on the SNS), and thereafter makes such facts 
publicly available. Another example of the disclosure of private facts contrary to a 
confidential relationship, would be if a doctor, having diagnosed a patient, were to 
post details on an SNS or send a private message to a third party regarding the 
diagnosis. 
                                                            
57  Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A).  
58  S v A 1971 (2) SA 293 (T). 
59  Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 65. 
60  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 222-4; McQuoid-Mason Law of Privacy 67-8. 
In Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya 2008 (6) SA 102 (W) para 26, Jajbhay J held that the 
medical records of a person are private and confidential. Accessing the information in an 
unauthorised manner therefore amounts to a wrongful act of intrusion which infringes upon 
the patient’s right to privacy. 
61  ‘Hacking into an account’ means that a person has gained unauthorised access to the 
account by exploiting a weakness in the computer system or computer network. 
62  This normally happens when the media publishes documents that were acquired in a 
wrongful, intrusive manner. 
63  Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para 68. See also Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 
(4) SA 842 (A); Financial Mail v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A); Janit v Motor 
Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 293 (AD). See further Neethling, Potgieter 
& Visser Law of Personality 226 ff; McQuoid-Mason Law of Privacy 129 ff. 
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(b) Wrongfulness 
An act of intrusion or disclosure constitutes a wrongful violation of privacy only if the 
acquaintance with private facts is both contrary to the subjective determination and 
will of the prejudiced party, and, viewed objectively, is unreasonable or contrary to 
the legal views of the community64 – that is, if it is contra bonos mores. The legal 
convictions of society (boni mores) are determined by what would be deemed 
reasonable or unreasonable. The legal convictions of the community are influenced 
by the Constitution and its values.65 They can also be determined or influenced by 
legislation.66 The boni mores is an objective test based on the criterion of 
reasonableness. Currie and De Waal explain that a person’s privacy expectations 
must be reasonable in order to qualify for protection.67 According to Loubser and 
Midgley,68 the invasion of privacy would be wrongful if the court is satisfied that the 
invasion was such as to attract liability: 
In accordance with general principle, courts used the criterion of reasonableness, or 
the boni mores or legal convictions of the community to determine whether they should 
                                                            
64  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 221. 
65  Constitution Ch 1; see also Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 76.  
66  McQuiod-Mason 2000 Acta Juridica 232; see also Smith v Partners in Sexual Health (Non-
profit) 32 IJL 1470 (CCMA). This was a labour matter, which led to the dismissal of an 
employee (the Company’s Administrator). During the inception of the organisation’s operation, 
the organisation did not have its own Microsoft Outlook domain e-mail account and thus relied 
on Google’s e-mail account (Gmail). They conducted their business communications through 
a Gmail account, which was frequently managed by the organisation’s administrator. 
However, the management of the organisation still had full access to this Gmail account. The 
employer accessed the employee’s private Gmail account allegedly by accident, since the 
employee was on leave at the time and had not logged off from her private Gmail account. 
The company also owned a Gmail account before acquiring its own Microsoft Outlook 
domain, and the organisation’s Gmail was also managed by the employee. Subsequently, the 
employer discovered confidential information about internal matters in the employer’s e-mails. 
The e-mails were later used as evidence in the employee’s dismissal. Bennett C found that 
the e-mails were discovered in a manner which contravened the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002. 
Chapter 2 of the Act provides for the prohibition of interception of communications and 
exceptions. Section 2 provides that “subject to the Act, no person may intentionally intercept 
or attempt to intercept, or authorise or procure any other person to intercept or attempt to 
intercept, at any place in the Republic, any communication in the course of its occurrence or 
transmission”. The Commissioner concluded that the action of the employer was in 
contravention of the provisions of Act 70 of 2002 and that the acquisition of the e-mail 
constituted a wrongful intrusion, and therefore infringed upon the constitutional right to 
privacy. Although this case has persuasive authority only, the facts are interesting and fit with 
the privacy threats addressed in this study. This case also demonstrates how other laws may 
be invoked to protect the constitutional right to privacy.  
67  Currie & de Waal Bill of Rights 318. 
68  Loubser et al Law of Delict 328.  
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recognise a claim. Factors that courts consider include whether society would protect 
confidentiality in the situation, for example, a doctor-patient relationship, or boardroom 
deliberations, whether a public value or constitutional right such as freedom of 
expression is involved, or whether the information disclosed is of public concern. 
Let us consider the following scenario: X, whilst walking in a park, notices Y who has 
collapsed due to an epileptic seizure. X searches Y’s handbag to establish her 
identity and obtain contact information. During the search, he also discovers an 
embarrassing detail about Y, which X considers to be a private fact. Although it is 
certain that there was a factual intrusion into her privacy, such an intrusion will not be 
wrongful unless X discloses this private fact to a third party. In this scenario, Y has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the contents of her handbag. On the 
other hand, when X’s act of intrusion is tested against the boni mores, it is clear that 
in this instance, X’s conduct will be considered reasonable. In the same vein, an 
American author, Parent, 69 opines that an adequate conception of privacy must not 
allow for the possibility that a person’s privacy should be considered to have been 
violated when another person has simply observed that person openly engaging in 
public activities. The case of De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions further 
illustrates the fact that an intrusion into the inner sanctum of the home is not prima 
facie wrongful in itself.70  
In the context of SNSs, in order for users to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with regard to their social network profiles or communications, they must 
select the necessary privacy settings. A user is able to control the ‘visibility’ or level 
of privacy of his or her social network profile and communications.71 Therefore, 
selecting the correct privacy settings is indicative of a subjective choice to limit 
access by outsiders to one’s private information and communications. This may also 
limit the possibility of an intrusion into the user’s social network profile, but does not 
guarantee that there will be no such intrusions. 
                                                            
69  Parent 1983 American Philosophy Quarterly 344. 
70  In De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division, and Others 
2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) para 90, the court held that although possession and consumption of 
child pornography often takes place in the inner sanctum of the home, the fact should not be 
overlooked that many of the resultant acts of abuse against children take place in private. In 
other words, where the reasonable risk of harm to children is likely to occur in private, some 
intrusion by the law into the private domain is justified.  
71  Roos 2012 SALJ 386-7. 
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Neethling points out that whether or not an intrusion or a disclosure will, once 
objectively considered, be wrongful, depends on the particular circumstances. 72 This 
view is also accepted in South African case law.73 It should be noted that it is not 
required that the plaintiff should have felt insulted or humiliated by the infringement 
before a person can be held liable for the infringement of privacy.74  
In the case of infringement of privacy by means of an intrusion or knowledge of 
private facts, Neethling distinguishes between two scenarios. In the first scenario, 
the private facts that the person accessed were considered confidential and were 
only available to a limited number of people. On Facebook, this would be the case if 
the Facebook user has restricted access to his or her profile to a particular group of 
users by limiting the number of friends accepted, and by ensuring that proper privacy 
settings have been selected. In such a scenario, an intrusion by a party not included 
in the close circle of friends will be considered contra bonos mores and thus 
wrongful.75  Roos76 argues that the law should recognise that 
people who use SNSs such as Facebook do not give up all expectations of privacy. 
The mere fact that they reveal personal information on what may be considered a 
public forum does not mean that they intend to make that information available to all 
and sundry. Information revealed to “friends only” should be treated as information that 
has been published to a limited number of persons and any distribution of that 
information by third parties to a wider audience should be considered an invasion of the 
right to privacy. 
In the second scenario, the personal facts are available to an indeterminate number 
of persons. In the Facebook context, this will be the case if the user has not used the 
privacy settings, or has accepted hundreds of people as friends, who then have 
access to his or her complete profile. In this scenario, an intrusion by an outsider will 
usually not be considered wrongful.77 The surrounding circumstances may, however, 
                                                            
72  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 221 ff. 
73  See Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 462; Jansen van 
Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) 850; National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 
270; O’Keffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 248. 
74  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 33, correctly state that “an infringement of 
dignity or insult plays no role in deciding whether there has been a violation of privacy”. 
75  Ibid 222. An interesting decision by the CCMA can be found in Smith v Partners in Sexual 
Health (Non-profit) (2011) 32 IJL 1470 (CCMA). Although this case has persuasive authority 
only, the facts are interesting and are relevant to the privacy threats addressed in this study, 
see discussion in n 66 above. 
76  Roos 2012 SALJ 401. 
77  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 225. 
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in particular cases indicate that the intrusion is wrongful. The electronic shadowing of 
a person serves as an example in this regard. In the ‘real world’,78 constantly 
following a person and keeping track of his or her movements is considered 
unlawful.79 It is suggested that when a person uses Facebook to shadow another 
person digitally, and so causes that person distress or a feeling of harassment, the 
conduct should be considered wrongful, even if the Facebook user has not used the 
privacy settings to limit his or her visibility.80  
In the case of infringement of privacy by means of disclosure, Neethling81 
distinguishes between three instances in which disclosure or revelation of private 
facts may occur: disclosure of private facts acquired through wrongful intrusion; 
disclosure of private facts acquired through a confidential relationship (contrary to 
the confidential relationship); and mass publication of private facts. 
In the first scenario, the private facts disclosed are acquired through a wrongful 
intrusion. Disclosure of such facts will, as a general rule, be wrongful and constitute 
an infringement of privacy.82 In the case of Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya, it was 
held that “where a person acquires knowledge of private facts through a wrongful act 
of intrusion, any disclosure of such facts by such person or by any person, in 
principle, constitutes an infringement of the right to privacy”. 83 
                                                            
78  ‘Real world’ is used because that is how people often refer to the world away from one’s 
keyboard. However, activities in the ‘cyberworld’ also have real life implications. 
79  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 225. The ‘shadower’ may, of course, have a 
legitimate reason for following the other person, such as a policeman following a suspect. 
Such conduct is not unlawful.  
80  The Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 affords victims of harassment an effective 
remedy against stalking (which is included in the broader definition of harassment); Roos 
2012 SALJ 399; also noteworthy is the Florida Statute, Ch 2003-23, amended by s 784.048, 
which includes cyberstalking as one of the recognised methods of stalking prohibited by 
Florida law. The statute defines cyberstalking as “the act of engaging in a course of conduct 
to communicate or cause to be communicated words, images or language through the use of 
electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial 
emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose”. A law enforcement 
officer has the power to arrest, without a warrant, any person that he or she has probable 
cause to believe has committed an act of cyberstalking. 
81  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 226-36. 
82  Financial Mail v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A); Janit v Motor Industry Fund 
Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 293 (AD); Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya 2008 (6) SA 
102 (W) para 26. 
83  2008 (6) SA 102 (W). 
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In the second scenario, the private facts are disclosed contrary to a confidential 
relationship. This often happens in a specific type of relationship, whereby a 
professional renders a service to a client, for example, a doctor-patient84 or attorney-
client relationship. Many of these relationships are governed by professional rules of 
conduct and ethical behaviour.85 
Neethling suggests that if the private facts are disclosed to only a few persons, the 
conduct is not wrongful, because people tend to gossip and the disclosure is, 
therefore, part of human nature.86 This means that trivial cases may not warrant legal 
recourse. However, should the private facts be published widely, for instance in the 
media, the publication would be considered unlawful. 87  
In the third scenario, private facts are disclosed through mass publication. Neethling 
argues that such publication is, as a general rule, always unlawful, provided that the 
information was intended to be accessible only to specific persons.88 In the 
Facebook context, this is the scenario in which a Facebook user limits the number of 
friends who are allowed to see his or her profile, and utilises the privacy settings to 
limit their visibility. If the privacy settings are breached and the information is made 
available to anyone on Facebook, such publication is unlawful and, in the absence of 
a ground of justification, constitutes an infringement of privacy.89  
If a person (A) publishes private information about another person (B) on his or her 
(A’s) Facebook page, the privacy of the other person (B) is, of course, also infringed. 
                                                            
84  Jansen Van Vuuren and another NNO v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A). 
85  General Council of the Bar or South Africa Uniform Rules of Professional Conduct highlight 
the professional ethics that are expected from a counsel. For instance, Rule 4.18.3 (f) states 
the following: “It is undesirable for a member to express an opinion in the press, by letter, 
article, interview or otherwise, on any matter which is still pending in the Courts. 
Notwithstanding the aforegoing, a member may express an opinion in the media, in general 
terms, on an issue which is still pending, provided that the member does not thereby purport 
to pre-judge the result.” 
86  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 227. 
87  NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). The 
applicants in this matter were three HIV-positive women who claimed that the respondents 
had violated their rights to privacy and dignity by publishing their names and HIV status in an 
autobiography; see also National Media Ltd and Another v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A). 
88  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 231. O’Keffe v Argus Printing and Publishing 
Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C); Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461 (W); 
Mhlongo v Bailey 1958 (1) SA 370 (W); Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan 
1975 (1) SA 590 (RA); Le Grange v Schoeman 1980 (1) SA 885 (E); National Media Ltd v 
Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A); see also Jooste v National Media Ltd 1994 (2) SA 634 (C). 
89  Neethling 2014 LitNet Akademies 40.  
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In Dutch Reformed Church v Rayan Sooknunan90 defamatory allegations were 
published by the defendant about the plaintiff on the defendant’s Facebook page. 
The plaintiff’s personal email address was also published on the webpage. Satchwell 
J91 considered this 
a gross invasion of privacy to furnish an individual’s personal contact details on a public 
forum such as his Facebook wall. It exposes the recipient to unsolicited and unwanted 
messages. It interferes with the recipient’s normal communications to others. It is 
private information which only [the plaintiff and his lawyer] have the right to impart or 
make public. 
It may sometimes be uncertain who should be considered responsible for the 
publication of the information on a Facebook webpage. In Sooknunan a Facebook 
page was created under the name ‘Glory Devine World Ministries’ (GDWM). 
Sooknunan was trading as GDWM. He denied, however, that he was the creator of 
the webpage, although several things pointed to the fact that the website was 
created to promote the viewpoint of GDWM, and Sooknunan himself also posted 
information on the site under his own name. The court found that GDWM’s denial of 
responsibility or control over the website was not credible. The court held that 
Sooknunan was personally the owner of the Facebook page and he was held 
responsible for the publications made by other anonymous users of the site. 
Sathcwell J held:92 
Sooknunan has created and made available this notice board in a public passage… He 
has made available the opportunity for such unlawful content and is, in effect, the 
publisher thereof – much as a newspaper takes responsibility for the content of its 
pages. 
A prima facie wrongful infringement of privacy can, of course, be justified by the 
presence of a ground of justification resulting in the conduct not being considered 
wrongful. These grounds of justification will be discussed after the discussion of the 
right to identity, as the grounds of justification for infringements of privacy and 
identity may overlap. 
 
                                                            
90  2012 (6) SA 201 (GSJ). 
91  Ibid para 78. 
92  Ibid para 49. 
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(c) Fault (animus iniuriandi) 
In order to be held liable for an infringement of privacy, the intruder must have acted 
with fault, usually in the form of intent.93 Once wrongfulness has been proved, 
intention or animus iniuriandi (intention to injure) is immediately presumed.94 The 
defendant will then bear the onus of rebutting this presumption. The requirement of 
intention means that the wrongdoer must have directed his or her will to achieving 
the specific result (infringement of the privacy of the plaintiff), and furthermore, that 
he or she must have been conscious of the wrongfulness of the intended result (that 
is, conscious of the wrongfulness of his or her infringement of another’s privacy).  
The absence of consciousness of wrongfulness on the part of the wrongdoer, 
excludes his or her fault. In Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger,95 the absence of 
consciousness of wrongfulness was successfully pleaded as a defence. Other 
factors which may result in the absence of an intention to injure due to the absence 
of consciousness of wrongfulness, include insanity and intoxication on the part of the 
defendant.96 
In the case of defamation, an exception is made for cases involving defamation by 
the media, in that fault in the form of negligence is sufficient to establish liability on 
the part of media defendants.97 Before the decision of National Media v Bogoshi,98 
the mass media could be held strictly liable for defamation. In Bogoshi, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal rejected the strict liability of the mass media on the ground that such 
an approach was incompatible with freedom of expression. The court created a rule 
based on the objective reasonableness of the publication to replace the rule of strict 
liability.99  
According to Loubser and Midgley, there are signs that in future negligence may also 
suffice in privacy cases involving media defendants. They refer to the minority 
                                                            
93  It seems as if there are Constitutional Court justices who are open to the idea of requiring 
negligence as sufficient for privacy infringement. See the minority judgments of O’Regan J 
and Langa CJ in NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute Intervening as Amicus Curiae) 
2007 (5)250 (CC). 
94  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 166-167, Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Delict 
339; Loubser et al Law of Delict 356; Mcquiod-Mason 2000 Acta Juricica 237. 
95  1993 4 SA 842 (A). 
96  Mcquiod-Mason 2000 Acta Juridica 237. 
97  Ibid 229. 
98  1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
99  Burchell Personality Rights 5. 
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judgment of O’Regan J and Langa CJ in NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression 
Institute as Amicus Curiae),100 who were of the opinion that the common-law 
requirements for fault in privacy cases should be similarly modified. O’Regan J 
stated: 101 
… I accept that the legal principles developed in Bogoshi should apply not only in the 
law of defamation but also to the infringement of privacy rights by the media. I take this 
view for the following reasons. First, the reason in Bogoshi and other given for 
distinguishing between the media and other citizens in respect of their liability for 
defamation lies in the power that the media have to cause harm by publication of 
defamatory material… Modern electronic, print and broadcast media are immensely, 
and indeed, increasingly powerful. Publications often reach hundreds of thousands of 
readers, viewers and listeners. It is accordingly appropriate, given the scale of damage 
to an individual that can be caused by such widespread publication, to confer special 
obligations upon the media in respect of publication. In so doing, we recognise that the 
media are not only bearers of rights under our constitutional order, but also bearers of 
obligations. 
The nature of obligations imposed however is merely a requirement that the media 
establish that the publication is reasonable in the circumstances or that it is not 
negligent. Such obligations require the media to consider the constitutional rights at 
play and be persuaded that publication is nevertheless appropriate. The effect on the 
media, therefore, is to require them to act in an objectively appropriate fashion. In 
determining whether they have so acted, a court will bear in mind the particular 
constraints under which the media operate and will not impose a counsel of perfection 
in circumstances where it would not be realistic. The effect of such a rule would be to 
require editors and journalists to act with due care and respect for the right to privacy, 
prior to publishing material that infringes that right. It will require them to ask the 
question: is the publication of this information, although it is private information, 
nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances? 
Such an obligation will provide some real protection for important constitutional rights. 
Accordingly, I conclude that it is appropriate to require the media when publishing 
private facts without consent to establish either that the publication is reasonable in the 
circumstances, in which case they will rebut wrongfulness, or that they have not acted 
negligently in the circumstances in which instance they will need to rebut the 
requirement of intention. 
Although the majority in NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus 
Curiae),102 did not depart from the intention requirement for the actio iniuriarum, the 
                                                            
100   NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) paras 
98 - 99,182. 
101   Ibid paras 77-9. 
102   NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC). 
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judges did not exclude the possibility that the common law could in future be 
developed in this regard.103 
In future it could, therefore, be relevant to determine whether or not SNSs may be 
equated to the ‘mass media’, and whether or not a user can be equated to a 
publisher.104 Social media such as YouTube, Flickr, Picasa, or Twitter are 
categorised as multimedia sharing sites. As a result, users of these sites could in 
future be considered to be part of the ‘mass media’. This includes institutions’ 
interactive websites which are used for business marketing, and those used for 
professional or social purposes as they also have mass audiences. The problem with 
this approach is that the users of SNS are non-media professionals and do not 
belong to the media’s professional body.105 The media professional bodies often set 
out regulations and ethical standards, which media professionals are expected to 
abide by. The same cannot, however, be expected of users of SNSs. 
I turn now to the infringement of privacy within the constitutional framework.  
 
                                                            
103   Ibid para 57. 
104  See Ch 2 para 2.4 above for the different categorisations of ‘social media’; Stefanone, Lackaff 
& Rosen 2010 Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 511, highlight that “the 
development of social media platforms enables non-media professionals or ‘normal people’ to 
participate in a newly accessible media environment, not just as an audience member, but 
also as multimedia producers”.  
105  The Press Council of South Africa (PCSA), which is the mother body of the press in South 
Africa. It has other affiliated bodies, which include the following: Newspaper Association of 
South Africa (NASA); The Magazine Publishers Association of South Africa (MPASA); The 
Association of Independent Publishers (AIP); The Forum of Community Journalists (FCJ); and 
The South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF).See http://www.presscouncil.org.za/-
ContentPage (date of use: 4 October 2016). 
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3.2.3.2 Constitutional law 
In order to establish an infringement of the constitutional right to privacy, a two-stage 
analysis is used.106 Firstly, the scope of the right must be assessed to determine 
whether or not the law or conduct has infringed the right to privacy. Secondly, if there 
has been an infringement, it must be determined whether or not it is justifiable in 
terms of the limitation clause.107  
As has been indicated, like other fundamental rights, the right to privacy may be 
limited in terms of the limitation clause. Although the right to privacy is of utmost 
importance in any democratic state, it should be balanced against other fundamental 
rights – such as the right to freedom of expression and the right to access to 
information.108 This is because no fundamental right is absolute, and it may be 
limited if it is justifiable and reasonable to do so in an open and democratic society, 
as contemplated in section 36 of the Constitution. The importance of other rights in 
the Bill of Rights should not be overlooked in attempts to protect the right to privacy 
at all costs. A balance should always be struck between the individual’s rights and 
those of others or competing social interests. 109 
 
Importantly, it has been held that the actio iniuriarum must contain rules to regulate 
the relationship between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, 
as the basis of a claim for breach of privacy in our common law is the actio 
iniuriarum. The legal rules forming the basis of the actio iniuriarum should be 
developed in a manner that “recognises both the importance of privacy and the 
importance of freedom of expression.” 110 
 
                                                            
106   Currie & de Waal Bill of Rights 317, Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 para 75. 
107  Constitution s 36; De Vos & Freedman Constitutional Law 354; Currie & de Waal Bill of Rights 
164 ff. In the case of Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 para 75, Ackermann J also noted 
that the American constitutional interpretative approach poses only a single inquiry, and does 
not follow the two-stage approach of Canada and SA. 
108  Constitution ss 16, 34. 
109  De Vos & Freedman Constitutional Law 349. 
110   NM v Smith (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) para 
47. 
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3.3 THE RIGHT TO IDENTITY 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
As with the right to privacy, the right to identity is a personality right protected in 
terms of the common law by the actio iniuriarum, as well as by the Constitution. 
Although the Constitution does not directly refer to the right to identity, it is argued 
that this right is protected under the right to human dignity.111  
Neethling defines identity as a person’s uniqueness or individuality, which identifies 
or individualises him or her as a specific person and so distinguishes such person 
from others.112 The person’s identity comprises all those facets (indicia)113 of his or 
her personality which make him or her a unique individual.114  
In the USA, identity is protected by privacy torts known as the ‘false-light tort’ and the 
‘appropriation tort’.115 Initially, South African courts also protected the right to identity 
under the right to privacy, 116 but more recently identity has been recognised as an 
independent personality right.117 
Although privacy and identity are analogous, they should be distinguished since 
privacy infringement involves acquaintance by a third party with true personal 
information, whereas identity infringement revolves around falsifying personal 
information.  In identity infringement, the person’s identity is falsified or an incorrect 
image is conveyed. 118 In contrast, privacy is not infringed by the false use of the 
person’s characteristics, but through an acquaintance with (true) personal facts 
                                                            
111  Constitution s 10; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 76; Burchell Delict 14. 
112  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 36; see also Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd 
[2011] JOL 27372 (GSJ) paras 15-17.  
113  Indicia includes the  facets of a person’s personality which are characteristic of or unique to 
him or her, such as his or her life history, name, creditworthiness, voice, handwriting, 
appearance etc. See Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 37. 
114  Ibid 36.  
115  Ibid. These torts will be dealt with in Ch 4 below. 
116  O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 224 (C); Kidson v SA National 
Associated Newspapers Ltd 1957 (3) SA 461 (W). 
117  Grütter v Lombard 2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA); Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 56 
(17 June 2011). 
118  De Antrade “The right to privacy” 32.  
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regarding that person.119 In other words, “at the heart of the distinction between the 
right to privacy and the right to identity we find two important elements: firstly, 
whether the facts concerning a given person are truthful or not; and secondly, 
whether such person wants to keep them private or not.” 120 
The distinction between the right to privacy and identity may at times seem complex 
as the two concepts are often intertwined.121 It can, for example, be said that privacy 
protects information that is linked to one’s identity.122 Furthermore, both rights are 
personality rights (rights which are non-patrimonial and which cannot exist 
independently of a person) and relate to an individual’s right to dignity123 and self-
determination.124 Nevertheless, they are two autonomous personality rights and 
should not be confused. 125 
It should also be kept in mind that infringement of identity can also constitute the 
crime of identity theft, which constitutes ‘fraud’.126 
 
                                                            
119  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 37. 
120  De Antrade “The right to privacy” 32.  
121  Ibid 19.  
122  Ibid 25.  
123  Constitution s 10. 
124  De Antrade “The right to privacy” 29.  
125  In Bernstein v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 65 the court stated the following: “The scope 
 of privacy has been closely related to the concept of identity and it has been stated that 
 ‘rights, like the right to privacy, are not based on a notion of the unencumbered self, but on 
 the notion of what is necessary to have one's own autonomous identity’.” 
126  If a user’s profile on a SNS is cloned, the cloned profile is often used to commit a crime, such 
as the infamous 419 scams. A cloned profile is also sometimes used to solicit money from 
friends of the original profile holder, or fake profiles are created using the names of charities in 
order to solicit donations. Snyman Criminal Law 520 defines fraud as the unlawful and 
intentional making of a misrepresentation, which causes actual prejudice or which is 
potentially prejudicial to another. 
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3.3.2 Infringement of identity: Wrongfulness and fault 
 
In South African case law, the right to identity is recognised as an independent 
personality right that requires protection under the actio iniuriarum.127 As has been 
said, the protection of the right to identity in South African law has developed from 
two independent privacy torts recognised in American law, namely:128  
 
 publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the eyes of the  public; or  
 appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.129 
 
An example of a false-light situation from early case law can be found in Kidson v SA 
National Associated Newspapers Ltd130 where a newspaper published a false story 
and photographs of the plaintiffs, depicting them as lonely nurses looking for 
boyfriends. The nurses had consented to their photographs being taken for the 
purposes of raising funds to build a recreation hall near their training facility. Some of 
the nurses were married and some engaged and accordingly felt aggrieved by the 
story. The court awarded damages for the iniuria. 
 
The O’Keeffe case, in which the right to privacy was recognised eo nomine for the 
first time in South African case law, actually provides an example of identity 
infringement involving the appropriation of the plaintiff’s image for advertising 
purposes. 131 
 
Grütter v Lombard132 is a more recent case which provides a good illustration of the 
right to identity as an independent personality right. It deals with a case of 
appropriation of the plaintiff’s (appellant’s in this case) name or likeness for the 
                                                            
127  Grütter v Lombard 2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA). 
128  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 256. 
129  Ibid 257, notes that the mere use of corresponding names cannot be regarded as 
infringement of identity. 
130  1957 (3) SA 461 (W).  
131  1954 (3) SA 224 (C). A proper analysis of the case reveals that the personality right infringed 
was actually the right to identity (particularly the appropriation of a person’s identity) and not 
privacy, as was decided with reference to US legal jurisprudence. 
132  2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA). 
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defendant’s advantage.133 Grütter and Lombard were two attorneys who, at some 
point had practised in association under the name ‘Grütter and Lombard’. Grütter 
then terminated his association with Lombard, but Lombard, together with another 
attorney, continued to practise under the name ‘Grütter and Lombard’. Grütter 
requested Lombard to remove his name from the name of the practice, because he 
(Grütter) was known to be the person named in the description of the practice and he 
no longer wished to be identified with it after his association with Lombard had come 
to an end. Lombard declined to do so and Grütter applied to the court for an order 
prohibiting Lombard from using his name. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that Lombard had infringed upon Grütter’s right 
to identity when he used his name without authorisation for his own commercial 
advantage, and ordered Lombard to remove Grütter’s name, as requested.134  
Nugent JA stated the following:  
 
What is conveyed to the outside world by the use of Grütter’s name is that he is in 
some way professionally associated with the respondents, or at least that he is willing 
to have himself portrayed as being associated with them, which … is a 
misrepresentation of the true state of affairs for which there can be no justification. 135 
 
The right to identity was also protected in Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd.136 Kumalo 
was a celebrity and public figure (model, television presenter, magazine editor and 
businesswoman), and Cycle Lab was a retailer of bicycles and cycling products. 
While Kumalo was shopping in the defendant’s store, a man approached her and 
took her photograph (on instruction of the defendant). The defendant subsequently 
incorporated the plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement for its store, which was 
published in a magazine entitled About Time and in a brochure called Cycling News. 
Kumalo objected, stating that the defendant had sought to exploit her image for 
commercial purposes without her knowledge and consent, and had published a low-
quality photograph of her in a poorly-designed advertisement for its shop. She felt 
that she had been abused and her privacy invaded. Kumalo was embarrassed, as 
                                                            
133  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 257 note that the mere use of corresponding 
names cannot be regarded as infringement of identity. 
134  2007 (4) SA 89 (SCA) para 13. 
135  Ibid. 
136  [2011] ZAGPJHC 56 (17 June 2011). 
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she feared that her friends, professional colleagues, and peers would assume that 
she had consented to the publication of the photograph, thereby lowering her 
professional standards and standing. 137 
 
Boruchowitz J held that the misleading use of the plaintiff's photograph in an 
advertisement without her permission constituted an infringement of her right to 
identity. 138 It was also a violation of the plaintiff's privacy, since a personal fact, 
namely her image, had been publicly exposed, contrary to her determination and 
will.139  
 
Applying these principles to SNSs, it becomes clear that a person’s identity will be 
infringed if he or she is portrayed in a false light on a SNS, or his or her identity is 
appropriated on a SNS for the wrongdoer’s benefit, as illustrated in the scenarios 
below.  
 
In the first scenario, user X creates or registers a Facebook profile in the name of a 
prominent politician, Y, and uploads a real photograph of Y. Furthermore, X provides 
false information to the effect that Y has joined an opposition party, even posting 
manipulated photographs of Y wearing the opposition’s colours. In another scenario, 
P creates or registers a Twitter profile in the name of Q, a well-known musician, in 
order to secure followers. This conduct infringes on Q’s identity for the benefit of P.  
Once a factual violation of the plaintiff’s identity has been established – in other 
words, that there has been a misrepresentation of his or her identity – an inference 
of wrongfulness and an inference of animus iniuriandi arise, which the defendant 
may rebut.140  Wrongfulness can be rebutted by grounds of justification, which will be 
discussed below.141 What has been said under privacy in regard to liability for 
negligence should also be kept in mind with regard to identity infringement. 
 
                                                            
137  Ibid para 5. 
138  Ibid. 
139  Para 23. 
140  Loubser et al Law of Delict 335. 
141  See para 3.7 below. 
50 
 
3.4 JURISTIC PERSONS AND PERSONALITY RIGHTS 
 
Juristic persons may also create profile pages on SNSs. The profile page may be 
used for various activities, such as marketing, communication, research, and many 
others that could benefit a juristic person. The question arises of whether juristic 
persons also have a right to privacy and identity which can be infringed by users of 
SNS. 
 
Midgley and Loubser highlight that “historically, the actio iniuriarum was available to 
protect the personality rights of natural persons only, based on the traditional 
acceptance that artificial or juristic persons cannot have rights that are closely 
associated with human beings”. The courts have also long recognised that a trading 
corporation can sue for defamation where its business reputation has been 
injured.142 In Dhlomo v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd, the Appellate Division (now the 
Supreme Court of Appeal) confirmed that a non-trading corporation or juristic person 
may sue for defamation.143  
 
Neethling highlights that a juristic person possesses those personality rights the 
objects of which may be infringed without the victim’s knowledge (that is, without the 
victim subjectively experiencing injured feelings).144 This means that a juristic person 
does possess a legitimate interest in the protection of its reputation, privacy, and 
identity. Therefore, in the case of a juristic person’s right to privacy or identity, the 
emphasis is placed on the objective aspect, which does not require human 
consciousness, sensation, feelings, or emotion with regard to the harm suffered.145  
 
                                                            
142  Witwatersrand Native Labour Association Ltd v Robinson 1907 TS 264 266; African Life 
Assurance Society Ltd v Phelan (1908) 25 SC 743; GA Fichardt Ltd v The Friend Newspaper 
Ltd 1916 AD 1 5-6, 9. 
143  1989 1 SA 945 (A) 952-3; Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 46; 
Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd v Janit 1994 3 SA 56 (W) 60-1; Janit v Motor 
Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd 1995 4 SA 293 (A) 303-04; also see Neethling, 
Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 69. 
144  Neethling 2005 CILSA 244. 
145  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 51-2, the objective element refers to the 
external, generally recognisable and concrete manifestation of personality harm, whilst the 
subjective element of personality exists in a person’s consciousness and is, inter alia, formed 
by his or her reaction to the factual infringement of his or her interests of personality. 
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The Constitution also adopts the common-law approach, namely the recognition that 
juristic persons may have personality rights. In terms of section 8(4) of the 
Constitution “a juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent 
required by the rights and the nature of that juristic person”. The Constitutional Court 
in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd,146 confirmed that: 
 
The right to privacy is applicable, where appropriate, to a juristic person…. Juristic 
persons are not the bearers of human dignity. Their privacy rights, therefore, can never 
be as intense as those of human beings. However, this does not mean that juristic 
persons are not protected by rights to privacy. Exclusion of juristic persons would lead 
to the possibility of grave violations in our society, with serious implications for the 
conduct affairs…  
 
This section highlights the fact that the personality rights under discussion in the 
context of SNSs may be applicable where a juristic person has suffered the 
infringement of such a personality right on SNSs either as a user or non-user. 
 
3.5 GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
Once the wrongfulness of the infringement of privacy or identity has been factually 
established, the defendant has an opportunity to show that his or her conduct is not 
wrongful. The wrongfulness of an infringement of privacy and/or identity may be 
excluded where a ground of justification can be shown to exist. The onus is on the 
defendant to prove that although there has been a factual infringement of privacy or 
identity, the infringement is not wrongful because of the presence of a ground of 
justification.147  
The different grounds of justification are situations in which the legal convictions of 
the community have, over time, determined that the conduct involved is not 
                                                            
146  2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) 557D-G; also see Currie & de Waal Bill of Rights 38. 
147  Loubser et al Law of Delict 163. 
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wrongful.148 Consequently, different grounds of justification may emerge with 
changes in the society’s norms. The grounds of justification which are applicable 
where other types of personality right are factually infringed, such as infringement of 
a person’s reputation (good name), dignity, and feelings, may also be relevant to the 
rebuttal of wrongfulness where there has been an infringement of privacy or 
identity.149   
In the case of privacy, the relevant grounds of justification are: necessity; private 
defence; consent to injury; and performance in a statutory or official capacity. These 
are the so-called ‘traditional grounds’ of justification. More recently the maintenance 
and furtherance of legitimate interests, including the public interest, has been 
recognised as a ground justifying knowledge of private facts. This defence is closely 
connected to the traditional grounds of private defence and necessity.150 The 
defences traditionally used in defamation cases, such as fair comment and privilege, 
could also justify the publication of private facts. 
The grounds of justification that may be relevant in the case of identity infringement, 
are consent (volenti non fit iniuria) – the only relevant ground of justification in 
appropriation cases; and, but only highly exceptionally, in the false-light cases), 
necessity and private defence.151 Privilege and media privilege (traditionally used for 
justification of defamation) may also be relevant; so too, public interest (in 
information). 152 
 
3.5.2 Consent or volenti non fit iniuria 
 
This ground of justification applies to rebutting both an infringement of the right to 
privacy and the right to identity (in cases of appropriation, consent could be the only 
                                                            
148  Burchell Principles of Delict 67 
149  McQuoid-Mason 1973 SALJ 28; see also Burchell Principles of Delict 193. 
150  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 240. 
151  Ibid 261. 
152  Ibid. 
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possible ground of justification).153 In Roman and Roman-Dutch law, consent as a 
ground of justification was expressed in the maxim volenti non fit iniuria, which 
means that no harm is done to someone who voluntarily consents to injury or to the 
risk of injury.154 A person who willingly releases private information to the public can, 
therefore, not complain that his or her privacy has been infringed. Also, where a 
person consents to his or her image being used to promote a product, that person 
cannot claim that his right to identity has been infringed. 
According to Loubser and Midgley,155 consent to the intentional causing of harm, 
which must be for a lawful purpose, involves a willingness to suffer specific harm, for 
example, consenting to an operation. Consent to the risk of injury, on the other hand, 
is less specific and involves a willingness to risk suffering some harm during a 
dangerous activity, such as a sport that involves risk of injury. They also point out 
that in specific situations, both forms of consent may apply – for example, where one 
consents to a specific operation, but also consents to the risk of complications as a 
result of the operation. In order for the consent to be valid, the person consenting 
must, of course, be fully informed of all the possible risks. The person must also be 
willing to suffer the risk. 156 In Waring and Gillow Ltd v Sherborne157 the court 
explained this as follows 
…in order to render the maxim [volenti non fit iniuria] applicable, it must be clearly 
shown that the risk was known, that it was realised, and that it was voluntarily 
undertaken. Knowledge, appreciation, consent – these are the essential elements; but 
knowledge does not invariably imply appreciation, and both together are not 
necessarily equivalent to consent… 
Consent may either be given expressly or may be implied. It can be given verbally or 
tacitly by conduct. It must, however, be indicated in an obvious manner.158 The 
consent must also be given before the prejudicial act that infringes upon the privacy 
or identity of the injured party. The act of giving consent is a unilateral act, which 
means that it can be retracted unilaterally.159  
                                                            
153  Ibid. 
154  Loubser et al Law of Delict 163. 
155  Ibid 163-4. 
156  Ibid. 
157  1904 TS 340 344. 
158  Loubser et al Law of Delict 163. 
159  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Delict 90. 
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The party whose personality rights have been infringed must have consented him or 
herself, and must have had the capacity to give such consent.160 That means that 
the person must be legally capable of expressing his or her will; the person does not 
have to be a major, but “they must have the mental ability to appreciate the 
implications of his or her actions, to distinguish between right and wrong, and to act 
accordingly”.161 
One cannot consent to the causing of harm that is considered contra bonos mores. 
Consent to harm that offends the boni mores will be wrongful and thus invalid. 162 
The subjective element of the right to privacy embraces the idea that a person (or a 
user in the context of SNSs) dictates which private facts are regarded as private. As 
soon as a person has disclosed private facts about him- or herself publicly or to a 
third party, he or she loses the reasonable expectation of keeping those facts 
private. For instance, in a situation where a user of SNSs publicly discloses private 
facts about him- or herself, that user loses the reasonable expectation of privacy with 
regard to those facts. Facebook, for instance, clearly specifies that it will use the 
information it obtains through the registration of a user profile, and any other 
information that users share with other users.163 In a case where a user makes use 
of privacy settings on his or her SNS profile, it can be argued that such user retains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. On the other hand, it could also be argued that he 
or she tacitly consents to the risk of injury (the Internet is not an absolutely safe 
environment – any piece of information posted online may go viral within a split 
second, thereby infringing upon the user’s personality rights). 
The following examples illustrate situations in which a person consents to injury. In 
terms of the RICA Act, a party to a conversation may consent to the interception of 
the conversation.164 Another example is section 14 of the National Health Act165 
                                                            
160  Santam Insurance v Vorster 1973 (4) SA 764 (A) 779. 
161  Loubser et al Law of Delict 163, 165. 
162  Ibid 167. 
163  See https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (date of use: 20 December 
 2016). 
164  Act 70 of 2002 s 5 (1): “Any person, other than a law enforcement officer, may intercept any 
communication if one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent in writing to 
such interception, unless such communication is intercepted by such person for purposes of 
committing an offence, where the party is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the party has given consent, as contemplated in this section.” 
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which provides that all the information concerning a user (patient), including 
information relating to his or her health status, treatment, or stay in a health 
establishment, is confidential, unless the patient consents to its disclosure, which 
may include publication of the information. 
The case of Jordaan v Delarey166 provides a good illustration of when consent can 
be viewed as a ground of justification. Although this case involves an action for 
damages for alleged defamation, the conduct complained of also caused an iniuria 
(that is, an infringement of a personality right) and the grounds of justification for 
infringement of personality rights are similar. The defendant had made grossly 
insulting remarks to the plaintiff in private. The plaintiff was anxious to get evidence 
that the defendant had uttered these insulting remarks, and for that reason she 
telephoned the police, asking them to come to the house where she was living. Two 
policemen arrived, and, before the plaintiff herself arrived, the defendant already 
knew of the police’s presence and the purpose for which they had been called by the 
plaintiff. The defendant told them what he had said to the plaintiff. Immediately 
thereafter, the plaintiff arrived and requested the defendant to repeat his remarks in 
the presence of the police. He did so.167 Hiemstra J held that in these circumstances, 
the iniuria took place with the assent (consent) of the plaintiff and dismissed the 
claim.168  
Consent is especially relevant in employment relationships. The contract of 
employment determines the terms and conditions of employment. This often includes 
a waiver of the right to privacy on the part of the employee. Other policies of the 
company, for instance its information and communications technology (ICT) policy, 
may also contain provisions in this regard. Although employees may be asked to 
waive their right to privacy in an employment contract, such terms are prohibited by 
law, since they could be considered immoral or contrary to public policy. Such terms 
are therefore not enforceable.169  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
165  Act 61 of 2003. 
166  1958 (1) SA 638. 
167  Ibid 638. 
168  Ibid 639. 
169  Hutchison Law of Contract in South Africa 240. 
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3.5.3  Necessity 
 
This ground of justification is applicable in cases of an infringement of the right to 
privacy,170 and, in exceptional circumstances, to infringement of the right to identity 
(only in false light cases).171  Necessity is present where the infringement of privacy 
or identity of an innocent person is the only reasonable way of protecting one’s own 
interest, or that of another person, against the danger created by natural phenomena 
(vis major) or human conduct.172 The danger must be present or imminent at the 
time, and the person relying on necessity must not be legally obliged to endure the 
consequences of the dangerous situation.173 Furthermore, there should be 
proportionality between the protected interest and the infringed interest – since an 
innocent party’s interest is infringed in necessity, the interest protected should not be 
outweighed by the harm done to the innocent party.174  
In the context of SNSs, the state of necessity may arise, for instance, when the life of 
another person is in jeopardy. Neethling175 provides an example of a father who 
publishes personal information regarding his missing son, who suffers from amnesia, 
in the hope that the information will help to locate the son. In this instance the 
infringement of the son’s privacy is reasonable in the circumstances and therefore 
not wrongful. 
A state of necessity may also arise in an employment relationship where the 
employer has a commercial interest which he or she must protect. In order to protect 
this commercial interest, the employer may infringe upon the privacy of prospective 
employees by obtaining or searching for information regarding not only the 
prospective employee’s technical and intellectual abilities, but also his or her 
personality or character.176  
 
                                                            
170  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 241 give the example of a person entering 
another’s private residence to escape violent rioters. 
171  Ibid 261 give the example where an attorney gives false information about a client to another 
party who is threatening to harm the client. 
172  Ibid 241; Loubser et al Law of Delict 171. 
173  Loubser et al Law of Delict 174. 
174  Ibid 171. 
175  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 241. 
176  Ibid 241. 
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3.5.4 Private defence 
 
This ground of justification is applicable where the defendant defends himself or 
herself against another’s actual or imminently threatening wrongful act, in order to 
protect his or her own privacy or identity, or the privacy or identity of some other 
person.177 Although it is said that private defence may be invoked against 
infringement of the right to privacy, acts of private defence justifying an infringement 
of privacy seldom occur.178 Neethling provides the example of one spouse 
appointing a private investigator to spy on the other spouse in order to collect 
evidence of adultery. He argues that the spouse has a legitimate interest in not being 
misled.179 This example could also extend to the SNS environment where a spouse 
hacks into the other spouse’s SNS account in order to determine whether the spouse 
is cheating on him or her.  
Private defence may also justify an infringement of the right to identity, but only in 
exceptional circumstances and only in false-light cases.180 A SNS user who posts 
false information on an SNS about another person, may use this ground of 
justification if that user posted the false information under duress – for example 
because he or she is being threatened with violence by a third party who is forcing 
him or her to make the posting.  
The act of private defence must remain within the prescribed limits; it must be 
relevant to the protection of the defendant’s interests; and may not exceed what is 
reasonably necessary to protect the interests.181  
3.5.5 Public interest in information 
 
The public interest in a true statement of fact can justify an infringement of privacy, 
similar to justifying an infringement of the reputation in defamation cases.  
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The information published must, of course, be true, otherwise privacy will not have 
been infringed (as noted above, the publication of false information does not infringe 
on someone’s privacy, but on his or her identity.) All that need be proved further is 
that the publication was in the public interest.182 The public has a right to be informed 
which is protected by the right to freedom of expression.183 Both the right to privacy 
and the right to be informed are constitutionally protected as fundamental rights.184 In 
a case where infringement of privacy is alleged, a balance must be struck between 
the interest of the public in being informed, and the interest of the individual in having 
a private life. Although publication of private facts is prima facie wrongful, the 
wrongfulness may be excused by the fact that the person concerned is a public 
figure, and as such, the publication of facts about his or her private life may be in the 
public’s interest.185  
McQuiod-Mason correctly opines that whether or not the invasion of privacy is for the 
public benefit is often a question of policy and has to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis.186 The case of Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya187 served as an example. 
The case involved the late Minister for the Department of Health and afforded the 
court an opportunity to consider the balance to be struck between the right to privacy 
and the public’s right to know about a public figure’s private life. 
The applicant, the minister, sought an order interdicting and restraining the 
respondent from making further comments and publishing any comments on 
unlawfully obtained medical records relating to her.188 The respondents contested 
the application on the basis that the allegations of alcohol abuse by the applicant 
during her stay in hospital (which emerged from her hospital records) were so 
germane to her fitness for office as a member of the Cabinet, that her hospital 
records and their disclosure were justified by the greater public interest in this 
                                                            
182  Ibid; see also Burchel Personality Rights 272 Loubser et al Law of Delict 360. 
183  Constitution s 16 (1) which includes the freedom of expression of the press and media, as 
well as [citizens’] freedom to receive or impart information or ideas. 
184  Constitution s 14 and s 34 respectively. 
185  McQuoid-Mason Law of Privacy 219.  
186  Ibid 218. 
187  2008 (6) SA 102 (W). 
188  Ibid paras 4, 15. 
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information.189 The court held that “the overwhelming public interest points in the 
direction of informing the public about the contents incorporated in the medical 
records in relation to the first applicant, albeit that the medical records may have 
been unlawfully obtained.”190  
Neethling191 points to the following factors that have been identified in case law as 
relevant to the determination of fairness: the fact that the plaintiff is a public figure; is 
involved in a newsworthy event; or exposed his or her privacy to the risk of 
publication (for example, by seeking the limelight). Other factors that should be 
considered are: whether the public has an interest in the information, or whether they 
are merely interested (curious) about it; the intensity of the violating conduct; the fact 
that the information was obtained wrongfully or was published contrary to a court 
order or in breach of a contract; the status of the person in society; the time span 
between the occurrence of the newsworthy event and its publication; the degree of 
identifiability of the plaintiff; and the defendant’s motive or purpose in publishing the 
information. 
The public interest in information may also justify an infringement of identity. In this 
instance the information published is, of course, not correct and creates a false 
image of the person reported on. Neethling192 refers to Coetser193 who argues that 
the media has to act with speed and efficiency when they distribute news. In the 
process errors will crop up when a person is portrayed in the press. The press will 
find itself in an intolerable situation if every false portrayal of personality leads to 
liability. Provided that the portrayal reflects the truth as far as is reasonably possible, 
the press should not be held liable. It is easy to imagine that a journalist who is 
tweeting on a prominent court case, may in his or her haste to stay on track with the 
reporting as the case progresses, portray a witness or one of the parties to the case 
in a manner that does not correctly reflect the image of the particular person. In such 
                                                            
189  Ibid para 11; see also Malema v Rampedi and others 2011 (5) SA 631 (GSJ) E, where 
Lamont J held that the public is entitled in general terms to have full disclosure concerning 
persons who stand in a public position, and who are high-profile personalities who invite 
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190  Ibid para 49. 
191  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 246-9. 
192  Ibid 261-2. 
193  Coertser Reg op Identiteit 224-6. 
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an instance the public’s interest in receiving the information timeously may arguably 
be offered as a defence. 
3.5.6 Public interest in art  
 
According to Neethling,194 public interest in art (freedom of creativity) may justify the 
infringement of identity in appropriate cases. The author further asserts that an 
artwork of exceptional quality will justify the infringement of identity more readily than 
one of inferior quality.195 Currie and de Waal196 note that artists are sometimes 
responsible for radical criticism of the way society functions and that all the activities 
associated with and necessary for the artist to be creative should, therefore, be 
constitutionally protected. The Constitution guarantees and protects freedom of 
artistic creativity under freedom of expression.197 In Laugh it Off Promotions CC v 
South African Breweries International,198 Moseneke J notes that: 
It follows clearly that unless an expressive act [an act artistic creativity] is excluded by 
section 16(2) it is protected expression. Plainly, the right to free expression in our 
Constitution is neither paramount over other guaranteed rights nor limitless. 
It is not clear whether the defence of public interest in art may apply in the context of 
SNSs, where infringement of identity in an appropriation case is alleged. The 
defendant arguably will not be liable where his or her act is successfully protected in 
terms public interest in art.199 Section 7 of the Protection of Personal Information 
Act,200 provides for the public interest in art in the context of the processing of 
personal information.  
 
 
                                                            
194  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 262. 
195  Ibid. 
196  Currie & de Waal Bill of Rights 370. 
197  Constitution s 16 (1)(c). 
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3.5.7  Privilege  
 
Privilege as a ground of justification may be applicable to justify the publication of 
both true and untrue statements. Privilege may therefore be applied to rebut an 
infringement of both privacy (true facts) and identity (untrue facts).201 There are two 
groups of privilege: absolute privilege; and relative privilege. For instance, 
statements made while participating in parliamentary proceedings (this includes the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces) enjoy the protection of 
absolute privilege.202 
On the other hand, in cases of a qualified privilege, the defendant forfeits the 
protection of the defence if he or she acted with improper motive (or malice) in 
publishing the material.203 In case of infringement of privacy, privilege may justify the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct “where a duty rests on a person to reveal private facts 
concerning another to outsiders who have a reciprocal duty or justified interest to be 
informed of such facts”.204 There are a number of recognised categories of qualified 
privilege. These include statements published in the discharge of a duty, the 
exercise of a right, or the furtherance of a legitimate interest; and statements 
published in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.205 It is still uncertain 
whether privilege will be a successful defence for users’ in the context of SNSs. 
 
3.5.8 Media privilege 
 
                                                            
201  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 251, 261. 
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witnesses, litigants, advocates, and attorneys. Judges and magistrates enjoy a special form of 
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Media privilege may be invoked against the reasonable publication of false or untrue 
defamatory allegations.206 It may also be applicable to rebut an infringement of both 
privacy and identity.207 In the context of SNSs, it is unclear whether a user 
(defendant) may rely on this ground of justification. If SNSs can be equated to mass 
media and its users to publishers, then they could possibly rely on this ground of 
justification.208 
3.5.9 Fair comment 
 
This ground of justification is closely linked to the defence that the publication of a 
true statement is in the public interest. As I have pointed out, the right to freedom of 
expression is an important fundamental right in a democratic society, and citizens 
should be free to comment publicly without fear of prosecution or persecution. It has 
been said that the defence of fair comment protects “the right of the citizen honestly 
to express his genuine opinion on a matter of public interest, however wrong, 
exaggerated or prejudiced that opinion may be”. 209 
In order for the defendant to succeed with the defence of fair comment, the 
defendant’s comments must comply with four requirements which have been 
developed through case law.210 These requirements are: the allegation in question 
must amount to comment or opinion; it must be fair; the factual allegations on which 
the comment is based must be true; and the comment must be related to a matter of 
public interest. For instance, a user may make a comment on SNSs about the 
behaviour of a certain politician or a famous cricket player’s lifestyle. Neethling211 
holds that in order for such a comment to be fair, it must remain within certain 
prescribed limits. These limits are determined in terms of the criterion of 
                                                            
206  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 155-6, 261. 
207  Ibid 251, 261. 
208  See the discussion under para 3.2.3.1 (c) above. 
209  Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1991] 4 All ER 817 826.   
210  Crawford v Albu 1917 AD 102; Marais v Richard 1981 (1) SA 1157 (A); see also Burchell 
Personality Rights 277. 
211  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Personality 157. 
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reasonableness or the legal convictions of the community.212 A comment made with 
malice or improper motive does not qualify for the defence of fair comment.213 
In the following section I summarise the relevant principles as they apply to SNSs. 
 
3.6  CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL APPLICATION TO SNSs 
 
The discussion so far has dealt with privacy and identity as personality rights, and 
how they may be infringed by users of SNSs, as well as the legal framework which 
governs or protects these infringements. In this section I provide a summary of the 
most important principles as they apply in the SNS environment. The delictual 
perspective is the focal point of this discussion.  
SNSs provide a platform for the free flow of information amongst users and third 
parties. However, every online conversation leaves a digital footprint, in contrast to 
the physical or offline world where a conversation between two people will only be 
remembered for a short while by the parties, and no physical trace of it will remain. 
On the other hand, anything which is posted on SNSs may go viral within a split 
second. The privacy policies of different SNSs therefore warn users that their privacy 
cannot be guaranteed.214 
Roos215 correctly points out that subscribing to SNSs and registering a profile 
account can be equated with appearing in a public space. In this space, the scope of 
privacy will be curtailed. This view is also evident from Bernstein v Bester,216 where it 
was held that as a person moves out of the inner sanctum of privacy into communal 
relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal 
                                                            
212  Ibid 157- 8. 
213  Loubser et al Law of Delict 361; Crawford v Albu 1917 AD 102 114; Jansen van Vuuren v 
Kruger 1993 SA 842 850H-I; Heroldt v Wills 2013 (2) SA 530 para 28. 
214  Roos 2012 SALJ 398; see also http://site.mxit.com/pages/policies/privacypolicy (date of use: 
2 August 2016). Mxit guarantees users that it will respect their privacy and right to anonymity, 
but also states that it abides by the law, and sometimes  may be required by law to hand over 
information [relating to the user] to the authorities. It also informs its users of the fact that 
communication amongst them is not encrypted – consequently, any third party can intercept 
the communications, for which Mxit will not be liable. 
215  Roos 2012 SALJ 398. 
216  Bernstein and others v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 67. 
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privacy shrinks accordingly. Roos217 further maintains that the type of privacy setting 
chosen by the user should determine whether he or she still maintains or has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
As has been pointed out above,218 if the Facebook user has utilised the privacy 
settings, for instance, to limit visibility to a particular group of friends (accepted into 
his or her network), an intrusion by a party not listed as a friend should be 
considered contra bonos mores and thus wrongful. In such circumstances, the user’s 
expectation that his or her privacy will be respected, is reasonable. 
However, it has also been pointed out that if the user has not utilised the privacy 
settings, or has accepted a large number of people as friends, who then have access 
to the user’s complete profile, an acquaintance with the user’s personal information 
by a third party will usually not be considered wrongful. It may be argued that such a 
user lacks the necessary reasonable expectation of privacy.   
As far as the publication of the user’s personal information is concerned, it was 
argued that if the user limits the number of friends that are allowed and utilises the 
privacy settings, but the privacy settings are breached and the information is made 
available to anyone on SNSs, such publication is prima facie unlawful and 
constitutes an infringement of privacy.219 Arguably, if one publishes another person’s 
photographs on SNSs without the person’s consent, this amounts to an infringement 
of the person’s right to privacy. 
Furthermore, in a case where a defendant (user) uses another persons’ photograph 
as his or her  profile picture on a SNS website, the defendant’s conduct infringes that 
persons privacy (publication of the plaintiff’s photograph) and identity (false-light 
situation). Furthermore, this conduct may infringe on a person’s identity (in cases of 
appropriation of name and likeness, for the defendant’s advantage), where the 
defendant uses the SNSs profile page for commercial purposes. Therefore, in such 
an instance there is an overlap between the rights to privacy and to identity. 
                                                            
217  Roos 2012 SALJ 398. 
218  Chapter 2 para 2.5.1.2 above. 
219  Ibid. 
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It has been pointed out that an infringement of privacy and identity may be justified 
by: consent; necessity; private defence; public interest in information; public interest 
in art; privilege; media privilege; and fair comment. 
From the above discussion it is my opinion that the common law adequately protects 
the infringement of privacy and identity in the context of SNSs. South African courts 
have already applied common-law principles in the context of SNSs, in the main 
cases dealing with defamation.220 None of these cases has, however, dealt directly 
with the right to privacy or right to identity in the context of SNSs. 
In the next section I discuss selected pieces of the legislation which limit the right to 
privacy. 
 
3.7 LEGISLATION REGULATING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
 
This section discusses a few pieces of legislation which may justify the wrongful 
intrusion into the privacy of a person, or which regulate the processing of personal 
information. Posting personal information on Facebook, of course, also qualifies as 
processing personal information.221 The Promotion of Access to Information Act,222 
the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication 
Related Information Act,223 and the Protection of Personal Information Act224 are the 
most relevant laws in the context of SNSs.225 
 
                                                            
220  Dutch Reformed Church Vergesig Johannesburg Congregation and Another v Rayan 
Soknunan t/a GloryDivinee World Ministries 2012 (6) SA 201 (GSJ); [2012] 3 All SA 322 
(GSJ); Isparta v Richter and Another 2013 (6) SA 529 (GNP). 
221  Paragraph 1.4 above on ‘personal information’. 
222  Act 2 of 2000. 
223  Act 70 of 2002 (commonly referred to as ‘RICA’). 
224  Act 4 of 2013. 
225  Other pieces of legislation which may be relevant, albeit to a lesser extent, are the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
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3.7.1 Promotion of Access to Information Act226 (the PAIA) 
3.7.1.1 The scope and objects of the Act 
Although it may appear self-evident that access to one’s personal information by 
third parties constitutes a wrongful intrusion into one’s right to privacy, this intrusion 
may be justified in terms of section 32 of the Constitution. Section 32 provides for the 
right of access to information. The Constitution also provides in section 36 that the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights may be limited by a law of general application. 
Furthermore, section 32(2) stipulates that “[n]ational legislation must be enacted to 
give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable measure to alleviate the 
administrative and financial burden on the state”.227 This culminated in the 
enactment of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (the PAIA). The PAIA 
therefore gives effect to section 32 of the Constitution. The objects of the PAIA are 
to: give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the 
state; and any information that is held by another person and that is required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights; to give effect to that right subject to justifiable 
limitations, including, but not limited to, limitations aimed at the reasonable protection 
of privacy, commercial confidentiality, and effective, efficient good governance; in a 
manner which balances that right with any other rights, including the rights in the Bill 
of Rights.228 
 
3.7.1.2 Access to information 
The PAIA creates a legal framework that makes it possible to request access to 
information held by both public and private bodies. Part 2 of the PAIA makes 
provision for access to the information held by public bodies, while Part 3 provides 
for access to information held by private bodies. This discussion focuses on the 
latter, since SNSs are private bodies. It is noteworthy that the PAIA does not apply to 
records requested for criminal or civil proceedings after the commencement of such 
proceedings.229 In terms of section 50, a requester230 may make an application for 
                                                            
226  Act 2 of 2000. 
227  Constitution s 36. 
228  Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) s 9. 
229  Section 7. 
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access to the records of private bodies in order to protect rights of others. In the 
context of SNSs, the PAIA applies to private bodies within the Republic, thus it is 
possible to request access to records of an SNSs within the Republic.231 This means 
that access to users’ information through a PAIA application is not wrongful if the 
request falls within the provisions of the Act.  
In Makhanya v Vodacom232  the court ordered the respondent (Vodacom Service 
Provider Company (Pty) Ltd) to supply the applicant with information relating to an 
unsolicited caller who had harassed the applicant with persistent, unsolicited 
telephone calls for several months. The infringement of the caller’s privacy was 
justified by the fact that such access is authorised by the PAIA.  
Mxit, a South African SNS, states in its privacy policy that the information or 
communications of its users may be given to authorities if the law requires it to do 
so.233 Once a user agrees to these terms set by Mxit, he or she gives implied 
consent to the terms. 
 
3.7.2 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication Related Information Act234 (the RICA) 
3.7.2.1 The scope and objects of the Act  
Interception of any form of communication is prima facie an act of intrusion, which 
amounts to an infringement of privacy, unless justified by a ground of justification.235 
The right to privacy enshrined in the Constitution specifically recognises the privacy 
of people’s communications.236 The Regulation of Interception of Communications 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
230  Section 1, “requester in relation to a private body means any person, including, but not limited 
to, a public body or an official thereof, making a request for access to a record of that private 
body or a person acting on behalf of the person making such a request”. 
231  Section 50. 
232  Makhanya v Vodacom 2010 (3) SA 79 (GNP) paras 5, 18. 
233  See http://site.mxit.com/pages/policies/privacypolicy (date of use: 6 August 2016). 
234  Act 70 of 2002. 
235  Section 1 distinguishes between two types of communication: direct communication and 
indirect communication. 
236  Constitution s 14(d). 
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and Provision of Communication Related Information Act (the RICA)237 creates a 
legal framework for the protection of the arbitrary interception of a communications 
and the Act now regulates any interception of a communication. The RICA, amongst 
its provisions, requires that all cell phone owners must register their sim-cards with 
their respective ‘service providers’.238  
The RICA regulates:  
 the interception of certain communications, the monitoring of certain signals 
and radio frequency spectrums, and the provision of certain communication-
related information; 
 the making of applications for, and the issuing of directions authorising, the 
interception of communications and the provision of communication-related 
information under certain circumstances; and 
 the execution of directions and entry warrants by law enforcement officers and 
the assistance to be given by postal service providers, telecommunication 
service providers, and decryption key holders in the execution of such 
directions and entry warrants. 
 
3.7.2.2 Interception of communications 
The RICA contains a general prohibition on the intentional or attempted interception 
of any communication in South Africa in the course of its occurrence or 
transmission.239 There are exceptions to this general prohibition in the Act.240 
Intentional interception of communication is allowed if the interception is under an 
                                                            
237  Act 70 of 2002. Another notable reason for this Act may be the availability of cheaper cellular 
phones, which has made the ownership of cellular phones easier and more widespread. In 
addition, due to the fact that a person may now own multiple sim-cards, it became imperative 
to introduce legislation which regulates, amongst others, the ownership and registration of 
sim-cards. 
238  Ibid s 1 states that: “Sim-card means the Subscriber Identity Module which is an independent, 
electronically activated device designed for use in conjunction with a cellular phone to enable 
the user of the cellular phone to transmit and receive indirect communications by providing 
access to telecommunication systems and enabling such telecommunication systems to 
identify the particular Subscriber Identity Module and its installed information. The network 
company that either issued the Sim-card or provides the network where the user has moved 
to another network”. 
239  Ibid s 2 which provides that authorising or procuring another person to intercept a 
communication is also prohibited. 
240  Ibid ss 3-9; also see Roos “Data privacy law” 392-5. 
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interception direction,241 if the interception is by a party to the communication,242 or if 
it takes place with the consent of a party to the communication.243 The interception of 
an indirect communication in connection with the carrying on of a business is also 
permitted,244 as is the interception of communication to prevent serious bodily 
harm245 or to determine a person’s location in an emergency.246 Interception of 
communication is also allowed when the interception is authorised by certain other 
Acts.247  
CMC Woodworking Machinery (Pty) Ltd v Pieter Odendaal Kitchens248 provides 
some interesting facts to consider in the light of the RICA. The case dealt with an 
interlocutory application. The applicant brought an ex parte application on an urgent 
basis, asking to be allowed to use a substituted service to serve the defendant with a 
notice of the date set for the trial and pre-trial conference via Facebook (by sending 
the notice to the defendant’s inbox).249 From the background to this case, it appears 
that the defendant evaded the applicant’s (plaintiff in the matter) notices, which is the 
reason the applicant sought a substituted service. The applicant and his attorney 
submitted a supplementary affidavit on the status of the defendant’s Facebook 
profile. It is not clear from this supplementary affidavit whether or not the applicant 
and his attorney had obtained the necessary court order permitting them to intercept 
the defendant’s communications on Facebook. In the event that the necessary court 
order had not been obtained, it is arguable that the action of the applicant and his 
attorney violated the regulations of the RICA250 and the defendant’s right to privacy. 
When the interception of communication is authorised by an order of court, such an 
                                                            
241  Act 70 of 2002 s 3; also see s 1: “Interception direction” means “a direction issued under s 16 
(4) or s 18(3)(a) and which authorises the interception, at any place in the Republic, of any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission, and includes an oral 
interception direction issued under s 23(7)”. 
242  Ibid s 4. 
243  Ibid s 5. 
244  Ibid s 6; also see s 1: ‘indirect communication’ means “the transfer of information, including a 
message or any part of a message, whether in the form of speech, music or other sounds; 
data; text; visual images, whether animated or not; signals or; radio frequency spectrum - or in 
any other form or in any combination of forms, transmitted in whole or in part by means of a 
postal service or a telecommunication system”.  
245  Ibid s 7. 
246  Ibid s 8. 
247  Ibid s 9; for instance in terms of the provisions of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. 
248  2012 (5) SA 604 (KZD). 
249  Ibid para 2. 
250  Act 70 of 2002. 
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intrusion is justified.251 The definition of ‘intercept’ in the RICA252 provides some 
guidelines to determine when interception has occurred. In the CMC Woodworking 
Machinery (Pty) Ltd case, it may be argued that even if one assumes that the 
defendant (user) had not employ privacy setting on its Facebook profile, the conduct 
of the applicant and his attorney amounted to an interception as neither of them was 
a recipient or intended recipient of the defendant’s communications. And clearly the 
interception did not fall within any of the exceptions.253 On the other hand, if the 
applicant or his attorney befriended the defendant on Facebook, there would have 
been no interception on their part, as they would be recipients or intended recipients 
of the defendant’s communications. If this was the case the applicant could have 
relied on consent as a ground of justification were interception to be alleged. 
 
3.7.3  Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (the POPI Act) 
3.7.3.1 Objects and scope of the Act  
The purpose of the POPI Act is to give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by: 
safeguarding personal information; regulating the manner in which personal 
information may be processed; providing persons with rights and remedies to protect 
personal information; and establishing an Information Regulator, in order to ensure 
respect for and promotion, enforcement, and fulfilment of the rights protected by the 
Act.254  
The Act applies to the processing of personal information in both the private and 
public sectors. Personal information is defined as information which relates to an 
identifiable individual (or data subject) and which is entered into a record by a 
                                                            
251  Ibid s 3. 
252  Ibid s 1. Interception means “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any 
communication through the use of any means, including an interception device, so as to make 
some or all of the contents of a communication available to a person other than the sender or 
recipient or intended recipient of that communication, and includes the monitoring of any such 
communication by means of a monitoring device, viewing, examination or inspection of the 
contents of any indirect communication; and diversion of any indirect communication from its 
intended destination to any other destination”.  
253  Ibid ss 3-9. 
254  Act 4 of 2013 s 2. 
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responsible party. 255 A responsible party is a party who determines the purpose and 
means of such processing.256 A record includes sound, image, and other electronic 
information.257 The Act applies to responsible parties domiciled in South Africa or 
abroad if they process information using means situated in South Africa.258 The Act 
defines ‘processing’259 as 
any operation or activity or any set of operations, whether or not by automatic means, 
concerning personal information, including- 
(a) the collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, updating or 
modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 
(b) dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any 
other form; or 
(c) merging, linking, as well as restriction, degradation, erasure or destruction of 
information.   
 
The responsible party is accountable for the processing of personal information that 
is done pursuant to such responsible party’s directions. In the context of SNSs, the 
Internet Service Providers (ISP), application providers, and users of the SNS could 
all potentially be regarded as responsible parties. The ISP (in this context, the SNSs 
operator) processes the personal information of users (who are the data subject in 
that situation), and the users, on the other hand, process personal information of 
other persons (third parties) when they upload the third parties’ personal information. 
The majority of information uploaded by SNS users (written comments, photographs, 
or videos) is personal information. Due to the wide definition given to processing, 
almost any action performed in relation to the information is regarded as the 
processing of information. 
                                                            
255  Ibid s 1. When the POPI Act came into operation it amended the definition of ‘personal 
information’ for both the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act and the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act.  
256  Section 2 defines a ‘responsible party’ to mean “a public or private body or any other person 
which, alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for 
processing personal information”. Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 370 notes that in this context 
the term ‘responsible party’ is synonymous with ‘data controller’. 
257  Ibid s 1. The Act defines a ‘record’ as “including writing on any material, information recorded 
on any electronic and computer equipment, labels, books, maps, plans, graphs, drawings, 
photograph, film, tape or other devices embodying visual images”.  
258  Act 4 of 2013 s 3.  
259  Ibid s 1. 
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The POPI Act excludes from its scope of application any processing of personal 
information during the course of a purely personal or household activity,260 or for 
exclusively journalistic, literary, or artistic purposes.261 The question arises whether 
individual users of SNSs who process personal information of friends for personal 
purposes (sharing news and photographs) could be excluded from the provisions of 
the POPI Act under the household exception.  
It is submitted that the situation should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Not 
every user of an SNS does so purely for social interaction. SNS websites may also 
be used for commercial purposes to advertise a product or service. In such an 
instance the household exception would not apply. 
 
3.7.3.2 Conditions for processing of personal information 
In order for the processing of personal information to be lawful, the POPI Act 
requires the responsible party to comply with the conditions for lawful processing.262 
The POPI Act sets out conditions which the responsible party must adhere to when 
processing personal information.263 There are eight information protection conditions: 
accountability; processing limitation; purpose specification; further processing 
limitation; information quality; openness; security safeguards; and data subject 
participation. These conditions are similar to the information-protection principles 
found in the OECD Guidelines264 and the EU Data Protection Directive.265 The latter 
two international instruments are discussed in Chapter 5 below.  
Should a SNS user be considered a responsible party within the meaning of the Act, 
and not afforded the household exception, such user will have to comply with the 
conditions for processing set out in the POPI Act. This means that the responsible 
party must comply with the conditions for lawful processing of personal information 
                                                            
260  Act 4 of 2013 s 6(1)(a). 
261  Ibid s 7. 
262  Sections 4, 8-25. 
263  Ibid s 4 provides a brief summary of the conditions which are dealt with in Ch 3 of the Act; 
Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 367-80. 
264  Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data. 
265  Directive 95/46/EC; see also Roos “Data Privacy Law” in Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 371. 
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set out in Chapter 3 of the Act. These conditions are not discussed further in this 
dissertation.  
3.9  PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES 
3.9.1  Introduction 
 
This section focuses on the procedural challenges involved when a user’s right to 
privacy or identity has been infringed on SNSs. The plaintiff must show a cause of 
action in order to receive the appropriate relief. In this section I consider the following 
issues: identifying the wrongdoer on SNSs; the role of an Internet service provider; 
and legal costs, which may be prohibitive.  
 
3.9.2  Identifying the wrongdoer  
 
If a plaintiff wishes to sue for an iniuria, he or she must know the identity of the 
wrongdoer.266 In cases where there has been an infringement of either privacy or 
identity on SNSs, the plaintiff can only identify the defendant’s SNSs profile. This 
approach on its own is not conclusive and raises a number of challenges. For 
instance, the user’s profile may be a fake or even an anonymous profile. On the 
other hand, the advancement in technology makes it possible for the identity of the 
defendant (user) to be revealed, be it lawfully or unlawfully.267 Nel268 notes that  
[m]any defendants in internet defamation actions [the same applies to privacy and 
identity infringement] claim that revealing their identity for purpose of a defamation suit 
would be a violation of their constitutionally protect right to free speech, and in some 
instances even their right to privacy. 
                                                            
266  Civil Procedure in Magistrates' Courts Rule B.i; Rule A7.1 and Civil Procedure in the Superior 
Courts Rule A6.1.The question as to whether or not a particular party has standing to sue and 
be sued may be dealt with on exception, in which event that party’s allegations concerning its 
legal standing must be accepted as being correct; see also Harms Amler’s Precedents of 
Pleadings 72. 
267  These are technical, not legal issues which fall outside the scope on this dissertation.  
268  Nel 2007 CILSA 194. 
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SNSs or the Internet in general, provide a space where users may communicate or 
post information using an anonymous profile or pseudonym. Amongst the reasons 
for communicating anonymously online is to prevent the association of speech with 
the speaker’s identity.269 Communicating anonymously may allow the user freedom 
of expression;270 however, it is clear that the right to freedom of speech cannot be 
exercised in a way that infringes upon the interests of others whose interests also 
warrant legal protection from infringement. According to Nel271  
….anonymity may lead to crime, and…that anonymity may undermine free speech in 
the sense that anonymous speakers face no consequences for speaking carelessly, 
callously or even criminally. 
A proper balance must be struck between the user’s need for anonymity and the 
protection of the plaintiff’s personality interests (privacy and identity in this context) 
from infringement. The task of identifying an anonymous wrongdoer may require 
sophisticated technical skills, and it is important that whatever method is used to 
establish the identity must be within the confines of the law.272 Nel273 suggests that 
South Africa could use disclosure (discovery) proceedings. She proposes an 
extension to rule 35 of the Uniform Rules of Court274 (rule 23 in the magistrate’s 
court).275 The rules of court make no provision for discovery before the 
                                                            
269  Nel ibid 193, notes that “the ability to conceal one’s identity while communicating, has the 
social benefit of encouraging uninhibited speech, which makes the internet desirable for those 
who feel persecuted or embarrassed or wish to raise issues which they might consider 
controversial”; also see Collingwood 2012 Comp L & Security Rev 329. 
270  Constitution s 16(2) the right in subsection (1) [right to freedom of expression] does not 
extend to: propaganda; incitement of imminent violence; or advocating hatred based on race, 
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
271  Nel 2007 CILSA 198. 
272  Act 25 of 2002; Act 70 of 2002; and Act 4 of 2013. 
273  Nel 2007 CILSA 210 ff. 
274  Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, Uniform Rules of Court 35 Discovery, Inspection and 
Production of Documents: 
 (1) Any party to any action may require any other party thereto, by notice in writing, to 
make discovery on oath within twenty days of all documents and tape recordings relating 
to any matter in question in such action (whether such matter is one arising between the 
party requiring discovery and the party required to make discovery or not) which are or 
have at any time been in the possession or control of such other party. Such notice shall 
not, save with the leave of a judge, be given before the close of pleadings. 
275  Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, Civil Procedure Rules in Magistrates' Courts Rule 23 
Discovery of Documents: 
(1) After the close of pleadings, but not later than 15 days before the date of trial, either 
party may deliver a notice to the other party calling on him to deliver a schedule 
specifying the books and documents in his possession or under his control which relate 
to the action and which he intends to use in the action or which tend to prove or disprove 
either party’s case. Such schedule, verified by affidavit, shall be delivered by the party 
required to do so within 10 days after the delivery of the aforesaid notice. If privilege be 
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commencement of an action.276 She suggests that the extension should allow the 
discovery proceeding to be instituted before commencement of an action and that 
the applicant be permitted to request a subpoena against the ISP. Drawing on cases 
where applications for obtaining discovery before commencement of an action were 
refused, Nel notes the following guidelines:277 
 it should be not be used as a ‘fishing’ expedition; 
 the applicant should not have another alternative remedy available to him (for 
instance the applicant should have already applied for a take-down notice in 
terms of the ECT Act); 
 the applicant cannot obtain discovery against one person for the purpose of 
bringing action against another person (this means that an applicant cannot 
apply for discovery in respect of ‘friends’ of the possible defendant); and 
 the court will not come to the assistance of a litigant in this way in order to 
enable him to ascertain whether or not he has a cause of action. 
 
This area of the law is not well developed in South Africa and it is therefore useful to 
look at the developments in United States278 and United Kingdom279 for guidance in 
future developments in South Africa.  
 
3.9.3 Internet Service Provider 
 
Here I briefly consider the position of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) – I examine 
the situation where a user, or another person, has suffered injury to his or her 
privacy or identity and seeks to determine whether or not the ISP can be held liable 
for the actions of its users. In other words, the plaintiff seeks to hold the ISP liable for 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
claimed for any of the books or documents scheduled, such books or documents shall be 
separately listed in the Schedule and the ground on which privilege is claimed in respect 
of each shall be set out. 
276  Cilliers, Loots & Nel Civil Practice of the High Court 779; also see Priday v Thos Cook & Son 
(SA) Ltd 1952 (4) SA 761 (C) 764; Walsh v Botha 1960 (2) SA 323 (O) 325F-G. 
277  Nel 2007 CILSA 210 ff. 
278  Paragraph 4.5.2 below. 
279  Pararaph 5.4.3.1 below. 
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content supplied by a third party. This may happen where the identity of the 
infringing user cannot be established, or where the defendant is a man of straw.  
 
An ISP, in most instances, grants access to its SNS or network without requiring any 
form of positive identification or verification of identity from its users. It is not feasible 
for an ISP to control who uses its SNS or verify the user’s personal information upon 
registration. This fact is humorously captured in Peter Steiner’s cartoon entitled ‘On 
the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog’.280  
 
The question of whether or not liability is imposed depends on the function or role 
played by the particular ISP.281 Where the ISP provides content on the SNS it is 
clear that the ISP may be sued where the content injures a person’s privacy or 
identity.282 In the context of SNSs, the ISP does not provide content; most of the 
content is generated by users. The problem arises where a plaintiff wishes to sue the 
ISP on the basis of it being liable for the actions of the users of its service.  
Chapter XI of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act limits the liability 
of service providers283 for the transmission, routing, temporary storing, caching, or 
hosting of unlawful material, provided they meet the conditions for eligibility.284 The 
service provider must belong to an industry representative body recognised by the 
Minister of Communications, and the ISP must have adopted and implemented the 
code of conduct of that body.285  
                                                            
280  The cartoon symbolises an understanding of Internet privacy which stresses the ability of 
users to send and receive messages in general anonymity. The cartoon can be viewed at 
www.google.co.za/search?q=on+the+internet+nobody+knows+you+re+a+dog+cartoon (date 
of use: 20 December 2016).  
281  Roos “Data privacy law” 417. 
282  Ibid. 
283  Act 25 of 2002 s 70 ‘service provider’ is defined as any person providing information system 
services. 
284  Section 72 provides that the limitations on liability established by this Chapter apply to a 
service provider only if: 
(a) the service provider is a member of the representative body referred to in section 71; 
and 
(b) the service provider has adopted and implemented the official code of conduct of that 
representative body. 
285  Section 72; http://www.ispa.org.za, the ‘Internet Service Provider Association’ (ISPA) is a 
recognised industry representative body. 
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In the event of the service provider acting as a ‘mere conduit’ (also referred to as an 
‘information carrier’ in some jurisdictions),286 the information is merely conveyed from 
one point to another without any monitoring of or control over the content. Section 
73(1) exempts a service provider who transmits, routes, stores, or provides access 
to data from liability for such activity if: the service provider does not initiate the 
transmission; does not select the addressee; performs the functions in an automatic, 
technical manner without selection of the data; and does not modify the data 
contained in the transmission.287 The acts of transmission, routing, and provision of 
access must be performed for the sole purpose of transmitting information. 288 
Section 74(1) exempts a service provider who caches289 information (also referred to 
as the ‘information distributor’ in some jurisdictions) from liability under certain 
conditions. A service provider that transmits data provided by a recipient of the 
service via an information system under its control is not liable for the automatic, 
intermediate and temporary storage of that data, where the purpose of storing such 
data is to make the onward transmission of the data more efficient to other recipients 
of the service upon their request, provided that the service provider does not modify 
the data; complies with conditions on access to the data; complies with rules 
regarding the updating of the data, specified in a manner widely recognised and 
used in the industry; does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely 
recognised and used in the industry, to obtain information on the use of the data; 
and removes or disables access to the data it has stored upon receiving a take-
down notice referred to in section 77.290  
Section 75(1) provides that a service provider that acts as a ‘host’ of, for example, a 
website (also referred to as an’ information controller’ in some jurisdictions),291 is not 
liable for damages arising from data stored at the request of the recipient of the 
service, provided that the service provider does not have actual knowledge that the 
data message, or an activity relating to the data message, is infringing the rights of a 
                                                            
286  See Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
287  Act 25 of 2002 s 73(1)(a)-(d). 
288  Act 25 of 2002 s 73(2). 
289  Section 1, ‘cache’ means high speed memory that stores data for relatively short periods of 
time, under computer control, in order to speed up data transmission or processing. 
290  A ‘take-down notice’ is discussed below under remedies, para 3.10.2. 
291  See Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
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third party; or is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity 
or the infringing nature of the data message is apparent; and upon receipt of a take-
down notification referred to in section 77, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the data. Section 75(2) provides that the limitation of liability will only apply 
if the service provider has designated an agent to receive notifications of 
infringement, and has provided through its services (including on its web sites in 
locations accessible to the public) the name, address, phone number, and e-mail 
address of that agent.  A competent court may order a service provider to terminate 
or prevent unlawful activity in terms of any other law, notwithstanding this limitation 
of liability.292 
 
Where a service provider provides information location tools:293  
 
A service provider is not liable for damages incurred by a person if the service provider 
refers or links users to a web page containing an infringing data message or infringing 
activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, 
pointer, or hyperlink, where the service provider— 
(a) does not have actual knowledge that the data message or an activity relating to the 
data message is infringing the rights of that person; 
(b) is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity or the 
infringing nature of the data message is apparent; 
(c) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity; and 
(d) removes, or disables access to, the reference or link to the data message or activity 
within a reasonable time after being informed that the data message or the activity 
relating to such data message, infringes the rights of a person. 
 
Therefore, in the context of SNSs, where a service provider falls within the above 
categories and has further complied with the requirements set out in Chapter XI 
(Limitation of liability of Service Providers) of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act, the service provider may not be held liable for the unlawful or 
wrongful actions of its users, even though the user may be using the service 
anonymously or is a man of straw. 
                                                            
292   Act 25 of 2002 s 75(3). 
293  Ibid s 76(a)-(d). 
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In the following section I consider the remedies available to a plaintiff whose 
personality rights have been infringed on SNSs. 
3.10  REMEDIES 
3.10.1 Introduction 
 
A person whose personality has been infringed or who is under threat of possible 
infringement due to a publication on a SNS, has a number of remedies which he or 
she might consider.  
3.10.2 Take-down notification 
 
In a case where a person’s privacy or identity has been infringed on SNSs, he or she 
may lodge a complaint with the ISP requesting that the infringing content be taken 
down (that is, removed) from the site. The Internet Service Provider’s Association 
(the ISPA), assists complainants with queries, where the ISP concerned is a member 
of the ISPA.294 The ISPA uses the procedure prescribed by the take-down 
notification process in section 77 of the ECT Act.295 Section 77 provides that a 
notification of unlawful activity must be in writing, must be addressed by the 
complainant to the service provider or its designated agent, and must include the 
following  
(a) the full names and address of the complainant; 
(b) the written or electronic signature of the complainant; 
(c) identification of the right that has allegedly been infringed; 
(d) identification of the material or activity that is claimed to be the subject of unlawful 
activity; 
(e) the remedial action required to be taken by the service provider in respect of the 
complaint; 
                                                            
294  See http://www.ispa.org.za/code-of-conduct/take-down-procedure/ (date of use: 20 December 
2016). 
295  Ibid. 
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(f)  telephonic and electronic contact details, if any, of the complainant; 
(g) a statement that the complainant is acting in good faith; 
(h) a statement by the complainant that the information in the take-down notification is 
to his or her knowledge true and correct. 
A person, who makes use of the take-down procedure in section 77, knowing that 
the notification materially misrepresents the facts, is liable for damages.296 A service 
provider who takes down material in response to a notification, cannot be held liable 
if the take-down turns out to be wrongful. 297 
The terms and conditions on Facebook provide for a take-down notice. However the 
court in Heroldt v Wills,298 held as follows:299  
There is nothing before me to assure me that Facebook would comply with such a 
request,  … if one wants to stop wrongdoing, it is best to act against the wrongdoers 
themselves. 
 
In the context of SNSs, a take-down notice seems to be an effective remedy of first 
instance for a person whose privacy or identity has been infringed, provided the ISP 
adheres to the take-down notice requests from users or non-users. If this type of 
remedy could be used successfully, it would help avoid the expensive process of 
litigation. 
 
3.10.3 Interdict  
 
An interdict is an order of court enjoining a respondent to refrain from doing 
something (a ‘prohibitory interdict’), or ordering a respondent to do something (a 
‘mandatory interdict’).300 An interdict is either interim or final. An interim interdict is a 
court order that preserves and restores the status quo pending the final 
                                                            
296  Act 25 of 2002 s 77(2). 
297  Ibid s 77(3). 
298  Heroldt v Wills 2013 (2) SA 530 para 38. 
299  Ibid. 
300  Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts Rule A5.1; Civil Procedure in the Magistrates’ Courts 
Rule A2.1. 
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determination of the rights of the parties.301 An injured party or a party whose 
personality interests are threatened, may apply to court for an interdict.302 An 
interdict will be granted where there is a threat of infringement or continued 
infringement of either privacy or identity. The case of Setlogela v Setlogela303 laid 
down the requirements for a final interdict: a clear right; an injury actually committed 
or reasonably apprehended; and the absence of another suitable remedy. The same 
requirements apply to an interim interdict, with the addition of one requirement: the 
applicant must also prove that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an 
interim order.304 In terms of the interim interdict actual harm need not be established 
on a balance of probabilities.305 
In the case of Heroldt v Willis,306 the applicant sought an order against the 
respondent in the following terms: interdicting and restraining the respondent from 
posting any information relating to the applicant on Facebook or any other social 
media (the respondent had refused to remove the posting, despite having been 
requested to do so by the applicant, acting through his attorney). The applicant 
further sought, in the event that the respondent failed to comply with the above  
request, that the court place the respondent under arrest for non-compliance with the 
order for a period of 30 days, or as determined by the court. The court did not agree 
to this latter request.307  
 
In this case, the first two requirements for an interdict, as laid down in Setlogela v 
Setlogela, were complied with, namely that the applicant had a clear right to his 
privacy and the protection of his reputation, and had been defamed.308 The only 
issue was with regard to the third requirement: the absence of a suitable remedy. 
The respondent drew attention to the fact that the applicant had previously, via his 
attorney, threatened to institute an action to claim damages. The respondent 
                                                            
301  Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts Rule A5.6. 
302  Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Delict 237; also see Roos 2008 PER 90. 
303  Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 227. 
304  Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts Rule A5.7. 
305  Ibid. 
306  Heroldt v Willis 2013 (2) SA 530 para 31. 
307  Ibid para 41. 
308  Ibid para 30. 
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suggested that if she was found to have defamed the applicant, his proper remedy 
would be damages.309 
 
The court granted the interdict and ordered the respondent to remove all postings 
which she had made on Facebook or any other social media site in reference to the 
applicant. In this case, the court deviated from the conservative requirements for an 
interdict. Willis J310 held that: 
 
It is in respect of the remedy where infringements of privacy take place in the social 
media that the common law needs to develop. The social media form a subset of the 
electronic media but are not coextensive with it: the social media are all part of the 
electronic media but not all the electronic media are social media. The electronic media 
were, almost certainly, beyond the imagination of the court when Setlogelo v Setlogelo 
was decided in 1914. Not only can items be posted and travel on the electronic media 
at a click on a computer in a moment, in an instant, at the twinkling of an eye, but also 
they can, with similar facility, be removed therefrom. This can also be done at minimal 
cost. The situation is qualitatively different from the scenario where newspapers have 
been or are about printed in hardcopy and distributed. The law has to take into account 
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility 
in the eyes of the people. Without credibility, law loses legitimacy. If law loses 
legitimacy, it loses acceptance. If it loses acceptance, it loses obedience. It is 
imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously 
and with wisdom. 
 
It is evident that in the context of SNSs an interdict provides immediate and effective 
relief to the plaintiff (user or non-user), and minimises the harm to the plaintiff’s (user 
or non-user) personality interests (privacy and identity in this instance). 
 
3.10.4 Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 
3.10.4.1 The scope and object of the Act 
The Protection from Harassment Act311 commenced on 27 April 2013. One of the 
objectives of the Act is to afford victims of harassment an effective remedy against 
such conduct. Harassment is defined as conduct that the defendant knows, or ought 
to know, causes harm to the plaintiff by, inter alia, unreasonably engaging in 
                                                            
309  Ibid para 30. 
310  Ibid para 31. 
311  Act 17 of 2011. 
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electronic communication aimed at the complainant or a related person, whether or 
not conversation ensues; or sending, delivering, or causing the delivery of electronic 
mail to the complainant or a related person.312 ‘Harm’ is defined as any mental, 
psychological, physical, or economic harm.313 Postings on an SNS infringing on the 
plaintiff’s privacy could, therefore, amount to harassment in terms of this Act. 
 
3.10.4.2 Protection order 
A complainant may apply to a magistrate’s court for a protection order against the 
harassment.314 If the complainant is not represented by a lawyer, the clerk of the 
court must assist him or her by informing him or her of the relief available in terms of 
the Act, as well as informing him or her of the right to lodge a criminal complaint of 
crimen iniuria against the defendant.315 A child may also apply for a protection order 
without the assistance of a parent or guardian.316   
A court must consider an application as soon as reasonably possible, and may 
consider additional evidence as it deems fit – for example, oral evidence or written 
affidavits.317 The court may issue an interim protection order against the respondent 
in a situation where the respondent failed to receive notice of the application. The 
court, however, must be satisfied that there is prima facie evidence that the 
respondent is engaging in or has engaged in harassment and that harm is being or 
may be suffered by the complainant or a related person as a result of the 
harassment if a protection order is not issued immediately. The court must also be 
satisfied that the protection to be accorded by the interim protection order is likely not 
to be achieved if prior notice of the application is given to the respondent.318 The 
interim order must be served on the respondent who may then show cause on the 
return date, why the interim order should not be made final.319 
                                                            
312  Ibid s1. 
313  Ibid s 1. 
314  Ibid s 2(1) 
315  Ibid s 2(2). 
316  Ibid s 2(4). 
317  Ibid s 3(1). 
318  Ibid s 3(2). 
319  Ibid s 3(3). 
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In cases where the complainant is being subjected to abuse via anonymous, 
threatening or offensive SMSs, e-mail, etcetera, and he or she is therefore unaware 
of the harasser’s personal details, the court is authorised to issue a directive to an 
electronic communications service provider demanding the full name, identity 
number, and address of the harasser sending the text messages, tweets, or e-
mails.320  
The effectiveness of the protection order is ensured by the fact that whenever it 
issues a protection order or interim protection order, the court must also make an 
order authorising the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the respondent should the 
subject not comply with the prohibition, condition, obligation, or order it has 
imposed.321 
Given that a complainant may approach a magistrate’s court for a protection order, 
that the order must be given as soon as reasonably possible, and that a warrant for 
the arrest of the respondent is issued should he or she fail to comply with an order, it 
is clear that the Protection from Harassment Act provides an inexpensive and 
effective civil remedy against harassment on SNSs. 
 
3.10.5 Claim for damages 
 
In this section I deal with the claim for damages where users’ or other persons’ 
personality rights have been infringed on SNSs.322 Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd323 
define damage as the diminution, as a result of a damage-causing event, of the utility 
or quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the legally recognised 
needs of the person involved. Damage consists of both patrimonial and non-
patrimonial loss.324 Neethling325 holds that in a case where a party has suffered 
patrimonial loss caused by an iniuria, the actio legis Aquiliae must be instituted. 
These authors assert that in practice, the actio iniuriarum and actio legis Aquiliae 
                                                            
320  Ibid s 4. See also Sewsunker 2013 De Rebus 34. 
321  Ibid s 11. 
322  This section does not look at how the damage is assessed. 
323  Potgieter, Steynberg & Floyd Law of Damages 20. 
324  Ibid 33. 
325  Ibid 67. 
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may be instituted in a single action to claim satisfaction and patrimonial damages, 
but a plaintiff must make the necessary averments in his or her pleadings to support 
both actions.326 
A claim for damages may not always be a useful remedy for infringement of 
personality on SNSs. The plaintiff may face various stumbling blocks in claiming 
damages: For example, the identity of the wrongdoer may not be known and as a 
consequence another procedure has first to be followed to establish such identity. In 
a case where the identity of the wrongdoer is known, the defendant may be a man of 
straw, meaning the plaintiff may never be able to receive the damages awarded.  
Having considered all the above remedies, the interdict and a protection order under 
the Harassment Act possibly offer the most effective legal relief in the context of 
SNSs. Plaintiffs could also consider alternative dispute resolution procedures in 
preference to litigation as these are often less costly and offer relief within a 
reasonable time, which helps reduce further damage to the plaintiff’s personality 
rights.327 
 
3.11 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter focused on the challenges highlighted in Chapter 2. I looked at the two 
personality rights – privacy and identity – and examined how they have been 
recognised and developed in South African law, as well as how they may be 
infringed. The possible grounds of justification that exclude the wrongfulness of 
infringing conduct were also considered. The chapter further explored the 
infringement of these personality rights in the context of SNSs and the possible 
grounds of justification in this regard. I addressed the procedural challenges where 
either privacy or identity has been infringed in the context of SNSs and finally 
identified possible remedies available to a plaintiff whose personality has been 
infringed on an SNS. 
                                                            
326  Ibid 68. 
327  Levmore & Nussbaum The Offensive Internet 26. 
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Chapter 4 
United States of America 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I discuss the legal position in the United States of America (United 
States), with particular reference to the protection of the rights to privacy and identity 
in the context of SNSs. I investigate whether the United States recognises and 
protects these rights, particularly in the context of SNSs.  
The chapter is structured as follows: a brief overview of the United States legal 
system is given as background to the discussion; the recognition and development of 
the right to privacy in the United States is discussed; the current constitutional and 
common-law positions regarding the right to privacy are explained; legislation 
relevant to SNSs is identified; a comparison is made between a few of the individual 
states’ laws; the application of the established legal principles in the context of SNSs 
is discussed; procedural challenges are highlighted; and I conclude the discussion 
with a brief analysis. 
 
4.2  OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
The United States is a common-law country, in other words the legal system is 
modelled on the British common-law system.1 The United States has a Constitution2 
which establishes a federal system of government. In total, the country is made up of 
50 states each enjoying a measure of legal independence. The federal government 
is given specific powers in terms of the Constitution. All powers not specifically 
granted to the federal government, remain with the states. In the case of conflict 
                                                            
1  Lomio & Spang-Hanssen Legal Research Method 13. The American state of Louisiana is the 
exception as it is regarded as a civil-law state 11. 
2  Ibid 10. 
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between federal and state law, federal law applies.3 Each state has its own 
Constitution, government structures, laws, and its own judiciary. The United States 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts4 have jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
federal laws as well as the United States Constitution. The individual state 
Constitutions and the laws of each state create state courts, lower courts, and higher 
courts. The lower courts are referred to as Circuit or District courts. The highest 
courts are known as Supreme Courts or Courts of Appeal.  
 
The different states may offer different approaches and solutions to the same 
problem. This provides possible alternative solutions for South African law to 
consider.  
 
In the following section I look at the recognition of the rights to privacy and identity in 
the United States. I focus on the following areas: constitutional law; common law; 
statutory law; and secondary sources. 
 
4.3  THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND IDENTITY 
4.3.1  Recognition and development 
4.3.1.1 Privacy 
In the United States, the development of hand-held cameras and sensationalist 
journalism in the 1890s were just a few of the issues which raised concern over 
privacy and stimulated a discourse on the topic.5 Other issues included the 
development of various technologies, such as telephone wiretaps, lie detectors, 
personality tests, and cameras.6  
                                                            
3  United States Constitution art VI s 2 declares federal law to be ‘the supreme law of the land’. 
4  United States Constitution art III, s 1. 
5  Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz Information Privacy Law 9-10. 
6   Li Center for Democracy and Technology 43; Westin Social and Political Dimensions of 
Privacy 435, according to Westin, this period marked the rise of information privacy as an 
explicit social, political and legal issue of the high-technology age. 
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The development of the concept of privacy in the United States legal system can be 
traced back as far as 1890.7 Before then there was no clear recognition of the right 
to privacy, either in the United States Constitution or in case law.8 In that year, two 
American lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, wrote their famous article 
“The Right to Privacy” in which they urged that an invasion of privacy tort action 
(delictual action) should be developed to protect ‘inviolate personality’.9 Their main 
concern was that information about an individual’s personal life should not be 
revealed to the public by the press.10 They argued that a right to privacy is implied at 
common law in the United States and expressed as ‘the right to be left alone’. The 
courts11 and legislatures12 of the different states started to apply the tort of privacy 
invasion, also to situations other than those where private information had been 
published.  
Another scholar who had a profound impact on the development of the privacy tort 
was Prosser. According to modern-day privacy scholars, Richards and Solove, 
“[w]hereas Warren and Brandeis planted the germinal seed for tort privacy, Prosser 
systematized and organized the law, giving it an order and legitimacy that it had 
previously lacked.”13 Prosser analysed privacy court cases and in 1960 wrote an 
article “Privacy” in which he declared that what emerged from those decisions was 
that the privacy tort was not a single tort, but a complex of four torts, protecting four 
different interests tied together by the common name ‘right to privacy’, but otherwise 
having almost nothing in common save that each represented an interference with a 
                                                            
7  Boyd v United States 116 US616 (1886) can be considered as the first case in which privacy 
was protected, although privacy as a concept was not specifically defined. The court referred 
to “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life”.  
8  Street & Grant Law of the Internet 111. 
9  Warren & Brandeis 1890 Harv L Rev 193 198-205. Also see Allen 2012 Fordham L Rev 1187 
1202; Richards & Solove 2010 Cal L Rev 1887-8.  
10  Roos Data (Privacy) Protection 28-9. 
11   The Georgia Supreme Court was the first state court to recognise the existence of a right to 
privacy (Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co 122 Ga 190, 50 SE 68 (1905)). Pavesich 
became the leading case, and in 1938 the first Restatement of Torts s 867 recognised a 
cause of action against anyone who “unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s 
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public” (see 
Roos Data (Privacy) Protection 30 n 23; McQuoid Mason Privacy 36-7; Roline & Skalberg 
2004 ALSD Journal of Employment Law and Labor Law 78. 
12   New York state adopted the first privacy legislation in 1903 (NY Sess Laws 1903 ch 132 ss 1-
–2).  See further Roos Data (Privacy) Protection 30 n 23. 
13   Richards & Solove 2010 Cal L Rev 1887-8. 
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plaintiff’s right ‘to be let alone’.14 I consider these torts in greater detail below under 
the section on common law. 
 
4.3.1.2 Identity 
Unlike the position in South Africa, the right to identity does not exist as an 
independent personality right in the United States. As I have pointed out,15 in South 
Africa the right to identity has developed from two of the four United States privacy 
torts – the false-light tort (publicity which portrays the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public’s eye), and the appropriation tort (appropriation, to the defendant’s advantage, 
of the plaintiff’s name or likeness). In essence, the right to identity is, therefore, 
protected under the guise of the right to privacy, but one cannot speak of an identity 
tort as such in the United States. A right of publicity has recently been developed – 
this is discussed in greater detail below. It is unclear whether this right should be 
categorised as a right to identity, an intellectual property right, or both.16  
Identity theft as a crime does exist; in fact the United States Congress has passed a 
number of laws to combat identity theft.17 I do not, however, deal with it in this study, 
as the study focuses on the private-law consequences of SNSs, and identity theft 
forms part of criminal law. 
                                                            
14  Prosser 1960 Cal L Rev 383 385-8. These four torts will be discussed in greater detail below. 
15  Chapter 3 para 3.5.2 above. 
16  Bartholomew 2011 Connecticut Law Review 305-06. 
17  Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998. It terms of 18 USC s 1028, it is a crime 
“to knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet  … any unlawful activity that constitutes a 
violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under applicable state or local law”. 
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4.3.2  Common law 
 
I have already pointed out18 that in the United States the right to privacy is 
recognised and protected in terms of common law. As said, whilst the famous article 
written by Warren and Brandeis introduced the concept of the right to privacy, 
Prosser had a profound impact on the structure and future development of the tort of 
privacy invasion.19  
Prosser analysed over 300 cases in which aspects of privacy were protected. He 
then organised these torts into four categories. He described these four torts as: 
intrusion upon a plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his or her private affairs; 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about a plaintiff; publicity that places 
a plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation, for the defendant’s 
advantage, of a plaintiff’s name or likeness.20 Prosser’s four-tort framework was 
widely accepted, and in 1977 the Restatement (Second) of Torts accepted this 
classification.21 Although the Restatement is regarded as a secondary source which 
courts are not bound to follow, case law does refer to it.22  
Recently Prosser’s division of privacy into four torts has met with some criticism from 
scholars. Richards and Solove note that these four categories of privacy torts are 
narrow and rigid. 23 The classification of privacy into four specific torts has, for them, 
stultified the development of privacy, and limited its adaptability to evolve in 
response to the technological changes over the last 50 years.24  
According to Cohen,25 “it is becoming increasingly clear that the common law 
invasion of privacy torts will not help to contain the destruction of informational 
privacy.” Powell26 concurs, and holds that technological developments necessitate 
                                                            
18  See par 4.3.1.1 above. 
19  Richards & Solove 2010 Cal L Rev 1888. 
20 Prosser 1960 Cal LR 383, 389.  
21 Restatement (Second) of Torts s 652B (s 625E (1977)). 
22  See also Turkington & Allen Privacy Law: Cases and Material 60. 
23  Richards & Solove 2010 Cal L Rev 1887, 1890. 
24   Ibid 1887, 1889.  
25   Cohen 2001 Geo LJ 2029, 2043. 
26  Powell 2011 Pace Law Review 161. 
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revisiting whether or not privacy concerns differ, and whether or not torts law needs 
to evolve to protect these concerns.  
In the following section I briefly explain – using the Restatement (Second) of Torts27 
– how the four privacy torts may be infringed and the possible grounds for 
justification. The discussion also considers other torts which protect aspects of 
privacy, namely, breach of confidentiality, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and the right of publicity. The manifestation of these torts in selected states is also 
considered. 
4.3.2.1  Prosser’s privacy torts 
(a) Intrusion upon seclusion 
The intrusion upon seclusion tort protects a person’s right to privacy when another 
person intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion 
of such person’s private affairs. When this happens, the wrongdoer is liable for the 
invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy.  
This tort requires that the plaintiff must have had a ‘privacy interest’ which was 
intruded upon, but does not require that publicity should be given to the person 
whose privacy has been invaded. It is also required that the wrongful conduct 
(intrusion) be ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’.28 The courts have recognised 
conduct that may be found to be highly offensive,29 as including: harassing telephone 
calls;30 peeping into home windows;31 snooping into mail;32 and secretly recording 
conversations.33 In terms of this tort, the intrusion itself renders the defendant liable 
even though there has been no publication or other use of photographs or 
                                                            
27  Restatement (Second) of Torts 1977. 
28  Ibid 652B; see also Solove & Schwartz Privacy Law Fundamentals 18. 
29  In this regard, the requirements for the privacy torts of intrusion and public disclosure, differs 
from the requirements in the South African law of delict. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of 
Personality 221 indicate that in South African law an act of intrusion or disclosure constitutes 
a wrongful violation of privacy only if the acquaintance with or disclosure of private facts is 
both contrary to the subjective determination and will of the prejudiced party, and, viewed 
objectively, is unreasonable or contrary to the legal views of the community, that is, if it is 
contra bonos mores. It is not required that the intrusion or disclosure must be ‘highly 
offensive’. 
30  Rogers v Loews L’Enfant Plaza Hotel 526 F Supp 523 (DDC 1981). 
31  Pritchett v Board of Com’rs of Knox Country 85 NE 32 (ND Ga 1951). 
32  Doe v Kohn Nast & Graf PC 866 F Supp 190 (ED Pa 1994). 
33  Fischer v Hooper 732 A2d 396 (1999). 
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information outlined.34 It is arguable that in the context of SNSs, the tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion will not apply, particularly to information that users’ have made public 
on SNSs.35 Abril36 notes that this tort would only apply if the information was 
uncovered in a furtive way from a place with which the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. A furtive way in the context of SNSs, would be snooping into 
someone’s Facebook page. 
 (b) Public disclosure of private facts 
This tort creates a cause of action for the public disclosure of a private matter that is 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and that is not of legitimate concern to the 
public. The Restatement provides that it is not an invasion of privacy, in the case of 
this tort, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to one person or 
even to a small group of persons.37 Many states require that the disclosure must be 
widespread – however, this is not the same in all jurisdictions.  
The state of Illinois requires widespread disclosure,38 as does the state of Kansas. 
But in Peterson v Moldofsky,39 a federal court in Kansas held that, because of the 
ease with which pictures can be further disseminated, a woman may institute a 
private-facts tort claim even though nude pictures of her were distributed by an ex-
boyfriend by email to only five other persons. It is argued that such an approach is 
effective in the digital age, because it acknowledges that publications are more 
easily spread via the Internet.40 
The defendant cannot be held liable for giving further publicity to information about 
the plaintiff that is already public (re-publication) or that is part of a public record, for 
                                                            
34  Restatement (Second) of Torts 652B, comment (b); Monroe v Darr 221 Kan 281, 559 P2d 322 
(1977), in a case of intrusion upon seclusion, it was held that the general rule is that punitive 
damages may be recovered for an invasion of the right to privacy where the defendant has 
acted with malice. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the defendant acted with malice. 
35  Abril 2007 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 79; Pabarcus 2011 
William Mitchell Law Review 411-12. 
36  Abril 2007 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 79. 
37  Restatement (Second) of Torts 652B, comment (a). 
38  Solove & Rotenberg Information Privacy Law 99; also see Miller v Motorola Inc 560 NE 2d 
900 (Ill App 1990).  
39  2009 WL 3126229 (D Kan Sept 29, 2009). 
40  Walters 2015 Campbell Law Review 439.  
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example, disclosing a person’s marital status, date of birth, or the fact that the 
person has filed a lawsuit.41 
There is also no cause of action if the plaintiff consented to the publication, or if the 
private facts are of legitimate public concern.42 
(c) Appropriation of name or likeness 
This tort provides a remedy for a plaintiff against someone who appropriates, for his 
or her own use or benefit, the name or likeness of the plaintiff. The wrongdoer is 
liable for the invasion of the plaintiff’s right to privacy.43 This tort protects the interests 
of an individual in the exclusive use of his or her own identity, in so far as it is 
represented by his or her name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of 
benefit to him, her or to others.44 The appropriation or use is actionable where the 
plaintiff’s name is used for either commercial or non-commercial purposes. In some 
states, liability has been limited by means of statute to commercial use of a name or 
likeness.45 
From the tort of appropriation of name or likeness, the courts have developed 
another tort – the tort of invasion of the right of publicity – which provides a remedy 
for famous people, in that it grants them an exclusive right to exploit the value of their 
identity as celebrities. The right to publicity is discussed below.46  
In the context of SNSs, a user may appropriate someone else’s name or likeness in 
order to attract a larger user base or ‘followers’ and in so doing infringe the privacy of 
the other person.47  
 
                                                            
41  Restatement (Second) of Torts 652D comment (a); also see Walters 2015 Campbell Law 
Review 441. 
42  Restatement (Second) of Torts 652D comment (a). 
43  Ibid 652C. 
44  Ibid 652C comment (a). 
45  Ibid 652C comment (b). 
46  Para 4.3.2.2 (c). 
47  Shepard’s Pharmacy Inc v Stop & Shop Companies Inc 37 Mass App Ct 516, 524; 640 NE 2d 
1112, 1117 (Ct App 1994). In this case restitution was denied because the defendant had 
made no profit from the use of the plaintiff’s photograph. 
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(d) Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the view of the public 
The false-light tort provides a remedy when one publicly discloses a matter that 
places a person in a false light that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
the actor had knowledge of, or acted in reckless disregard for, the falsity of the 
publicised matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.48 In the case 
of Time Inc v Hill,49 the United States Supreme Court held that the United States 
Constitution’s First Amendment permits liability in false-light cases only if the plaintiff 
publicly discloses information with a reckless disregard for the truth, or with actual 
knowledge of falsity. Not all states recognise the false-light tort.50 
 
4.3.2.2  Another tort that protects privacy: Right of publicity 
 
The right of publicity, as explained above,51 developed from the tort of ‘appropriation 
of name and likeness’. This tort action protects the financial interests of celebrities 
against misappropriation of the intellectual property interest celebrities have in their 
celebrity personae. In Jim Henson Productions, Inc v John T Brady & Associates, 
Inc,52 the court distinguished between the tort of appropriation of name and likeness 
and the action for infringement of the right of publicity as follows: 
The privacy-based action is designed for individuals who have not placed 
themselves in the public eye. It shields such people from the embarrassment of 
having their faces plastered on billboards and cereal boxes without their 
permission. The interests protected are dignity and peace of mind, and 
damages are measured in terms of emotional distress. By contrast, a right of 
publicity action is designed for individuals who have placed themselves in the 
public eye. It secures for them the exclusive right to exploit the commercial 
                                                            
48  Restatement (Second) of Torts 652E. 
49  385 US 374 (1967); see too Solove & Schwartz Privacy Law Fundamentals 21. 
50  In Lake v Wal-Mart 582 NW 2d 231 (Minn 1998), the Minnesota Court of Appeal affirmed the 
recognition of the three invasion of privacy torts, but declined to recognise the tort of false- 
light publicity. Among the reasons given were the fact that this tort is similar to the action for 
defamation and the fact that there exists a possible tension between the tort of false light 
publicity and the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. Other states that rejected this 
privacy tort include Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, New York, Virginia, and Texas. 
See Osorio 2010 NYU Annual Survey 173, 174. 
51  See para 4.3.2.1(a), also see para 4.3.1.2 for a discussion on the right to identity. 
52  687 F Supp 185, 188-9 (SDNY 1994). 
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value that attaches to their identities by virtue of their celebrity. The right of 
publicity protects that value as property, and its infringement is a commercial, 
rather than a personal tort. Damages stem not from embarrassment but from 
the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s property. 
From the above distinction, it may seem that the right of publicity in the United States 
is similar to the independent personality right, namely the right to identity, which is 
recognised in South African law.53 However, there are differences. The first 
difference lies in the fact that the right to identity is available to everyone, while the 
right of publicity is available exclusively to celebrities. A further distinction is that the 
right of publicity protects a patrimonial interest, whilst the right to identity protects a 
personality interest.  
In the context of SNSs, it is possible to envisage that an ordinary person (user of 
SNSs) may gain prominence and fame within the SNSs, and therefore become a 
celebrity. This has been evident, for instance, on YouTube, where ordinary people 
upload videos which may go viral in a matter of seconds. An ordinary person who 
becomes a celebrity on SNSs should be able to use the right of publicity action if the 
users’ name or likeness is appropriated for commercial purposes. 
 
4.3.3  Federal Constitutional Law 
 
Here I examine the Constitution of the United States and focus specifically on 
provisions regarding the protection of privacy. These provisions are found in the Bill 
of Rights, which consists of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. The United 
States Constitution is the supreme law of the land; the supremacy clause in article 6 
of the Constitution provides that:54 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
                                                            
53  See para 3.3 above. 
54  Constitution of the United States art VI clause 2. 
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The Bill of Rights is included in the United States Constitution as amendments, and 
the Constitution comprises 27 amendments to date. The first ten Amendments, 
forming the Bill of Rights, were ratified by the states in 1791.55 The Bill of Rights is a 
declaration of the American people’s rights against the federal government.56 Before 
the introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights was limited to the 
federal government. It was the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that 
introduced a mechanism which imposed the guarantees of the Bill of Rights at state 
level; as a result the Bill of Rights is now binding on state governments.57 The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
The right to privacy is recognised and protected under the United States Constitution 
as a result of judicial interpretation. The decisions in Griswold v Connecticut58 and 
Katz v United States59 were the first cases to feature the concepts ‘right to privacy’ 
and ‘expectation of privacy’.60 In Griswold v Connecticut,61 the majority opinion held 
that a legal right to privacy could be found in the penumbra (shadows) of the First,62 
Third,63 Fourth,64 Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution.65  
 
Allen66 notes that although the founders and framers did not include the word 
‘privacy’ in the text of the written Constitution, rich conceptions of privacy are implicit 
in any plausible renderings of the text. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments all possess elements that protect the right to privacy. The First 
Amendment deals with the protection of freedom of speech, but in some instances it 
                                                            
55  Constitution of the United States Preamble to the Bill of Rights. 
56  Kanovitz Constitutional Law 24. 
57  Ibid. 
58  381 US 479 (1965). 
59  389 US 347, 359 (1967). 
60  Also see Allen 2012 Journal of Constitutional Law 890. 
61  381 US 479, 484 (1965). 
62  Constitution of the United States, Amendment I. 
63  Ibid Amendment III. 
64  Ibid Amendment IV. 
65  Ibid Amendment XIV.  
66  Allen 2012 Journal of Constitutional Law 887. 
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may be interpreted also to protect privacy, for example, by protecting the right to 
speak anonymously.67 The Third Amendment deals with protection of the home from 
the quartering of troops without the consent of the owner. The Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, while the Fifth Amendment 
provides a privilege against self-incrimination. This Amendment protects privacy by 
restricting the ability of the government to force individuals to divulge certain 
information about themselves that would lead to their prosecution in a criminal 
proceeding.68 The Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process clause has been 
interpreted by the courts to protect privacy by protecting the freedom of individuals to 
make certain choices in regard to procreation, motherhood, and child rearing.69 In 
this sense, the right to personal autonomy is also seen as part of the right to privacy. 
For the purposes of this study, only the First and the Fourth Amendments’ protection 
of privacy will be discussed as the protection of the privacy of published personal 
information (as would be the case on a SNS) seems to fall under these two 
Amendments. 
4.3.3.1  First Amendment  
 
The First Amendment provides that:70 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right 
of the people peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
The First Amendment protects, amongst other rights, the right to freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, the right to speak anonymously, and freedom of association. 
This provision has a strong implicit constitutional value that protects privacy since the 
freedom of association clause is interpreted to protect individuals from being 
compelled to disclose the groups to which they belong or contribute.71  
                                                            
67  Solove & Rotenberg Information Privacy Law 20. 
68  Ibid 21; also see Allen 2012 Journal of Constitutional Law 888. 
69  See Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) and Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973). 
70  Constitution of the United States, First Amendment. 
71  Solove & Rotenberg Information Privacy Law 20. 
98 
 
The First Amendment curtails the government’s power to dictate what is written, 
spoken, or read.72 This Amendment restricts liability for causes of action relating to 
the disclosure of both true and false information.73 The rights protected under this 
Amendment are not absolute, which means that certain categories of speech are not 
protected by the First Amendment.74 For instance, the disclosure of false information 
regarding another person, may lead to the person disclosing this information being 
held liable in terms of the tort of defamation (libel or slander). Other categories which 
may be excluded from the First Amendment include: obscenity;75 fighting words;76 
threats;77 incitement of immediate unlawful action; and child pornography.78 In the 
context of SNSs, for instance, the right to speak anonymously may be prone to lead 
to abuse of other users’ personality rights. Therefore a balance should be struck 
between one’s interest in anonymity and the interests of others’ personality rights.79 
 
4.3.3.2  Fourth Amendment  
 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the courts to apply where a person 
exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy. It aims to protect citizens from the 
government. Thus, whenever a government official conducts a search and seizure, 
the Fourth Amendment is activated.80 Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted this 
                                                            
72  Kanovitz Constitutional Law 45. 
73  Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz Privacy, Information, and Technology 25. 
74  Kanovitz Constitutional Law 51. Also see Burns Communications Law 28. She notes that the 
privilege granted by the right to freedom of speech is limited by, for example, the law of 
copyright, law of delict, libel laws, laws which protect national security, and so on. 
75  Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973). 
76  Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 315 US 568 (1942). 
77  Watts v United States 394 US 705, 89 S Ct 1399, 22 L Ed 2d 664 (1969). 
78  New York v Ferber 458 US 747 (1982). 
79  Solove, Rotenberg & Schwartz Privacy, Information, and Technology 428. 
80  Ibid 61. 
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amendment narrowly, protecting only against the physical intrusion upon private 
property by a law enforcement officer. In the case of Olmstead v United States,81 the 
Supreme Court decided that wiretapping does not violate the Fourth Amendment, as 
no search and seizure of anything tangible, or any physical trespass had occurred. 
The majority of the Supreme Court concurred that police wiretapping did not 
constitute an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. This was the position until 
1967. Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting judgment, contending that the central 
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was not property, but the ‘right to be let 
alone’. 
The position changed in Katz v United States.82 Prior to the Katz decision, there was 
legal uncertainty as to whether or not the Fourth Amendment covered government-
initiated electronic surveillance or intangible interests. It is inevitable that these 
electronic devices improved the law enforcement’s investigative techniques. In the 
Katz case, police ‘believed’ that a listening device placed in a telephone booth was 
not prohibited wiretapping, since it did not penetrate the wall of a phone booth, and 
was therefore a justified intrusion. The court held that the Fourth Amendment 
‘protects people, not places’ and that police must obtain a warrant when a search 
takes place in a public pay phone on a public street. In order to determine whether or 
not a right to privacy in terms of the Fourth Amendment exists, the court developed a 
‘reasonableness standard’. The reasonableness standard involves the following 
inquiry: whether a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; 
and whether the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognise as 
reasonable. In a case where a search is conducted with a warrant supported by 
probable cause, the search is reasonable, with a few exceptions.  
The advent of new technologies has an impact on the application and development 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. In Kyllo v United States,83 two Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents used a thermal imaging device to scan parts of 
petitioner, Kyllo’s, triplex on suspicion that he was illegally growing marijuana inside 
his house. The scan was performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott’s 
vehicle across the road from the front of the house and also from the street at the 
                                                            
81  1928 227 US 438. 
82  1967 389 US 347. 
83  533 US 27, 29 (2001); see also Candy 2012 Drake Law Review 237. 
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back of the house. With the information that was gathered, the government 
discovered that the defendant was indeed growing marijuana illegally inside his 
home. A Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorising a search of the 
petitioner’s home. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the government’s use of 
sense-enhancing technology not in ‘general public use’ without a search warrant 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court emphasised the requirements 
of a warrant and probable cause. This case is another illustration how the advance in 
technology affects the degree of privacy of the citizens protected in the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In the following section I look at some of the legislation protecting privacy at the 
federal level. 
 
4.3.4  Legislation 
4.3.4.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this section I look at some of the relevant legislation protecting 
privacy at the federal level. In the United States, there are many pieces of legislation 
which regulate and protect privacy interests. These pieces of legislation cover 
different areas, such as law enforcement and government records,84 data security,85 
consumer data,86 medical and genetic data,87 and employment.88 Congress often 
enacts legislation to address an imminent threat to privacy. These pieces of 
legislation are applied and interpreted together with the United States Constitution 
and common law. This section will first of all discuss the laws most relevant in the 
area of SNSs. 
                                                            
84  Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970; Bank Secrecy Act of 1970; Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986; Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994; Identity 
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998; Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998; Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999; USA-PATRIOT Act of 2000; CAN-SPAM Act of 2001; 
and Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004. 
85  Privacy Act of 1974; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974; Rights to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978; Privacy Protection Act of 1980; Computer Matching and Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988; and Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988. 
86  Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. 
87  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; 
88  Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988; Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994; and 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 
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International instruments such as the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines of 1980, and the EU Data Protection Directive of 
1995, also influence the privacy laws in the United States. The OECD Guidelines 
and the EU Directive are discussed in Chapter 5. The ‘Privacy Shield’ agreement 
reached between the United States and the EU to ensure compliance with the EU 
Directive is therefore discussed. 
In the last part of this section I consider the application of some of the laws 
discussed in the context of SNSs. 
4.3.4.2 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) 
 
The ECPA was passed by the United States Congress in 1986. The Congress noted 
the growth in wiretapping carried out in the absence of a legal sanction, and without 
the consent of any of the parties to the conversation.89 Furthermore, the evidence 
derived in this way was being used by public and private parties in court and 
administrative proceedings. This created a lacuna in the effective protection of the 
privacy of wire,90 oral,91 and electronic communications.92 Congress found it 
necessary to define a uniform basis for the circumstances and conditions under 
which the interception of wire or oral communications may be authorised, to prohibit 
any unauthorised interception and use of the contents of such communications, as 
evidence in courts and administrative proceedings.93 
The ECPA is a federal law which governs wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. 
The ECPA was enacted in an attempt to keep pace with the prevalence of electronic 
                                                            
89  Rotenberg Privacy Law Sourcebook 103. 
90  18 USC s 2510(1) interprets ‘wire communication’ to mean “any aural transfer made in whole 
or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of 
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception 
(including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any 
person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or 
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce”.  
91  18 USC s 2510(2) interprets ‘oral communication’ to mean “any oral communication uttered 
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communications is not subject to interception 
under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any 
electronic communication”. 
92  18 USC s 2510(12) interprets ‘electronic communication’ to mean “any transfer of signs, 
signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence or any nature transmitted in whole or in 
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include any wire or oral communication”. 
93  18 USC s 2515. 
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communications. The ECPA regulates wire,94 oral,95 and electronic 
communications.96 The ECPA divided electronic surveillance into three sections or 
titles: the Wiretap Act;97 the Stored Communications Act;98 and the Pen Register 
Act.99 All these Acts are briefly discussed below. However, it is notable that only the 
Stored Communications Act has a direct bearing on SNSs within private law. On the 
other hand, the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register Act focus more on effective law 
enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering, in conjunction with other relevant 
legislation.100  
In the following paragraphs I look at the scope of application of the three Acts. 
(a) Wiretap Act (Title I) of Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
 
In terms of the Wiretap Act,101 it is a federal crime to engage in wiretapping or 
electronic eavesdropping, to possess wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping 
equipment, to use or disclose information obtained through illegal wiretapping or 
electronic eavesdropping, or to disclose information secured through court-ordered 
wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping.102 This applies to any employee or agent of 
the United States or any state or political subdivision thereof, as well as any 
individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation.103 
The Wiretap Act applies to the intentional interception of communications 
simultaneously with their transmission – in other words, while the communication is 
being transmitted.104 The Act defines ‘interception’ as the aural or other acquisition of 
                                                            
94  Ibid s 2510 (1). 
95  Ibid s 2510 (2). 
96  Ibid s 2510 (3). 
97  Wiretap Act 18 USC ss 2510-2522 (2006). 
98  Stored Communications Act 18 USC ss 2701-2712 (2006). 
99  18 USC ss 3121-3127 (2007). 
100  USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001; 21st century 
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act of 2002; Department of Homeland 
Security Act of 2002; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2006; and 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 Amendments Act of 2008. 
101  The Wiretap Act is also referred to as the revised Title III (Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Street Act). 
102  18 US s 2511. Also see Doyle Overview of the ECPA 7 available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=725508 (date of use: 20 December 2016). 
103  18 USC s 2510 (6). 
104  Noel v Hall 568 F 3d 743, 749 (9th Cir 2009). The court held that replaying of tapes containing 
a recorded phone conversation does not amount to a new interception in violation of the 
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the contents of various kinds of communication by means of electronic, mechanical 
or other devices.105 In order for a government official lawfully to intercept the 
contents of a communication using an electronic, mechanical, or any other device, 
the official is required to obtain a court order. Section 2518 requires that an 
application for a court order to intercept must contain details that justify the 
interception, information regarding how the interception will be conducted, and 
information on the duration of the interception.106 There are recognised exceptions 
which exclude the application of the Wiretap Act. First of all, if one of the parties to 
the communication consents to the interception the Wiretap Act will not apply.107 
There is also an exception which permits the service provider, “whose facilities are 
used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, 
or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in 
any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the 
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service….”.108 
In cases where the provisions of the Wiretap Act have been violated, there are two 
possible remedies available to the plaintiff. Firstly, the aggrieved party may move to 
supress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted or evidence 
obtained (in terms of the exclusionary rule of the rules of evidence).109 Secondly, the 
responsible party could be held liable for damages of a minimum of $1 000 per 
violation or up to five years’ imprisonment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Wiretap Act. See also United States v Szymuszkiewicz 622 F 3d 701, 705-06 (7th Cir 2010). 
The court held that an employee surreptitiously programming his supervisor’s computer so 
that the server forwards duplicates to the employee of all e-mails sent to the supervisor, 
constitutes an interception in violation of Title III. 
105  18 USC s 2510 (4). 
106  Ibid s 2518. 
107  Ibid s 2511 (2)(c). In other words, one of the parties to the communication may secretly record 
his or her own phone conversation; it is not illegal under federal wiretap law. 
108  18 USC s 2511 (2)(a)(i). In terms of s 2511, a service provider may intentionally disclose 
intercepted communications to the proper authorities when criminal activity is afoot; with the 
consent of the originator, addressee, or intended recipient; or to any intermediary provider. 
109  18 USC s 2518 (10)(a). 
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(b)  The Stored Communications Act (Title II) of Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 
 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA Act)110 applies to stored communications or 
records held by ISPs. The SCA Act makes it a federal crime intentionally to access, 
without authorisation, a facility through which an electronic communication service is 
provided, thereby obtaining, altering, or preventing access to a wire or electronic 
communication while it is in ‘electronic storage’ in such a system.111 ‘Electronic 
storage’ is defined as encompassing temporary, intermediate storage incidental to 
transmission, as well as backup storage.112 Before a government official may gain 
access to these communications, section 2703 requires him or her to obtain a court 
order, subpoena, or warrant.  
In a case where there has been an infringement of the SCA Act, there is a remedy 
available to the plaintiff. If found guilty, the responsible party will be held liable for 
damages, with a minimum of $1 000 per violation or up to one year’s imprisonment, 
if the violation was for commercial gain. 
The case of Juror Number One v The Supreme Court of Sacramento113 was a 
petitioned appeal to the Court of Appeal in California. The applicant in the matter 
was ‘juror number one’ (fictitiously named) in the assault case of People v 
Christian.114 The respondent learned that the applicant had, in violation of an 
admonition by the court (juror misconduct), posted something about the case on his 
Facebook account while the case was still before the court. The trial court then 
entered an order in accordance with the SCA Act, requiring the juror to sign a 
consent form authorising Facebook to release, for in-camera review, all the items 
posted during the trial. The juror filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. The 
applicant’s petition was an attempt to stop the respondent from enforcing its order. 
This was based on the ground that such an order, if enforced, would violate the 
                                                            
110  Ibid ss 2701-2711. 
111  Ibid s 2701 (a). 
112  Ibid s 2711 (1). 
113  206 Cal App 4th 854; 2012 Cal 142 Cal Rptr 3d 151. 
114  Sacramento County Superior Court case number 08F09791. 
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provisions of the SCA Act, as well as the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in terms of 
the Federal Constitution.115 
The court drew a distinction between posting for public viewing and posting to a 
closed group of friends. The former refers to a situation where a user posts 
information on the ‘Timeline’ (previously referred to as the ‘Wall’)116 on Facebook or 
a profile page on MySpace, which is similar to the ‘Timeline’ feature on Facebook. 
The court held that a party does not forfeit his SCA Act protection by making his 
communications available to a closed group. It also held that the SCA Act protection 
applies only to an attempt, either by the court or by relevant parties, to compel 
Facebook, as the service provider, to disclose the requested information. In this 
case, the attempt was directed at juror number 1 and not at Facebook. Mauro J 
concurred in this view. The court held that the applicant had failed to demonstrate 
any expectation of privacy with regard to his Facebook posts, and that such posts 
constituted misconduct on the part of the applicant.117  
The petition for writ of prohibition was therefore denied. The Court of Appeal held 
that the juror’s right to privacy with regard to his Facebook posts is not absolute, and 
that a balance had to be struck between the interests of the parties involved in the 
trial, and their interests in a fair trial.  
 
(c) Pen Register Act (Title III) of Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
 
The Pen Register Act applies to pen registers or trap-and-trace devices.118 The 
government must obtain a court order to install pen register and trap-and-trace 
                                                            
115  206 Cal App 4th 854; 2012 Cal 142 Cal Rptr 3d 151 para [9]. 
116  See Chapter 3 above.  
117  See also Moreno v Hanford Sentinel Inc 91 Cal Rptr (Cal Ct App 2009).The court held that 
postings on publically accessible MySpace pages were not private, and as such, the plaintiff 
could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in terms of the information published to 
her profile.  
118  18 USC s 3127(3), defines a ‘pen register’ as a “device or process” that records outgoing 
“dialing, routing, addressing or signalling information,” but “such information shall not include 
the contents of any communication”; 18 USC s 3127(4) defines a ‘trap and trace device’ as a 
“device or process” that captures incoming “dialing, routing, addressing and signaling 
information” but “such information shall not include the contents of any communication”. 
106 
 
devices. Pen registers are useful for a number of reasons, including the following: to 
aid in identifying a person making annoying or obscene calls; to keep records of 
monthly bills for calls; to check overbilling; and many more. The court must grant the 
order sought if the government has shown that the information likely to be obtained 
by the installation and use is relevant to a criminal investigation. The Pen Register 
Act is not applicable in the context of SNSs and will therefore not be discussed in 
any detail. 
4.3.4.3 Safe Harbour privacy principles and the ‘Privacy Shield’ 
(a) Background 
 
From time to time the United States promulgates information privacy laws which are 
intended to protect the privacy of personal information while at the same time 
allowing for the free flow of information. As noted above, the approach towards the 
protection of privacy in the United States is piecemeal and based on self-regulation. 
The same trend is found in the field of data privacy. Roos notes that: “American-
policy makers prefer to deal with data-privacy issues as and when such issues 
become a problem; a specific event usually ‘triggers’ the legislative process”.119 The 
Working Party set up in terms of article 29 of the 1995 European Union Directive on 
Data Protection, viewed the United States’ information privacy laws as not meeting 
the adequacy standard as set in article 25 of the Directive.120 Only if a country 
provides an adequate level of protection to personal data, will a European Union 
data controller be allowed to transfer personal data from the European Union country 
to the other country. This finding could potentially have meant that the flow of 
personal information between the European Union and the United States would 
come to a standstill.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Section 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2000 has amended these definitions to read “a 
device or process which records or decodes dialling, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the 
contents of any communication attached.” 
119  Roos “Data protection law” 349. The EU Directive on Data Protection is discussed in Ch 5; 
Roos 2007 SALJ 414. 
120  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of such Data. This Directive is discussed in the next chapter.  
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Therefore, in 1998 the United States began to negotiate with the European Union for 
a ‘European Union-United States Safe Harbor Agreement’ (Safe Harbour 
Agreement).121 The negotiations were aimed at ensuring continued trans-border 
flows of personal data and compliance with the requirements of article 25 of the EU 
Directive on Data Protection. After two years of negotiations, the United States 
Department of Commerce and the Internal Market Directorate of the European 
Commission reached an agreement in 2000. The Safe Harbour Agreement has 
seven privacy principles: notice; choice; onward transfer; security; data integrity; 
access; and enforcement, 
In terms of the agreement, United States’ companies voluntarily agreed to adhere to 
these privacy principles. Once they had signed up to the agreement, they had to 
ensure compliance with the EU Directive, as non-compliance could lead to 
prosecution by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). After self-certifying their 
compliance with the agreement, these companies were presumed to provide 
adequate protection to the privacy of personal information and could continue to 
receive personal data from the European Union. 
 
(b) Critique of the Safe Harbour Agreement 
 
From the outset, the Safe Harbour Agreement met with criticism. The European 
Commission noted in its 2013 report122 that the Safe Harbour Agreement was based 
on voluntary self-certification by the companies. As a result, any lack of transparency 
from the participants and shortcomings in enforcement, undermined the foundations 
on which the Safe Harbour scheme was construed.123 Other concerns stemmed from 
whether all self-certified companies complied with the transparency requirements. 
The reports also noted that some companies still fell short of fully incorporating all 
Safe Harbour privacy principles. It also noted that some privacy principles of self-
certified companies were often unclear as regards the purposes for which data had 
                                                            
121  Roos “Data Protection Law” 350. 
122  European Commission Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the perspective of EU citizens 
and companies established in the EU (2013) 4. 
123  Ibid 5. 
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been collected and the right to choose whether or not data could be disclosed to 
third parties. This raised issues of compliance with the privacy principles of ‘notice’ 
and ‘choice’.  
(c) Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner 
On 6 October 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Schrems v 
Data Protection Commissioner,124 invalidated decision 2000/520 of the European 
Commission which approved the Safe Harbour scheme as providing for an adequate 
level of protection for personal data when assessed against the standard set by EU 
data protection law.  
The background to this case is that in 2013 Schrems, an Austrian citizen, lodged a 
complaint with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, asking, in essence,  the 
Commissioner to exercise its statutory powers to prohibit Facebook Ireland from 
transferring his personal data to the United States. Facebook stores the information 
of its European users on servers located in Ireland before transferring it to the United 
States. Schrems contended in his complaint that the law and practice in force in the 
United States did not ensure adequate protection for the personal data held in its 
territory against the surveillance activities engaged in in the United States by public 
authorities.125 The Irish High Court rejected the complaint as under the 2000 decision 
of the European Commission, the Safe Harbour Agreement was held to provide 
adequate protection. 
The issue was referred to the CJEU which declared the Safe Harbour decision 
invalid. It was, inter alia, pointed out that once the personal data has been 
transferred to the United States, it is capable of being accessed by the NSA and 
other federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the 
course of the indiscriminate surveillance and interception carried out by them on a 
large scale.126 
After the ruling of the CJEU, the Article 29 Working Party made an urgent call on the 
member states and the European institutions to open discussions with United States’ 
                                                            
124  EUCJ Case C-362/13 6 October 2015. 
125  Para 25. 
126  Para 31. 
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authorities in order to find political, legal, and technical solutions which would enable 
data transfers that respect fundamental rights to the territory of the United States.127  
On 2 February 2016 the European Commission and the United States agreed on a 
new framework for transatlantic data flows: the EU-US Privacy Shield. The European 
Commission announced that the new arrangement will include the following three 
elements.128 
 
1.  Strong obligations on companies handling Europeans' personal data and robust 
enforcement. United States’ companies wishing to import personal data from 
Europe will need to commit to robust obligations on how that personal data is 
processed and individual rights guaranteed. The Department of Commerce will 
monitor that companies publish their commitments, which makes them 
enforceable under United States law by the United States Federal Trade 
Commission. In addition, any company handling human resources data from 
Europe will have to commit to complying with decisions by European DPAs. 
 
2.  Clear safeguards and transparency obligations on United States’ government 
access to personal data. For the first time, the United States has given the 
European Union written assurances that the access of public authorities for law 
enforcement and national security, will be subject to clear limitations, 
safeguards, and oversight mechanisms. The United States has ruled out 
indiscriminate mass surveillance of personal data transferred to the United 
States under the new arrangement. There will be an annual joint review to 
monitor the functioning of the arrangement on a regular basis, which will 
include the issue of national security access. The European Commission and 
the United States Department of Commerce will conduct the review and invite 
national intelligence experts from the United States and European Data 
Protection Authorities to attend. 
 
                                                            
127  EU art 29 DP WP Statement of the Working Party (Brussels) 16 October 2015. 
128  “EU Commission and United States agree on new framework for transatlantic data flows: EU-
US Privacy Shield” (Strasbourg 2 February 2016). Press release available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm (date of use: 13 October 2016). 
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3.  Effective protection of European Union citizens' rights with several redress 
possibilities. Any citizen, who considers that his or her data has been misused 
under the new arrangement, will have several avenues of redress. Companies 
have deadlines within which to reply to complaints. European DPAs can refer 
complaints to the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade 
Commission. In addition, alternative dispute resolution will be provided free of 
charge. For complaints on possible access by national intelligence authorities, 
a new Ombudsperson will be created. 
 
This new framework will protect the fundamental rights of Europeans where their 
data is transferred to the United States and ensure legal certainty for businesses. 
 
4.4  PRACTICAL APPLICATION TO SNSs 
 
The Internet is arguably a public space by default. This has often raised the question 
of whether an Internet user retains or has a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
he or she is online. Ganguly129 holds that the advent of the Internet makes traditional 
privacy protection more important than ever, as privacy becomes easier to violate. It 
is trite that the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ is the test or standard for 
determining whether or not a person has a right to privacy that should to be 
protected by law.  
With regard to the reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, Grant130 is of the 
view that in both society and the online world, there are situations which are not 
covered by the reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the Katz decision is an 
example which shows that even in a public place, there are some matters that 
remain private and thus warrant protection. Hogde131 holds that on SNSs, users’ 
messages (or posts) may be received by a large number of recipients, and that this 
has the potential to diminish the expectation of privacy. In United States v 
                                                            
129  Ganguly 2008-2009 Wis Int LJ 1151. 
130 Street & Grant Law of the Internet 135. 
131  Hodge 2006 South Illin Univ LJ 105. 
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Rodriguez,132 it was held that although individuals generally have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on their home computers, for Fourth Amendment purposes 
they do not enjoy such an expectation of privacy in the case of transmissions over 
the Internet, or e-mails which have already reached the recipient. In contrast, 
Newell133 is of the view “that the subjective expectation of privacy in information 
posted to limited-access social media websites also described as the notion of 
‘network privacy’ is an expectation that society recognises as reasonable in the 
twenty-first century”. Therefore, it may be concluded that a user does retain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy where the communications are to a closed group 
and where adequate privacy settings have been put in place.134 
 
4.5  PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES 
 
An ISP often gives users access to SNSs or networks without requiring any form of 
positive identification or verification of the users’ true identity. Here I address whether 
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can be held liable for content posted by a user 
whose identity is unknown to the plaintiff, either because the defendant is 
anonymous or is using a pseudonym. I also discuss whether or not the ISP would be 
liable if the wrongdoer could not be located. Lastly, I discuss whether, in the case of 
an anonymous user, an ISP may be compelled to reveal the user’s identity. 
4.5.1 Liability of an Internet Service Provider for third-party content 
 
The Communications Decency Act135 (CDA) provides immunity to website operators 
and other ‘interactive computer services’136 for liability regarding content posted by 
third parties which may potentially be tortious (wrongful) in nature, even when the 
                                                            
132  532 F Supp 2d 332 (DPR 2007). 
133  Newell 2010-2011 Rich JL & Tech 7. 
134  Also see para 3.6 above. 
135  Communications Decency Act of 1996 s 230. 
136  Ibid. ‘Interactive computer service’ means “any information service, system or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including a service or system that provides access to the Internet, and such systems 
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions”.  
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website operator or interactive computer service has become aware of the tortious 
nature of the content. Section 230 provides: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. 
The immunity applies to either a provider or a user (defendant) of an interactive 
computer service; where the cause of action treats the defendant as the publisher or 
speaker of the alleged tortious or unlawful content; and where the content is 
provided by another ‘information content provider’.137 This means that online 
intermediaries that host or re-publish speech, are protected against liability for 
information posted by third parties. In the context of SNSs, the ISP generally does 
not provide content; most of the content is generated by users. Therefore this 
immunity will apply in the context of SNSs. 
The case of Zeran v America Online Inc138 is the leading case dealing with section 
230. In this case an unknown user advertised T-shirts on a message board operated 
by America Online (AOL). The T-shirts contained offensive slogans relating to the 
bombing of Oklahoma City’s federal building. The unknown user gave Zeran’s name 
and address as the contact information (this was Zeran’s business number) for the 
advertisement. Those who had an interest in purchasing a T-shirt had therefore to 
contact Zeran. As a result, he received a high volume of angry and derogatory calls, 
including death threats. Zeran notified AOL of his predicament and AOL then 
removed the post and terminated the account of the unknown user. The unknown 
user then created another post, again using Zeran’s contact details. Zeran sued AOL 
for failing to remove the advertisement more speedily, alleging that AOL had been 
negligent. AOL advanced section 230 of the CDA as a defence. The district court for 
the Western District of Oklahoma granted judgment in favour of AOL and Zeran 
appealed the decision. The decision was later affirmed by the Fourth Circuit court, 
which stated that: 
By its plain language, section 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action 
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service. Specifically, section 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims 
                                                            
137  Ibid. ‘Information content provider’ means “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service”.  
138  129 F 3d 327 (4th Cir 1997). 
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that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits 
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions - such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content - are barred.139 
The immunity provided under section 230 of the CDA has not escaped criticism. 
Solove140 is of the view that “the law is hampered because it overprotects free 
speech. In particular, the Communications Decency Act section 230 promotes a 
culture of irresponsibility when it comes to speech online”. Furthermore, the author 
states that he would 
recommend that section 230 be modified to have a notice-and-takedown system rather 
than complete unmitigated immunity, Whenever bloggers or website operators know 
that a comment posted by another is tortious, the law should create an incentive for 
them to remove it. If a person promptly removes a tortious comment after being 
notified, then that person would be immune. If the person fails to remove the comment, 
only then would the person be subjected to potential liability. 
The immunity provided under section 230 of the CDA is similar to that provided by 
South Africa141 and the United Kingdom.142 
4.5.2  Anonymous users 
 
In the United States, the use of a pseudonym or the decision to remain anonymous 
in online communication is considered to be a democratic right protected under the 
First Amendment.143 It is clear that anonymity may be used to protect a user’s right 
to freedom of speech, and Barendt144 notes that the freedom to choose anonymity is 
one aspect that guarantees the right to privacy. However, neither free speech nor 
privacy is an absolute right, which means that when these rights are invoked, a 
balance should always be struck with the rights of others. In a case where a 
personality right has been infringed, the plaintiff will seek to determine the identity of 
the anonymous user, in order to succeed in the redress sought.  
                                                            
139  129 F 3d 327 (4th Cir 1997) 330. 
140  Solove in Levmore & Nussbaum The Offensive Internet 25. 
141  See para 3.9.3 above. 
142  See para 5.4.3.2 below. 
143  Sobel 2000 VA JL & Tech para [3] available at www.vjolt.net (date of use: 1 September 2014); 
Moore Privacy Rights 103, notes that the ability to speak freely sometimes relies heavily upon 
anonymity. 
144  Barendt “Privacy and Freedom of Speech” 15. 
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In the case of a law enforcement officer or government entity who seeks to pierce 
the veil of online anonymity, the position is governed by the ECPA, which requires 
the law enforcement officer to obtain a warrant according to the procedural 
requirements stipulated in the ECPA.145 Section 2703(c)(1)(A) of the ECPA provides 
that:146 
A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or 
remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a 
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of 
communications) only when the governmental entity, obtains a warrant issued using 
the procedure described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or in case of a 
State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
In a civil suit, once the plaintiff has filed a complaint suing a fictitious ‘John Doe’, the 
next step would be to serve a subpoena on the ISP, with the permission of the court, 
which seeks to determine the identity of the anonymous poster.147 It is then the duty 
of the ISP to notify its user of the pending subpoena, which will provide him or her 
with an opportunity to oppose the subpoena. Whether or not an ISP notifies its user 
when there is a pending subpoena is determined by the ISP’s privacy policy.148 
According to Larson and Godfread,149 “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
largely silent or unclear on the matter of anonymous defendants, leaving various 
jurisdictions to develop different methods of dealing with anonymous parties”.  
Thus, in the United States, the civil process of unmasking an anonymous user may 
have a negative effect in two respects before the defendant is afforded an 
opportunity to oppose the unmasking. Firstly, it may infringe upon the defendant’s 
freedom of speech, and secondly, it may infringe upon the defendant’s right to 
privacy.150 
In Columbia Insurance Co v Seescandy.com,151 the court required the plaintiff to 
identify the relevant party with sufficient specificity to enable the court to determine if 
                                                            
145  18 USC s 2518 (Wiretap Act); s 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act); and s 3123(a) (Pen 
Register Act).  
146  18 USC s 2703 (c)(1)(A). 
147  Sobel 2000 VA JL & Tech para [14]; see also Larson & Godfread 2011 William Mitchell LR 
339. 
148  Ibid. 
149  Larson & Godfread 2011 William Mitchell LR 337. 
150  Ibid 339. 
151  Columbia Insurance Co v Seescandy.com 185 FRD 573 (ND Cal 1999). 
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the defendant was a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court. In 
order to lift the veil of anonymity, the plaintiff must approach the court to subpoena 
the ISP, in order to compel the ISP to reveal the identity of the anonymous user. The 
plaintiff should also show the court all the steps taken to locate the anonymous 
defendant.152  
In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc,153 the court identified three 
criteria which will convince the court to order a non-party (ISP) to provide information 
concerning the identity of a subscriber. These requirements are: the court must be 
satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to it; the party requesting the 
subpoena must have a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be a victim 
of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit is filed; and the subpoenaed 
identity information is central to advance that claim. 
Larson and Godfread154 note that most ISPs or website operators have little 
incentive to either comply with a request to identify an anonymous speaker, or to use 
their resources to protect anonymous speakers. They cite the immunity granted by 
section 230 of the CDA as one of the reasons for this as ISPs or website operators 
run little risk of liability for tortious claims that arise as a result of content created by 
anonymous third parties.155 
In the United States, when an infringement of a personality right such as the right to 
privacy has occurred (under either the Constitutional or tort law) in the context of 
SNSs, it is clear that an SNS may not be held liable for the content published by third 
parties, whether anonymous or not. The duty to find an anonymous defendant 
ultimately falls to the plaintiff. It therefore appears that without successfully 
identifying the anonymous user, the plaintiff has no legal recourse. 
 
4.6  CONCLUSION 
 
                                                            
152  Ibid. 
153  In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online Inc 52 Va Cir 26 (2000) and Columbia 
Insurance Co v Seescandy.com 185 FRD 573 (ND Cal 1999) adopted the same approach. 
154  Larson & Godfread 2011 William Mitchell LR 348. 
155  Ibid. 
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In this chapter I have considered the recognition, protection and regulation of the 
right to privacy and the right to identity in the United States. I examined various 
sources in this regard, namely constitutional law (at both federal and state level), 
legislation, common law, and case law. From my discussion, it is clear that the 
United States Federal Constitution does not explicitly protect the rights to privacy 
and identity. However, United States’ case law has helped develop the right to 
privacy through judicial interpretation. For instance, although the United States 
Constitution does not provide for dignity, the courts have interpreted the Constitution 
to include dignity.156  
The implied protection of the rights to privacy and identity in the United States 
Constitution applies only within a vertical relationship – the relationship between the 
state and its citizens. Consequently, in the context of SNSs, the constitutional 
provisions implicitly dealing with privacy may not apply between users as this falls 
outside of the vertical application of the Constitution. At federal level it is challenging 
to draw a clear distinction between public and private law protection of privacy. The 
common law also offers protection to both the vertical and horizontal relationship. In 
the context of SNSs, particularly when there are two private parties, the common law 
has a role to play, especially in the absence of legislation. 
Furthermore, the United States often enacts piecemeal legislation whenever an 
interest is under threat. The enacted legislation may be less or more stringent than 
the provisions of the United States’ Constitution. South African law may draw some 
lesson from the United States’ legal position specifically on how it deals with 
anonymous defendants in the context of SNSs.157 
                                                            
156  Schmerber v California 384 US 757, 767 (1966). 
157  Para 4.5.2 above; also see para 3.9.2 above.  
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Chapter 5 
International documents and the European Union 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I discuss some of the important documents relating to the protection 
of the right to privacy and the right to identity (as a part of the right to dignity1) in the 
context of SNSs issued by international organisations and the European Union (EU). 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with documents issued by 
international organisations which contribute to the development and protection of the 
right to privacy and data protection. The second focuses on the EU legal instruments 
in this area. Lastly, I explore the legal position in the United Kingdom (UK) as an 
example of the application of EU law in a specific EU member state.2  
Some of these documents are human rights documents which consider the right to 
privacy and the right to dignity (encompassing the right to identity) as fundamental 
human rights. However, the majority of the legal instruments I discuss are data 
protection legal instruments. As said, data protection laws become relevant 
whenever personal information is processed,3 and so, in essence, protect a person’s 
right to privacy and right to identity.4 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1  As said, the right to identity is usually protected under the guise of privacy or dignity; also see 
para 3.3.1 above. 
2  Britain is leaving the European Union sometime in the future. On 23 June 2016 UK held an 
EU Referendum where the people of the UK were required to vote on whether to stay within 
or exit the EU. They voted to leave – see para 5.4 below. 
3  Para 1.1 above. 
4  Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 270-1. 
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5.2  INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
 
The Internet and SNSs operate on an international platform which allows the trans-
border communication and processing of personal information. This may lead to the 
infringement of one’s rights to privacy or identity in a country other than one’s own. 
Although this study does not cover the issue of international jurisdiction, it is 
necessary to highlight a few of the notable international documents that have 
influenced national laws in different jurisdictions, including South Africa. Some of 
these international documents were discussed and incorporated in the South African 
Law Reform Commission’s (SALRC) discussion paper on privacy and data 
protection.5 
I refer to international documents issued by the United Nations (UN), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of 
Europe, the African Union (AU), and the EU. Other organisations have also issued 
privacy and data protection documents – for example, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but 
as the influence of these documents on South African law is minimal, I do not 
consider them further. 
 
5.2.1  United Nations  
5.2.1.1 Introduction 
 
The UN is an international organisation that was established in 1945 after the 
Second World War. South Africa was one of the 51 founding member states.6 The 
Charter of the UN serves as the constitutive document that guides the operation of 
the UN and member states.7 Article 1 of the Charter sets out the purposes of the UN 
                                                            
5  South African Law Reform Commission “Privacy and data protection” Project 124 discussion 
paper 109 October 2005. 
6  Between 1974 and 1994 South Africa’s membership was suspended owing to international 
opposition to the policy of apartheid. 
7  Charter of the United Nations 24 October 1945 1 UNTS XVI available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter (date of use: 10 February 2016). 
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which include maintaining international peace and security, promoting human rights, 
fostering social and economic development, protecting the environment, providing 
humanitarian aid, and to be a centre of harmonisation for nations in order to achieve 
these common ends.  
The principal judicial organ of the UN is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It 
was established by Chapter XIV of the Charter and settles legal disputes submitted 
to it by states in accordance with international law.8 
The following paragraphs briefly explore important documents issued by the UN in 
which the right to privacy and the right to dignity (and by extension the right to 
identity) are protected as fundamental human rights. 
5.2.1.2  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948.9 It arose from the experience of the Second World War and was 
adopted to define the meaning of the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental 
freedoms’ which appear in the Charter; it is therefore considered to be a constitutive 
document of the UN.10 The UDHR, together with two other UN instruments, the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)11 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),12 form the so-called 
International Bill of Human Rights.13 
The General Assembly proclaimed the UDHR as  
                                                            
8  Ibid arts 92-96. 
9  UN General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights 10 December 1948 217 A (III). 
The Union of South Africa abstained from voting in 1948 in order to protect its system of 
apartheid. 
10  Everything explained today “Universal Declaration of Human Rights Explained” available at 
http://everything.explained.today/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights/ (date of use: 10 
February 2016). 
11  United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 16 December 1966 999 
UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / [1980] ATS 23 / (1967) 6 ILM 368. 
12  United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 16 December 
1966 999 UNTS 171 and 1057 UNTS 407 / [1980] ATS 23 / (1967) 6 ILM 368. 
13  United Nations “What we do: Protect Human Rights” available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/index.html (date of use: 10 
February 2016).  
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 a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
 every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
 mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
 freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
 universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
 Member States and themselves and  among the peoples of territories under their 
 jurisdiction.14 
There are at least three notable provisions in the UDHR which are relevant to our 
topic: article 1 (human dignity), article 12 (right to privacy), and article 19 (freedom of 
expression).  
Article 1 deals with the protection of human dignity. It provides: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Article 12 deals with the protection of privacy and provides: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 19 protects freedom of expression: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
The UDHR is not a legally binding treaty but forms the inspiration for numerous 
international human rights treaties and declarations, regional human rights 
conventions, domestic human rights bills, and constitutional provisions.15 It is also 
strongly reflected in the Constitution of South Africa.16  
 
 
 
                                                            
14  Ibid, Preamble. 
15 United Nations “Human Rights Day” 10 December 2008 available at 
http://www.un.org/en/events/humanrightsday/2008/ihrl.shtml (date of use: 10 February 2016). 
16  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 10, 14 and 16.  
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5.2.1.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and came into force in 1976 after its ratification by 
the required number of countries.17 Privacy is protected in article 17(1): 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. 
In terms of article 17(2), everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attack, but the Covenant itself provides no clear legal 
mechanism by which individuals can enforce privacy rights.  
5.2.1.4  United Nations Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerised Personal Data 
Files  
 
The Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerised Personal Files (Guidelines) were 
adopted in 1990.18 The Guidelines give member states ‘orientations’ to follow when 
implementing regulations concerning computerised data files. They set out non-
binding principles concerning the minimum guarantees that should be included in 
national legislation.19  
 
(a) Scope and application 
The Guidelines recommend that they should be made applicable by states to public 
and private computerised files and, optionally, also to manual files.20 They further 
recommended that organisations designate the authority statutorily competent to 
supervise the observance of the Guidelines.21  
 
                                                            
17  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and ratified 
at the same time. 
18  UNGA Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Files GA res 45/95 14 
December 1990. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid para 10. 
21  Ibid para 8. 
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(b)  Principles concerning the minimum guarantees that should be provided in 
national legislations 
The Guidelines adopted the following principles: principle of lawfulness and fairness; 
principle of accuracy; principle of purpose specification; principle of interested-
person access; and principle of non-discrimination.22 
Principle of lawfulness and fairness. Information about persons should not be 
collected or processed in unfair or unlawful ways, or used for ends contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Principle of accuracy. Persons responsible for the compilation or keeping of files 
have certain obligations in respect of the accuracy of the data. They must carry out 
regular checks on the accuracy and relevance of the data. The data must be kept as 
complete as possible in order to avoid errors of omission. And, finally, data must be 
kept up to date.  
Principle of purpose-specification. The purpose for which a file is used should be 
specified, legitimate, and brought to the attention of the person concerned. This is to 
ensure that: (a) the personal data collected and recorded remain relevant and 
adequate for the purposes specified; (b) none of the personal data is used or 
disclosed, except with the consent of the person concerned and for purposes 
compatible with those specified; (c) and the period for which the personal data is 
kept does not exceed that which would enable the achievement of the purpose 
specified. 
Principle of interested-person access. This principle gives everyone, irrespective of 
nationality or place of residence, certain rights in respect of their personal 
information. All persons, who provide proof of their identity, have the right to know 
whether information concerning them is being processed, and to obtain a copy of the 
information in an intelligible form, without undue delay or expense. All persons also 
have a right to require that appropriate rectifications or erasures be made in the case 
of unlawful, unnecessary, or inaccurate entries, and, when they are being 
communicated, to be informed of the addressees. They are also entitled to a 
                                                            
22  Ibid paras 1-5. 
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remedy, if need be, from a supervisory authority. The cost of any rectification must 
be borne by the person responsible for the file. 
Principle of non-discrimination. Data that is likely to give rise to unlawful or arbitrary 
discrimination may not be compiled. Such information includes information on racial 
or ethnic origin, colour, sex life, political opinion, religious, philosophical and other 
beliefs, as well as membership of an association or trade union. Certain exceptions 
are allowed. This principle is similar to the sensitivity principle in other data 
protection documents. 
Power to make exceptions. Exceptions may be provided for in regard to the principle 
of fairness and lawfulness of processing, and the principle of access to information, 
but only if this is necessary to protect national security, public order, public health, or 
morality, as well as the rights and freedoms of others – in particular persons being 
persecuted (the so-called ‘humanitarian clause’). Such exceptions must be expressly 
specified in a law or equivalent regulation, their limits must be expressly stated, and 
appropriate safeguards must be spelled out. Exceptions may also be made to the 
principle of non-discrimination. These exceptions must be subject to the same 
safeguards as those prescribed above, and may be authorised only within the limits 
prescribed by the International Bill of Human Rights and the other relevant 
instruments in the field of protection of human rights and the prevention of 
discrimination. 
Principle of security. Appropriate measures should be taken to protect the files 
against dangers such as accidental loss or destruction, unauthorised access, 
fraudulent misuse of data, or contamination by computer viruses. 
Supervision and sanctions. The law of every country must designate the supervisory 
authority which is to be responsible for supervising observance of the above 
principles. This authority must be impartial, independent vis-à-vis persons or 
agencies responsible for processing data, and be technically competent. Criminal 
penalties and individual remedies should be available for the violation of the 
provisions of the national law implementing the principles. 
Trans-border data flows. This principle aims to promote the free flow of data across 
national borders. It states that when the legislation of the countries involved in a 
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transborder data flow, offer comparable safeguards for the protection of privacy, 
information should be able to circulate freely. If there are no reciprocal safeguards, 
undue limitations on such circulation may not be imposed and, if they are, they 
should be limited to what is required for the protection of privacy. 
5.2.2 African Union 
5.2.2.1 Introduction 
 
The AU was established in 2002, replacing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
which was established in 1963. The objectives of the AU are: to promote the unity 
and solidarity of African states; coordinate and intensify states’ cooperation and 
efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa; defend states’ sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; 
promote international cooperation, having due regard to the UN Charter and the 
UDHR; coordinate and harmonise members’ political, diplomatic, economic, 
educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical, and defence policies. All 
African states – save for Morocco – are members of the AU.23  
5.2.2.2 Human Rights Charters 
 
The AU adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 24 in 
1981,25 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) in 
1990.26 The ACHPR does not provide for a right to privacy, but the ACRWC does. 
Article 10 of the ACRWC provides: 
 
                                                            
23  See African Union website www.au.int (date of use: 2 March 2016); The Central African 
Republic (CAR) has been suspended since 25 March 2013 (PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXIII)) and 
is suspended from all AU activities until constitutional order in CAR is re-established 
permanently, available at http://au.int/en/AU_Member_States (date of use: 21 December 
2016). 
24  Also known as the Banjul Charter. 
25  Organisation of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 27 June 
1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5 (1982) 21 ILM 58. Entered into force 1986. 
26  OAU African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 11 July 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
(1990). Entered into force 1999. 
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Protection of Privacy 
No child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family 
home or correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or reputation, provided that 
parents or legal guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over 
the conduct of their children. The child has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights issued a Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa in 2002 which also refers to privacy 
when it states in article XII.2: 
Privacy laws shall not inhibit the dissemination of information of public interest. 
Apart from these human rights documents referring to the right to privacy, the AU 
has also adopted a Convention on data protection. 
5.2.2.2  African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
 
In June 2014 the AU adopted the Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection at the African Union’s Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.27 The 
Convention covers a very wide range of online activities, including electronic 
commerce, data protection, and cybercrime, with a special focus on racism, 
xenophobia, child pornography, and national cyber security. The Convention will only 
come into force once fifteen of the 54 AU member states have ratified it. 
 
(a) Objectives 
The aim of the Convention as regards personal data is that states should commit to 
establishing legal frameworks that strengthen fundamental rights and public 
freedoms, particularly the protection of physical data. Privacy violations should be 
punished, but the principle of free flow of personal data should not be prejudiced.28 
States should establish mechanisms that will ensure that data processing respects 
the fundamental freedoms and rights of natural persons, but at the same time 
                                                            
27  AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection EX.CL/846(XXV) (2012). The 
text of the Convention is available at https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/.../AU-270614-
CSConvention.pdf.  
28  AU Convention art 8(1). 
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recognise the prerogatives of the state, the rights of local communities, and the 
purposes for which the businesses were established.29  
(b) Scope of application  
 
The Convention applies to any collection, processing, transmission, storage, or use 
of personal data by a natural person, the state, local communities, and public or 
private corporate bodies. Subject to certain exceptions, its application extends to any 
automated or non-automated processing of data that forms part of a file. The 
processing should be undertaken in the territory of a state member of the AU. The 
Convention applies to the processing of data relating to public security, defence, 
research, criminal prosecution, or state security, subject to certain exceptions 
provided for by other laws.30 
Data processing undertaken by a natural person within the exclusive context of his or 
her personal or household activities is excluded from the scope of the Convention, 
provided, however, that the data are not for systematic communication to third 
parties or for dissemination. Also excluded are temporary copies produced by 
technical means for the purpose of automatic, intermediate, and temporary storage 
of data in order to offer the best possible access to users of the service.31 
 
Any processing for journalistic or research purposes, or for artistic or literary 
expression, is deemed acceptable, if conducted within the ambit of professional 
codes of conduct.32 
(c)  Basic principles governing the processing of personal data 
 
The Convention has six basic principles governing the processing of data: the 
principles of consent and legitimacy; lawfulness and fairness; purpose, relevance, 
and storage; accuracy; transparency; confidentiality; and security.33 Sensitive 
                                                            
29  AU Convention art 8(2). 
30  Ibid art 9(1). 
31  Ibid art 9(2). 
32  Ibid art 14(3). 
33  Ibid art 13. 
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personal data (ie data revealing racial, ethnic and regional origin, parental filiation, 
political opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, sex life; 
and genetic information (or, more generally, data on the state of health of the data 
subject) may not be processed, unless certain specific exemptions are applicable.34 
 (d)  Data subject rights and data controller obligations 
 
In terms of the Convention, a data subject has a right to information; right of access; 
right to object; and a right of rectification or erasure.35 A data controller has 
obligations relating to confidentiality, security, storage, and sustainability.36 A data 
controller also has an obligation to make a declaration before the data protection 
authority in regard to the data processing, unless: the processing activities are 
exempted from the scope of the Convention; the processing is undertaken in order to 
maintain a register for private use; or the processing is undertaken by a non-profit 
making association or body with a religious, philosophical, political or trade union 
aim.37 
(e)  Special processing activities 
 
The Convention prohibits profiling or automated decision making,38 and regulates 
data matching. Data matching (referred to as ‘interconnection of files’) may only take 
place after authorisation by the data protection authority,39 and should assist in 
achieving legal or statutory objectives which are of legitimate interest to data 
controllers.40 Data processing involving a national identification number, genetic 
information, biometric information, and information on offences, convictions and 
security measures, are also subject to prior authorisation.41 Direct marketing is also 
addressed as part of the chapter on Electronic Transactions. Direct marketing using 
any form of indirect communication is prohibited unless the individual has given prior 
                                                            
34  Ibid art 14. 
35  Ibid arts 16-19. 
36  Ibid arts 20-23. The sustainability obligation is a novel one, and states that the data controller 
must take appropriate measures to ensure that processed personal data can be utilised 
regardless of the technical device employed in the process. In particular, it must be ensured 
that technological changes do not constitute an obstacle to the utilisation. 
37  Ibid art 10. 
38  Ibid art 14(5). 
39  Ibid art 10(4).  
40  Ibid art 15. 
41  Ibid art 10(4). 
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consent to such direct marketing.42 Direct marketing by means of e-mail is only 
allowed if: the particulars of the addressee have been obtained directly from him or 
her; the recipient has given consent to be contacted by the marketing partners; and 
the direct marketing concerns similar products or services provided by the same 
individual or corporate body.43 
 (f) Data protection authority (DPA) 
 
Each AU member state is required to have a national data protection authority that 
must be an independent administrator with certain powers and duties.44 Most data 
processing activities may only take place after a declaration has been made before 
the DPA.45 For certain sensitive processing activities, the DPA must give prior 
authorisation.46 Certain processing activities may only take place in terms of 
legislation or a regulatory Act, and in such a situation a DPA must give ‘informed 
advice’ before the Act or regulation is enacted.47 
 
(g) Cross border transfers 
 
A data controller may not transfer personal data to a non-member state of the AU 
unless such a state ensures an adequate level of protection for the privacy, 
freedoms, and fundamental rights of persons whose data are being processed, or 
unless the data controller has requested authorisation for such transfer from the 
national protection authority.48  
 
(h)  Conclusion 
 
                                                            
42  Ibid art 4(3). 
43  Ibid art 4(4). 
44  Ibid art 11 and 12. 
45  Ibid art 10(2). 
46  Ibid art 10(4). 
47  Ibid art 10(5). 
48  Art 14. 
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The provisions on personal data protection in the Convention were clearly influenced 
by the EU Directive.49 It is still too early to determine whether it will have an influence 
on the adoption of data privacy laws in Africa.  
 
5.2.3  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
The OECD is an international organisation established in 1948. It comprises of 34 of 
the leading industrialised states, including all the EU member states and the United 
States. South Africa is a non-member economy with which the OECD has a working 
relationship. The OECD Council adopted a resolution on 16 May 2007 to strengthen 
the cooperation with South Africa, as well as with Brazil, China, India and Indonesia, 
through a programme of enhanced engagement.50  
The mission of the OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and 
social well-being of people around the world. It provides a forum in which 
governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common 
problems, be they social, economic, or environmental. It aims to set international 
standards on a range of issues.51  
In the next section I examine the OECD Guidelines on data protection which are 
relevant to the development and recognition of the rights to privacy and identity.  
 
5.2.3.1  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of 
Personal Data (OECD Guidelines on Data Protection) 
 
The OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of 
Personal Data (OECD Guidelines) were adopted in 198052 and revised in 2013.53 
                                                            
49  Greenleaf & Georges (2014) Privacy Laws & Business International Report 18. 
50  See OECD website at http://www.oecd.org/southafrica (date of use: 20 December 2015). 
51  See OECD website at http://www.oecd.org/about/ (date of use: 20 December 2015). 
52  OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Paris (23 September 1980). 
53  OECD Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws 
Protecting Privacy available at http://www.org (date of use: 20 December 2015). 
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The OECD Guidelines were the first international statement on data protection,54 and 
contain a set of data protection principles that set minimum standards for member 
states, who may supplement the conditions with additional measures. The OECD 
Guidelines are not legally binding on member states, but merely recommendations to 
guide member states55 contemplating adopting or revising national legislation. The 
OECD Guidelines on data protection have influenced both national and international 
data protection laws.56 They remain an influential statement of the foundations of 
privacy protection.57    
(a) Scope  
 
The OECD Guidelines apply to personal data, whether in the public or private 
sectors, which, because of the way in which they are processed, or because of their 
nature or the context in which they are used, pose a risk to privacy and individual 
liberties.58 Consequently, these Guidelines neither distinguish between the 
processing of personal data in the private and public sectors, nor between manual or 
automatic processing of personal data. 
(b) The OECD Guidelines data protection principles 
 
There are eight basic data protection principles. 
(i) Collection limitation principle. There should be limits to the collection of 
personal data and such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means 
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.  
(ii) Data quality principle. Personal data should be relevant, accurate, and 
kept up to date taking into account the purpose for which they will be used. 
                                                            
54  See Kirby 2011 International Data Privacy Law (IDPL) 6. 
55  Roos “Data protection law” 321. 
56  South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109, Project 124, October 2005. 
Reference was here made to the OECD Guidelines on data protection and they influenced 
South Africa’s data protection law, which contributed to the promulgation of the Protection of 
Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
57 Bygrave Data Privacy Law 50. 
58  OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data s 2; also see Roos “Data protection law” 
378. 
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(iii) Purpose specification principle. Personal data should be used only for 
purposes specified at the time of its collection; subsequent use of the data 
should be for the same or a compatible purpose. 
(iv) Use limitation principle. Any disclosure or use of personal data should be 
for the purpose initially specified, unless the data subject has consented to 
a different purpose or a different purpose has been authorised by law.  
(v) Security safeguards principle. Personal data should be protected by 
reasonable security safeguards against risks such as unauthorised 
access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.59 
(vi) Openness principle. There should be a general policy of openness as 
regards developments, practices, and policies in respect of personal data. 
Means should be readily available to establish the existence and nature of 
personal data, the main purposes for which they are used, and the identity 
and usual residence of the data controller.  
(vii) Individual participation principle. Data subjects have the right to participate 
in the processing of their data. Therefore, they have a right to access their 
personal data, and to be given reasons for any denial of such access. 
They also have a right to challenge data relating to them and, if the 
challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, completed or 
amended 
(viii) Accountability principle. A data controller should be accountable for 
implementing the above principles.60  
The Guidelines were reviewed in 2013 and now also require that a data controller 
should have a privacy management programme in place. This should include privacy 
policies, employee training and education, provisions for sub-contracting, an audit 
                                                            
59  In September 2015 the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation on Digital Security and 
Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity (Digital Security and Risk Management 
Recommendation (DSRMR)). The DSRMR was developed as a result of a growing number of 
uncertainties relating to the use of the digital environment. An increase in digital security 
threats and incidents has led to significant financial, privacy, and reputational consequences, 
as well as physical damage. The DSRMR should be seen as complementary to the OECD 
Guidelines on data protection. The OECD Council emphasised “that digital security risk 
management provides a robust foundation to implement the ‘Security Safeguards Principle’ in 
the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, and that the DSRMR and the OECD Privacy Guidelines 
mutually reinforce each other. See OECD Digital Security Risk Management for Economic 
and Social Prosperity: OECD Recommendation and Companion Document (2015) 7. 
60  OECD Guidelines on data protection paras 7-14; www.oecd.org (date of use: 29 May 2016). 
Also see Jay Data Protection 9. 
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process, and privacy risk assessment. The revisions also introduced mandatory data 
security breach notification – the privacy enforcement authority and individuals 
should be notified when a significant breach which is likely to affect individuals 
adversely has occurred.61 
5.2.4  Council of Europe 
 
The Council of Europe should not be confused with the European Council; the latter 
institution is discussed below.62 The Council of Europe was established in 1949 after 
the Second World War as a structure for political cooperation between the 
democratic European countries. At present it comprises 47 member states of which 
28 are members of the EU.  
In 1950, delegates representing various European states met in Rome to discuss 
human rights. These discussions led to the enactment of the European Convention 
on Human Right (ECHR).63 The ECHR was signed into law by ten member states.64 
All Council of Europe member states must sign up to the ECHR. The aims of the 
Convention are to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The judicial 
organ of the Council of Europe is the European Court of Human Rights which 
oversees the implementation of the Convention in the member states.65 
The ECHR is ‘soft law’; in order for it to be binding it must ratified by the member 
states. In the United Kingdom, for example, the ECHR has been implemented 
through the Human Rights Act 1998.66 The ECHR requires of member states to 
provide an effective remedy against human rights violations. These remedies can be 
found in states’ human rights or tort laws.67 
                                                            
61  OECD Guidelines on Data Protection para 15. 
62  Kuner European Data Protection Law 48. 
63  Council of Europe European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms ETS 5 (4 November 1950). The Convention entered into force in 
1953. 
64  Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
65  Council of Europe “Who we are” available at http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are 
(date of use: 15 February 2016). 
66  Act of 1998. 
67  Van Dam European Tort Law 23. 
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5.2.4.1 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR guarantees the right to privacy. It refers to “the right to 
respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.” Article 8(2) lays down 
the conditions under which restrictions of this right are permitted. 
 Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The provisions of article 8 are broad enough to cover data protection and a tort of 
privacy invasion. 
Article 10 of the ECHR guarantees freedom of expression: 
1  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
The right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression enjoy equal status and 
neither articles 8 nor 10 takes precedence over the other. When deciding whether it 
is appropriate to bar the disclosure of private information, a balance must be struck 
between freedom of expression and the right to privacy. For instance, a court is likely 
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to permit publication of matters of legitimate public interest. Also, information will not 
be protected against publication if it is already public knowledge.68 
As said, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg oversees the 
implementation of the Convention in the member states. Individuals can bring 
complaints of human rights violations to the Strasbourg Court once all avenues of 
appeal have been exhausted in the member state concerned. An applicant need not 
be a national of one of the member states.69 
The ECtHR has heard several complaints from individuals about infringements of 
article 8. In Bărbulescu v Romania70 the ECtHR heard a complaint by a Romanian 
engineer who was fired from his work because he used his Yahoo Messenger 
account, which was created to respond to clients’ enquiries, for personal purposes. 
The company had a policy that strictly forbade employees to use computers, 
photocopiers, telephones, telex, and fax machines for personal purposes. The 
engineer had sent personal messages to family members and his fiancée. When 
confronted by the employer about his unauthorised personal use, he denied such 
use. The employer then showed him a printout of personal messages he had sent. 
He sued his employer on the ground that his right to private life under article 8 of the 
ECHR had been infringed.  
The court pointed out that it has consistently held that the notion of private life is a 
broad concept that encompasses, for example, the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings, and the right to identity and personal 
development.71 The court has also held that telephone calls from business premises 
are prima facie covered by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ for 
purposes of article 8(1).72 E-mails sent from work, and information derived from the 
monitoring of personal Internet usage, should also be protected under article 8.73 In 
all of these instances an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
                                                            
68  Giliker & Beckwith Tort 468. 
69  Council of Europe Handbook4 available at www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook (date of 
use: 15 February 2016). 
70  [2016] ECHR 61. 
71  See Niemietz v Germany 16 December 1992 Series A no 251 B § 29; Fernández Martínez v 
Spain [GC] no 56030/07 § 126 ECHR 2014 (extracts). 
72  See Halford v The United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523 and Amann v Switzerland [GC] no 
27798/95 § 43 ECHR 2000‑II. 
73  Copland v The United Kingdom no 62617/00 § 41 ECHR 2007- I. 
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court therefore had to decide whether in the case under discussion the applicant had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy when communicating from the Yahoo 
Messenger account that he had registered at his employer’s request. The court 
noted that it was not disputed that the applicant’s employer’s internal regulations 
strictly prohibited employees from using the company’s computers and resources for 
personal purposes. The court was, therefore, of the opinion that the case differed 
from previous cases in which the personal use of an office telephone was allowed or, 
at least, tolerated. The court was satisfied that the applicant’s ‘private life’ and 
‘correspondence’ within the meaning of article 8 were limited by these measures, but 
as the employer had accessed the applicant’s Yahoo Messenger account in the belief 
that it contained professional messages, the employer had acted within its 
disciplinary powers and such access had therefore been legitimate.74 
The result of this case is that, according to the ECtHR, where an employer has 
banned the use of a computer or the Internet for personal purposes, the employee 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to personal information 
exchanged in a communication using the computer or the Internet. By analogy, one 
could probably argue that an employee, who uses a social network service such as 
Facebook on an employer’s computer during working hours, would also not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. On the other hand, Facebook entries are usually 
made for personal purposes, and an employer would find it difficult to argue that he 
or she thought the information on Facebook dealt with work issues. 
In 2010 Bowen75 analysed the ECtHR decisions on ‘private life’ and distilled six 
categories of protected interests. These are:  
 Physical and psychological (or moral) integrity, that is, matters impacting on a 
person’s body or mental health (such as physical assault and caning, sexual 
assault, conditions of detention, searches, etc).76 These rights are similar to 
the personality right to bodily integrity in South African law. 
                                                            
74  [2016] 31496/08 ECHR 61 para [57]. 
75  Bowen ALBA Article 8 and “private life”: The protean right The Constitutional and 
Administrative Law Bar Association Seminar 2 March 2010 6-8. 
76  Costello-Roberts (1995) 19 EHRR 112; Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36; 
Raninen v Finland (1998) 26 EHRR 563; Shelley v UK (2008) 46 EHRR SE16. 
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 The right of autonomy or self-determination, or “the right to conduct one’s life 
in a manner of one’s own choosing”.77 This protects a person’s right to refuse 
medical treatment, and the right to choose the timing and manner of one’s 
own death.78 
 The right to identity and personal development, which, inter alia, includes the 
right to choose a name, gender identification, sexual orientation, and sexual 
life, and whether to have a child or not to have a child.79 The scope of this 
right goes far wider that the right to identity under South African law. 
 The right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. This 
includes the right of prisoners to associate with each other and to maintain 
contact with their families. Relationships that are not close enough to fall 
within ‘family life’ are also protected under this aspect.80 One could ask 
whether the right to form on-line friendships could also be protected under this 
right. 
 The protection of private sphere and private space (privacy). This is the core 
value and protects, amongst others, against telephone tapping, publication of 
confidential information, and surveillance.81 It may extend to personal 
interactions taking place in a public place if the person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that situation.82 Communications on Facebook will 
fall into this category. 
 State action having financial consequences, such as taxation.83 
 
Identity and privacy as defined in South African law are thus protected by the right to 
‘private life’. The right to establish relationships with other human beings is of course 
also relevant in the SNSs environment. 
                                                            
77  Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 par 62. 
78  Pretty v UK (2001) 35 EHRR 1; R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45; [2009] 3 WLR 403. 
79  Stjerna v Finland (1997) 24 EHRR 195; Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18; R (B) v MOJ 
[2009] EWHC 2220 (Admin); Dudgeon v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 573; Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 
EHRR 186; Laskey v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 39; EB v France [GC] (2008) 47 EHRR 21. 
80  McFeeley v UK (1981) 3 EHRR 161; McCotter v UK (1993) 15 EHRR CD98; Wakefield v UK 
No 15817/89 (1 October 1990); Slivenko v Latvia (2004) 39 EHRR 24. 
81  See Halford v the United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
82  Peck v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 719; Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 22. 
83  Bowen “Article 8 and ‘private life’: The protean right” 8. 
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5.2.4.2  Council of Europe Convention on Data Protection 
 
The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data was signed in 1981, and came into force in 
1985 after ratification by the required number of countries.84 It is based on article 8 of 
the ECHR,85 but it was felt that article 8 was not adequate to protect all personal 
information and that a more proactive approach was needed.86 The Convention was 
the first legally binding international instrument with worldwide significance for data 
protection.87 It is open for signature by member states and for accession by non-
member states.88  
The purpose of the Convention is “to secure in the territory of each Party for every 
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data relating to him”.89 The Convention applies to automated 
personal data files and automatic processing of personal data in the public and 
private sectors.90 
Chapter Two of the Convention sets out the basic principles for data protection. 
These include principles regarding the quality of data, special categories of data, 
data security, and the rights of data subjects.91 Chapter Three of the Convention 
deals with the “Trans-border flows of personal data and domestic laws”.92  
                                                            
84  Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data No 108/1981 (Convention 108/1981). 
85  See, eg, MS v Sweden 20837/92 [1997] ECHR 49 where the ECtHR has stated that the 
protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her 
right to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by article 8 of the ECHR. 
86  Hustinx “The reform of EU data protection” 63. 
87  Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs Data Protection: 
Compilation of Council of Europe Texts 2010 8; also see Greenleaf “A world data privacy 
treaty?” 94. 
88  Convention 108/1981, art 23 provides: 
1 After the entry into force of this Convention, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe may invite any State not a member of the Council of Europe to accede to this 
Convention by a decision taken by the majority provided for in Article 20.d of the Statute 
of the Council of Europe and by the unanimous vote of the representatives of the 
Contracting States entitled to sit on the committee. 
Also see Greenleaf (2008) 94 Privacy Laws & Business International 13-14. 
89  Convention 108/1981 art 1. 
90  Ibid art 3. 
91  Ibid arts 5-7. 
92  Ibid art 12. 
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An Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Supervisory Authorities and 
Trans-border Data Flows was adopted in 2001. The Protocol requires the 
establishment of national supervisory bodies and the setting of standards for trans-
border data flows to non-contracting states.93  
In 2010 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe met to respond to rapid 
technological and globalisation trends that have brought new challenges for the 
protection of personal data.94 The Consultative Committee of the Council of Europe 
adopted the final proposals.95  
Roos96 notes that the Convention has been an important stimulus for data privacy 
legislation in member countries of the Council of Europe.  
5.2.4.3  Council of Europe Recommendations 
 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is the decision-making 
body of the Council, may make recommendations to member states on matters for 
which the Committee has agreed on ‘a common policy’. These recommendations are 
not binding, but are very influential. Several recommendations dealing with the 
protection of privacy in specific sectors have been issued over the years, such as a 
recommendation on the protection of medical data, on the protection of privacy on 
the Internet, on the protection of personal data collected and processed for 
insurance purposes, and a recommendation on the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data in the context of profiling.97 
                                                            
93  Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding supervisory authorities and trans-
border data flows (2001). 
94  Recommendation 679 for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on the 
modernisation of Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individual with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data (EST 108), and the conditions and modalities of 
accession of the European Union to the modernised Convention (16 November 2012); also 
see Roos “Data privacy law” 377. 
95  The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (EST 108) available at 
https://www.coe.int/...documents/T-PD(2012)RAP29Abr%20E%20-%20Abridged%2. 
96  Roos “Data privacy law” 382. 
97  Recommendation (97)5 on the Protection of Medical Data (13 Feb 1997); Recommendation 
(99)5 on the protection of privacy on the Internet (23 Feb 1999); Recommendation (2002)9 on 
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5.2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this section, dealing with international instruments, I have established that both the 
right to privacy and the right to identity are considered worthy of protection at the 
international level. Privacy is usually expressly identified, whereas identity is 
protected indirectly, sometimes as part of privacy, other times as part of dignity. I 
also established that these rights must be balanced against other fundamental rights, 
in particular the right to freedom of expression. I further pointed out that data 
protection laws also come into play when personal information is processed, for 
example by publishing it online. 
In the following section I consider the law of the EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the protection of personal data collected and processed for insurance purposes (18 Sept 
2002); Recommendation (2010)13 on the protection of individuals with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data in the context of profiling (23 Nov 2010). 
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5.3  EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
In this section I consider EU law as regards the right to privacy and identity in order 
to establish how the law of the EU applies to and influences the laws of its member 
states, as well as states outside the EU. The recognition and development of the 
right to privacy and the right to identity at EU level, particularly in the context of 
SNSs, are investigated. The rights to privacy and identity are often interlinked,98 and 
both these rights may be protected as human rights and also under tort law or the 
law of delict. Data protection law also protects the right to privacy and identity of 
persons when their personal information is processed – for example when someone 
posts personal information regarding another person on a website – and I therefore 
also consider data protection laws. The transposition of EU laws into the law of 
member states is also examined.  
It should always be remembered that all the EU member countries are also members 
of the Council of Europe and have all ratified the ECHR. Decisions by the ECtHR on 
this Convention are therefore applicable in EU member countries. 
 
5.3.2  Overview of the legal system 
 
The European Community (EC), the predecessor to the EU, was set up after World 
War II with the aim of bringing an end to wars between neighbouring countries and 
achieving economic and political stability. The EC had six founding members: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.99 The EU 
currently comprises of 28 member states.100 Each member state in the EU has full 
sovereignty and independence, and may act independently on an international 
                                                            
98  Bruggemeier, Ciacchi & O’Callaghan Personality Rights in European Tort Law 9. 
99  http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history (date of use: 08 May 2014). 
100  Ibid. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. 
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level.101 The EU often adopts legislation (such as Regulations, Directives, and 
Decisions) with the aim of harmonising specific areas of the law. Regulations are 
directly binding upon all member states without the need for implementation into 
national law. Directives do not have a direct legal binding effect on member states; 
their provisions need to be transposed into the national laws of the member states. 
Decisions are binding upon whomever they are addressed to, and are aimed at 
individual governments, groups, or individuals. EU law generally takes precedence in 
the case of conflict with the national law of member states.102  
A majority of the EU member states follow a civil-law system, as opposed to a 
common-law system.103  
The EU is made up of the following institutions: the European Parliament; the 
European Commission; the Council of the European Union; the European Council; 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).104 All of the above 
institutions have a unique and an important role within the EU.  
The European Parliament is the law-making body and represents the EU citizens. Its 
members are directly elected by EU voters every five years.105 The individual 
member states are allocated a number of seats in the European Parliament. The 
European Parliament meets in Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg.106 
The European Commission serves as the EU’s executive body and promotes its 
general interests. It is based principally in Brussels and Luxembourg. It is 
responsible for proposing new laws and for their implementation once they have 
been adopted by the Parliament and the Council of the EU. It is also responsible for 
implementing policies and the EU budget. The European Commission monitors the 
                                                            
101  Kuner European Data Protection Law 5. This is in contrast to the United States where the 
federal states may not act independently at international level. 
102  Ibid 34. 
103  The main feature of civil law is that it is contained in codes. The courts’ task is to apply and 
interpret the law in the code. Whereas civil law is a codified system, common law is based 
mainly on case law. In common caw, earlier judicial precedents should be respected – a 
principle known as stare decisis. In a civil law system case law does not have binding force 
and the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply. See Pejovic (2001) 32 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 817; Lomio & Spang-Hanssen Legal Research Methods in the US 
and Europe 102. 
104  See www.europa.eu/about-eu (date of use: 8 May 2014). 
105  Kuner European Data Protection Law 5; www.europarl-europa.eu (date of use: 8 May 2014). 
106  Kuner European Data Protection Law 7. 
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treaties and the executive administration of the EU.107 The European Commission 
can take action against any member state which fails to implement a Directive within 
the time limit provided, and for contravention of European laws.108 
The Council of the EU is an institution which represents member states’ 
governments. It comprises of government ministers. The national ministers from 
each member state meet in the Council to adopt laws and to coordinate policies. 
This institution is, therefore, also involved in the enactment of EU legislation.109 
The European Council, (which should not be confused with the Council of the EU 
referred to above, or with the Council of Europe both of which have been discussed 
previously), defines the general political direction and priorities of the EU. The 
European Council brings together EU leaders to set the EU's political agenda. It 
represents the highest level of political cooperation between EU countries. This 
institution does not exercise legislative functions, and is not involved in the 
enactment of EU legislation.110 
The Court of Justice of the European Union – not to be confused with the ECtHR 
which is the judicial organ of the Council of Europe – is the judicial authority of the 
EU. It ensures the uniform application and interpretation of EU law. It has its seat in 
Luxembourg and is composed of one judge per member state (currently 28) and is 
assisted by eleven Advocates-General. A member state may bring a matter before 
the European Court of Justice. The courts of an EU member state may also refer a 
question on EU law to this court for interpretation. The European Commission may 
also bring a matter against a member state for failing to implement an instrument of 
EU law.111 
Although not an official EU institution, reference can also be made to the European 
Data Protection Supervisor situated in Brussels. This is an independent supervisory 
authority responsible for monitoring compliance by the European Commission 
institutions and bodies as regards their data protection obligations. It covers only the 
processing of personal data by EC institutions and bodies. Processing of personal 
                                                            
107  Ibid 5. 
108  Ibid 37. 
109  See www.consilium.europa.eu (date of use: 8 May 2014). 
110  See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/ (date of use: 5 October 2016). 
111  Kuner European Data Protection Law 7. 
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data in the member states, falls under a particular state’s national legislation adopted 
in compliance with its obligations under EU law. 
 
5.3.3.  EU legislation on privacy and data protection 
5.3.3.1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU112 protects both the right to privacy 
and the right to protection of personal data as two distinct fundamental human rights. 
It recognises the right to privacy in article 7 and the right to the protection of one’s 
personal data in article 8.  
 
Article 7 provides: 
Respect for private and family life 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications. 
Article 8 provides: 
Protection of personal data 
1.    Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her. 
2.  Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 
3.    Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority. 
 
Limitations may be placed on these rights, but in order to be justified, the limitations 
must be provided for by law, must respect the essence of the rights limited, and, 
                                                            
112  EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2010 OJ (C 83) 02. The Charter 
became legally binding on the EU institutions and on national governments on 1 December 
2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (EU Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 2007/C 
306/01). 
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subject to compliance with the principle of proportionality, must be necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU, or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.113  
 
In Volker und Markus Schecke v Land Hessen114 these limitation principles were 
considered by the CJEU. In this case the two applicants were German farmers who 
received agricultural aid from two EU agricultural funds. The website of the German 
Federal Office for Agriculture and Food made available to the public the names of 
beneficiaries of aid from these funds, the place at which those beneficiaries reside, 
and the annual amounts received. The two farmers asked the Administrative Court, 
Wiesbaden (Germany) to require the Land of Hesse not to publish the data relating 
to them. The court took the view that the EU rules – which imposed the obligation to 
publish those data – amounted to an unjustified interference with the fundamental 
right to the protection of personal data, and the national court therefore requested 
the CJEU to examine the validity of those rules. 
 
The CJEU took the view that, while it is true that in a democratic society taxpayers 
have a right to be kept informed of the use made of public funds, the fact none the 
less remains that striking a proper balance between the various interests involved 
makes it necessary for the institutions concerned, before adopting the disputed 
provisions, to ascertain whether publication, via a single, freely-accessible website in 
each member state, of data naming each of the beneficiaries concerned and the 
precise amounts received by each of them – with no distinction being drawn 
regarding the duration, frequency, or nature and amount of the aid received – did not 
go beyond what was necessary for achieving the legitimate aims pursued.  
The court held that by imposing an obligation to publish personal data relating to 
each natural person who was a beneficiary of aid under the funds, without drawing a 
distinction based on relevant criteria such as the periods during which those persons 
received such aid, the frequency of such aid, or the nature and amount thereof, the 
                                                            
113  Charter of Fundamental Rights art 52. All EU member states are also state parties to the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (discussed above) which 
protects the right to privacy in art 8. 
114  Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v 
Land Hessen ECLI:EU:C:2010:662 para [48].  
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Council and the Commission had exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with 
the principle of proportionality.115 
 
One of the rights that can come into conflict with the right to privacy and the right to 
data protection is the right to freedom of expression which is protected in article 11 of 
the Charter. 
 
Article 11 provides: 
Freedom of expression and information 
1.    Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
2.    The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 
 
The Directive on Data Protection116 (which I discuss below) also provides for a 
balancing of the right to privacy with the right to freedom of expression by stating, in 
article 9, that member countries must allow for exemptions to the provisions of the 
Directive where personal data are processed solely for journalistic purposes, or for 
purposes of artistic or literary expression, if the exemptions are necessary in order to 
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.117 
An example of the interaction between the right to data protection and the right to 
freedom of expression is to be found in a case where two Finnish media companies 
published the tax data of 1,2 million natural persons. The data were lawfully obtained 
from the Finnish tax authorities and were a matter of public record. However, the 
Finnish Data Protection Board forbade the companies to collect, save, and process 
the taxation data on so large a scale in future. The case was referred to the CJEU for 
a preliminary ruling.118 
                                                            
115  Ibid para [79]. 
116  EU Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data 95/46/EC OJ L 281/31 (Data Protection Directive or 
Directive 95/46/EC). 
117 Dir 95/46/EC art 9.  
118  The courts of the EU member states may refer questions about the interpretation of European 
Union law that arise in disputes which have been brought before them, to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. The CJEU does not decide the dispute itself. It is for the national court to 
dispose of the case in accordance with the court’s decision, which is similarly binding on other 
national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised. 
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The CJEU held that the publication of the tax data amounted to ‘a processing of 
personal data’ within the meaning of the EU Directive on data protection. The court 
also held that the activities of the media could be classified as ‘journalistic activities’ 
within the meaning of that term in article 9 of the Directive, if their object was the 
disclosure to the public of information, opinions, or ideas, irrespective of the medium 
used to transmit them. The court further ruled that these activities are not limited to 
media undertakings and may be undertaken for profit-making purposes. As the case 
was referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, the CJEU left it to the national 
court to determine whether this was the situation in this specific case.119  
 
After proceeding at national level, the case was subsequently heard by the ECtHR 
which held that the prohibition by the Finish Data Board was a legitimate interference 
in the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and information.120 The ECtHR 
accepted the finding by the Finnish authorities that, in this instance, the publication of 
personal data could not be regarded as journalistic activity, in particular because the 
journalistic-purposes exception was to be interpreted strictly. The court noted that 
the media companies were not subjected to a general prohibition on publishing 
private persons’ tax information, but only to a limited prohibition. 121 
5.3.3.2 EU Data Protection Directives (and proposed Regulation) 
 
As I have indicated, the European Union treats the protection of personal data as a 
matter of great importance, protecting it as a fundamental right.122 Several Directives 
protecting personal data have been adopted since 1995, the first of which was the 
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, adopted in 1995.123 This Directive is 
usually referred to as the ‘Data Protection Directive’ or the ‘General Data Protection 
Directive’. Other Directives have since been adopted which have translated the 
                                                            
119  C-73/07 Satamedia Case ECLI:EU:C:2008:727. 
120  Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy And Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 ECtHR (21 July 
2015) para 55. 
121  Ibid para 63. 
122  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 art 8. 
123  Directive 95/46/EC. 
147 
 
general principles of the 1995 Directive to specific areas. Of relevance for the current 
discussion are the Directives on electronic communications. The most recent 
Directive on electronic communications is the so-called ‘e-Privacy Directive’ of 
2009.124 
The European Commission recently proposed a reform package stating that the 
current rules on data protection needed to be modernised in light of rapid 
technological developments and globalisation. The reform package consists of a 
proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation125 intended to replace the 1995 
Data Protection Directive, as well as a Directive for the law enforcement area.126 The 
Regulation was adopted on 27 April 2016 and will come into effect from 6 May 
2018.127 However, currently the 1995 Data Protection Directive remains the principal 
legal instrument on data protection in the EU. 
As the 1995 Data Protection Directive has had a major influence on the South 
African Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013, I address certain aspects of 
the Directive relevant to the topic under discussion in some detail. 
(a) General Data Protection Directive 
 
                                                            
124  Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for 
the enforcement of consumer protection laws ( e-Privacy Directive or Directive 2009/136/EC). 
This Directive is sometimes referred to as the ‘Cookie Directive' because it deals with cookies 
in art 5(3).  
125  European Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General data protection regulation) Brussels (25 January 
2012) 2012/0011 (COD). 
126  European Commission Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement free movement of such 
data Brussels (25 January 2012) COM(2012)10Final. 
127  European Commission Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/680) art 59 (1). 
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The EU Directive on data protection evolved from the earlier OECD Guidelines and 
Convention on data protection, but sets a higher level of protection for data 
subjects.128 
Aim 
The purpose of the Directive is to ensure the free flow of personal data between EU 
member states while at the same time ensuring a ‘high level of protection’ for the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals –the right to privacy in particular. This 
it aims to achieve by setting standards for the protection of personal information that 
will ensure an equivalent level of protection in all the member countries, and by 
prohibiting member states from inhibiting the free movement of personal data 
between them on grounds related to the protection of the rights of individuals.129  
Scope 
The Data Protection Directive applies to the processing of personal data by a data 
controller where the processing is done wholly or partly by automatic means, or by 
non-automatic means, provided that the personal data form part of a filling system, 
or are intended to form part of a filling system.130  
The data controller is the natural or juristic person, public authority, agency, or other 
body which determines the purposes for which and the means by which data are 
processed.131 The EU Working Party on data protection132 has pointed out that in the 
context of social network services (SNSs), several persons can qualify as data 
                                                            
128  Roos 2012 SALJ 400, 405. 
129  Directive 95/46/EC Recitals 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The Data Protection Directive starts with 72 
Recitals. Recitals in Directives are preliminary statements that explain the background to the 
Directive. Recitals always start with ‘whereas…’.  According to Bennett & Raab 1997 Inf Soc 
245, 249 the “'whereas’ statements state intentions, place this Directive in the context of other 
values and policies, help interpretation and reflect the variety of interests that shaped its 
content”. See also Greenleaf (1995) 2 Int Priv Bul 11. 
130  Directive 95/46/EC art 3. 
131 Ibid art 2(d). 
132  Ibid art 29(1) establishes a Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data (also referred to as the Article 29 Working Party). It has advisory 
status and acts independently. It is composed of representatives of the member states’ Data 
Protection Authorities (DPAs). Its tasks are set out in article 30 of the Data Protection 
Directive, and in article 15 of the Data Retention Directive. (The Data Retention Directive is 
discussed below.) The Article 29 Working Party plays an important and influential role in 
interpreting EU Data Protection law. It provides interpretative documents in the form of 
opinions and recommendations. Although the opinions and recommendations do not have 
legal binding effect, they often influence the adoption of legal binding rules. 
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controllers. First, the SNS can be a controller in that it provides the means for the 
processing of user data, and provides all the basic services related to user 
management (such as registration and deletion of accounts). The SNS provider also 
determines the use that may be made of user data for advertising and marketing 
purposes. Second, third-party providers of applications may also be data controllers.  
Third, the SNS user can act as a controller when he or she discloses personal 
information of third parties on the website, unless an exemption applies.133 
Exemptions from Directive 
In the context of SNSs two specific exemptions or exclusions need to be examined. 
First of all, article 3(2) excludes from the Directive as a whole, the processing of 
personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity.134 The Directive explains in Recital 12, that activities which are exclusively 
personal or domestic include correspondence and the holding of records of 
addresses.  
The meaning of ‘purely personal or household activity’ came under scrutiny by the 
CJEU in the Bodil Lindqvist case.135 Mrs Lindqvist worked as a catechist in the 
parish of a church in Alseda (Sweden). She set up Internet pages at home on her 
personal computer in order to allow parishioners preparing for their confirmation to 
obtain information they might need. At her request, the administrator of the Swedish 
Church's website set up a link between those pages and that site. The webpages set 
up by her contained information about her and eighteen colleagues in the parish, 
including, in some cases, their full names, and in others only their first names. She 
also described the jobs held by her colleagues and their hobbies. In some instances 
family circumstances and telephone numbers were mentioned. She also stated that 
one colleague had injured her foot and was on half-time on medical grounds.  
Lindqvist had not informed her colleagues of the existence of the pages or obtained 
their consent, nor had she notified the Datainspektionen (the Swedish supervisory 
authority for the protection of electronically transmitted data) of her activity. She 
                                                            
133  EU Art 29 DP WP Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking WP 5-6. 
134  Directive 95/46/EC art 3(2). 
135  Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist ECLI:EU:C:2003:596. See also C-73/07 Satamedia case 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:727 para [44]. 
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removed the pages in question as soon as she became aware that they were not 
appreciated by certain of her colleagues. 
The public prosecutor brought a prosecution against Lindqvist charging her with 
breaching the Swedish data protection law136 on the grounds that she had 
processed personal data by automatic means without giving prior written notification 
to the data protection authority; processed sensitive personal data (injured foot and 
half-time on medical grounds) without authorisation; and had transferred personal 
data to a third country without authorisation. I refer to second and third grounds later 
in the discussion. 
 
The case was referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on certain questions. The 
following rulings are of interest for the current discussion:  
 
 The act of referring, on an Internet page, to various persons and identifying 
them by name or by other means – for instance by giving their telephone 
numbers or information regarding their working conditions and hobbies –  
constitutes the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means within the meaning of the Data Protection Directive.137  
 
 Further, such processing of personal data is not covered by any of the 
exceptions in article 3(2) of the Data Protection Directive, as the exception in 
article 3(2) must be interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried 
out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the 
case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the 
Internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of 
people.138 
 
The EU Data Protection Working Party has nevertheless argued that the ‘purely 
personal or household activity’ exemption may apply to users of SNS, provided that 
                                                            
136  Personuppgiftslag (SFS 1998:204). 
137  Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist ECLI:EU:C:2003:596 para [27]. 
138  Ibid, paras [47] and [48]. Bygrave considers this a sensible result, but nevertheless wishes 
that the court had given more guidance as to when a webpage with personal data will be 
sufficiently private in order to qualify for the household and personal use exemption (see 
Bygrave “Data privacy law” 259, 268. 
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the privacy settings allow the user to publish the personal data to self-selected 
contacts only. However, when an SNS allows access to profile information beyond 
self-selected contacts – for example, when access is provided to all members within 
the SNS, or if the personal data can be indexed by search engines – access goes 
beyond the personal or household sphere. Also, if an SNS user decides to extend 
access to his or her profile beyond self-selected ‘friends’, the SNS user can be 
regarded as a data controller. 139 
 
Another exclusion which may be relevant is article 9 which requires that the 
processing of personal information ‘solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of 
artistic or literary expression’ should be exempted from certain provisions of a data 
protection Act adopted by a member state.140 In those cases, the Working Party 
points out, a balance needs to be struck between freedom of expression and the 
right to privacy.141 The two exemptions (for ‘purely personal or household activity’ 
and ‘solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression’) 
are increasingly overlapping in situations where an SNS user ‘publishes’ personal 
data online.142 The Working Party points out: 
 
It would be wrong to say that all of an individual’s personal online activity is being done 
for the purposes of journalism or artistic or literary expression. However, the advent of 
‘citizen’ bloggers and the use of social networking sites to carry out different forms of 
public expression, mean that the two exemptions have become conflated. The 
interaction between the two exemptions – and their scope - could have a significant 
impact on competing rights.143 
 
It argues further that “an inappropriate level of scrutiny and regulation of natural 
persons’ personal or household processing activities by DPAs could inhibit 
individuals’ freedom of speech and could in itself constitute a breach of the 
                                                            
139  EU Art 29 DP WP Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking WP 6. 
140  Member states must make provision for exemptions or derogations from the provisions 
relating to the lawfulness of processing, the rules relating to the transfer of data to third 
countries, and the provisions relating to the supervisory authority and the Working Party 
established by the Directive, if the exemptions are necessary in order to reconcile the right 
and privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression – Directive 95/46/EC art 9. 
141  EU Art 29 DP WP Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking WP 6. Also see C-73/07 
Satamedia case ECLI:EU:C:2008:727 discussed above. 
142  See EU Art 29 DP WP Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding the 
data protection reform package Annex 2: Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for 
personal or household activities (27 February 2013) 1.  
143  Ibid. 
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individual’s right to privacy.”144 It proposes that the exemption for ‘exclusively 
personal or household purposes’ should remain,145 but that the law must provide far 
clearer guidelines to help DPAs to determine whether the processing falls within the 
scope of the exemption or not. The Working Party has suggested that a combination 
of certain factors could be used to determine whether or not a specific instance of 
processing falls within the scope of personal or household processing. These factors 
are: 146 
 
 Is the personal data disseminated to an indefinite number of persons, 
rather than to a limited community of friends, family members, or 
acquaintances? 
 Is the personal data about individuals who have no personal or household 
relationship with the person posting it? 
 Does the scale and frequency of the processing of personal data suggest 
professional or full-time activity? 
 Is there evidence of a number of individuals acting together in a collective 
and organised manner? 
 Is there the potential for adverse impact on individuals, including intrusion 
into their privacy? 
 
Another case in which the CJEU had to interpret the purely personal or household- 
exemption concerned the use of CCTV cameras by a private household. A Czech 
citizen, Ryneš, installed a CCTV camera after his house had been vandalised on 
several occasions. The camera covered not only his property, but also a public 
footpath. After an incident of vandalism, two persons were identified from the CCTV 
footage and arrested. One of them questioned whether the use of CCTV footage 
was permissible under the Czech data protection law implementing the Directive. 
Ryneš argued that the exemption for purely personal and household use applied. 
The Czech Supreme Administrative Court, Nejvyšší správní soud, referred the 
                                                            
144  Ibid 2.  
145  Regulation (EU) 2016/680, art 2(2)(d). 
146  EU Art 29 DP WP Statement of the Working Party on current discussions regarding the data 
protection reform package Annex 2: Proposals for Amendments regarding exemption for 
personal or household activities (27 February 2013) 4. 
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following question to the CJEU: “Does the operation of a camera system affixed to a 
family home for the purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home 
owner constitute data processing ‘by a natural person in the course of a purely 
personal or household activity’ within the scope of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC 
albeit that this system also captures images of a public space?” The CJEU answered 
this question in the negative 
… the answer to the question referred is that the second indent of Article 3(2) of 
Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that the operation of a camera system, 
as a result of which a video recording of people is stored on a continuous recording 
device such as a hard disk drive, installed by an individual on his family home for the 
purposes of protecting the property, health and life of the home owners, but which also 
monitors a public space, does not amount to the processing of data in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity, for the purposes of that provision.147 
It is clear that one should not interpret this exception too widely. If a public element is 
present, the processing is probably not being done for personal or household 
purposes. 
Data protections principles 
In terms of the Directive, personal data may only be processed if this is done fairly 
and lawfully.148 This will be the case if the data complies with principles relating to 
data quality, and the data processing complies with certain criteria.149 
Data quality. Data must be collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes 
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. They must 
also be: adequate, relevant and not excessive; accurate and, where necessary, kept 
up to date; not be stored for longer than is necessary; and then solely for the 
purposes for which they were collected. The responsibility for complying with these 
principles rests on the data controller.150 
Criteria for making data processing legitimate. Personal data may be processed only 
if: the data subject has given his or her unambiguous consent; or processing is 
necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or 
processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller 
                                                            
147  Case C-212/13 František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428. 
148  Directive 95/46/EC art 6(1). 
149  Ibid arts 1 and 2. 
150  Ibid art 6. 
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is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; 
or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third 
party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of a legitimate interest pursued by 
the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection.151 
Special categories of personal data (data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life) receive heightened protection. 
These data may be processed only in a limited set of circumstances. These are: 
where a data subject has given express consent; or processing is necessary for the 
controller to meet legal obligations with respect to employment law; or processing is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of a data subject (or another person), and the 
data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent; or processing is 
carried out by a non-profit organisation whose aim is to advance an agenda related 
to one of the categories of sensitive data; or the data are manifestly made public by 
the data subject; or processing is necessary to establish or defend legal claims; or is 
required by a health professional in the course of providing treatment or managing 
health-care services.152 
In the Bodil Lindqvist case153 referred to above, the CJEU interpreted the meaning of 
health data. It held that a reference to the fact that an individual has injured her foot 
and is on half-time on medical grounds, constitutes personal data concerning health 
within the meaning of article 8(1) of the Directive (ie sensitive personal 
information).154 Discussing a friend’s illness on Facebook could therefore be 
considered as processing sensitive information. 
Data subject rights 
The Directive requires that the data subject be informed of the data processing 
activities and their purpose, as well as of his or her right of access and right to rectify 
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154  Ibid para [51]. 
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incorrect personal data.155 Other rights afforded the data subject include the right to 
object to certain processing activities,156 the right to object to processing of personal 
data for direct marketing,157 and the right not to be subjected to automated individual 
decisions.158 Exemptions and restrictions may be imposed on the data subject’s 
rights for purposes of national security, defence, public security, the prosecution of 
criminal offences, an important economic or financial interest of a member state or of 
the EU, or the protection of the data subject.159 
Data controller obligations  
A data controller must notify the data protection authority before any processing 
activities take place.160 The controller must also implement appropriate security 
measures to protect personal data. 161  
Judicial remedies 
Every person has the right to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights 
guaranteed by national law applicable to the processing in question.162 In addition, 
any person who has suffered damage as a result of the unlawful processing of their 
personal data is entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered.163 
Transfer of personal data to third countries 
Transfers of personal data from a member state to a third country may only take 
place if the third country offers an adequate level of data protection.164 However, 
although transfers may not take place when an adequate level of protection is not 
guaranteed, there are a number of exceptions to this rule listed in the Directive, for 
example, if the data subject himself or herself agrees to the transfer, in the event of 
the conclusion of a contract, if it is necessary on public interest grounds, but also if 
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163  Ibid art 23. 
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binding corporate rules or standard contractual clauses have been authorised by the 
member state.165 
In the Bodil Lindqvist case166 the question was raised whether in the facts of that 
case, personal data had been transferred to a third country. The CJEU held that 
there will have been no transfer of personal data to a third country within the 
meaning of article 25 of the Data Protection Directive where an individual in a 
member state loads personal data onto an Internet page which is stored with his or 
her hosting provider which is established in that state or in another member state, 
thereby making those data accessible to anyone who connects to the Internet, 
including people in a third country. The court emphasised that the information was 
not being automatically sent from the server to other Internet users, and that there 
was no evidence that the information had actually been accessed from outside of 
Europe. The court pointed out that if article 25 were interpreted to mean that there is 
a transfer of data to a third country every time personal data are loaded onto an 
Internet page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the third countries 
with the technical means needed to access the Internet. The special regime provided 
for by the Directive would thus necessarily become a regime of general application 
as regards operations on the Internet. Therefore, if the Commission found, pursuant 
to article 25(4), that even one third country did not ensure adequate protection, the 
member states would be obliged to prevent any personal data from being placed on 
the Internet. Accordingly, it must be concluded that article 25 of Directive 95/46 is to 
be interpreted as meaning that operations such as those carried out by Lindqvist do 
not as such constitute a transfer of data to a third country.167 
 
This aspect of the case was criticised by Poullet as being based on weak arguments. 
He argued that “[e]ven if the website is not as such exporting data, by his/her 
conscious operation, although he/she has deliberately created the risk of 
exportations by placing personal data on his/her website.” He argues that articles 25 
and 26 are applicable to the situation in Lindqvist.168 
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Kuner also argues that some of the court’s reasoning can be faulted, for example, 
whether or not the data were actually accessed, should be irrelevant. The key 
question should be whether the data could have been accessed. He argues:169 
 
Failing to consider as data transfers situations when data were not being automatically 
transmitted to other countries seems untenable, given that the intention to make data 
available to other countries may exist just as much when they are merely made 
accessible as when they are actively transmitted, and that technological advancements 
will probably blur the distinction to a point where it can no longer be maintained. 
 
Kuner nevertheless praises the court for its willingness to consider the international 
implications of its ruling, and its decision not to apply the EU restrictions on 
international data transfers “past a point of reasonableness”.170 According to Kuner, 
there continues to be a lack of clarity regarding the definition of ‘data transfer’, 
particular with regard to a situation where individuals post their personal data on an 
Internet site. (This would, of course, also be the situation in the case of a social 
network service.) He points out that the question of whether a data transfer has 
taken place, is sometimes another way of asking whether the data protection law of 
a particular country is applicable to the processing. He argues that while data 
controllers should not be able to evade their responsibilities by claiming that no 
transfer has taken place, not every interaction of an individual with a website should 
be regarded as a data transfer. Kuner concludes that the definition of a data transfer 
depends on the facts of a particular case.171  
He argues that in practice, the likelihood that a finding will be made that a data 
transfer has taken place, is higher in the following circumstances: 172 
 Where the data controller has an establishment in the country of the individual 
whose data are processed. 
 When the controller in some way targeted the individual. 
 When the controller has some degree of control over the means used by the 
individual to process data. 
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On the other hand, it is less likely that it will be found that a data transfer has taken 
place in the following situations:173 
 The individual has initiated contact with the controller without being targeted 
by the controller. 
 When the controller does not have any operations in the in the individual’s 
country. 
 When the controller does not have control over the purpose to be served or 
means which the individual uses to process the data. 
 
It is evident that in the case of social network services, where the majority of the 
SNSs and their servers are located in the USA, personal data are transferred across 
borders when these services are used outside of the USA. 
It should perhaps be mentioned that the Directive does have an ‘applicable law’ 
provision, providing which national law is applicable to a particular processing 
activity. This provision is based on territoriality: the national law of the country where 
the data controller is present applies. If the data controller is not situated in a country 
but is making use of equipment in a particular country, the national law will apply.174  
Kuner argues that in many instances trans-border data flow regulations serve the 
same function as rules on applicable law. When data is transferred from Europe to 
third countries, EU standards of data protection are applied to the transfer as well as 
to any further transfers that may take place.175  
According to the EU Working Party on data protection, the combined effect of the 
applicable law provisions of the Directive (establishment of the data controller in the 
territory of the EU, or the use of equipment in the EU) has the result that the 
Directive is applicable to SNS providers even if their headquarters are located 
outside of the EU.176 
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(b) e-Privacy Directive177 
The Directive Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of 
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (e-Privacy Directive) was adopted 
in 2002178 and amended in 2009.179 The e-Privacy Directive replaced the 1997 
Directive Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy 
in the Telecommunications Sector,180 in order to adapt Community legislation to  
developments on the Internet, and thus to “provide an equal level of protection of 
personal data and privacy for users of publicly available electronic communications 
services, regardless of the technology used”.181 The e-Privacy Directive is intended 
to particularise and complement the Data Protection Directive.182 This Directive aims 
to harmonise the provisions of the member states required to ensure an equivalent 
level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to 
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic 
communications sector, and to ensure the free movement of such data and of 
electronic communication equipment and services in the community.183 The e-
Privacy Directive also extends its protection to juristic persons.184  
The e-Privacy Directive applies to the processing of personal data in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic communication services in public 
communication networks in the EU.185 It lays down the rules applicable to the 
processing by network and service providers of traffic186 and location data187 
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generated by using electronic communication services. Such data must be erased or 
made anonymous when no longer needed for the transmission of a communication. 
Traffic data that are necessary for billing or interconnection payment may be 
processed up to the end of the period during which the bill may lawfully be 
challenged or payment pursued. Traffic data may be processed for marketing 
purposes and the provision of value added services, if the subscriber or user to 
whom the data relate has given his or her consent.188  
The e-Privacy Directive regulates unsolicited electronic communications (‘spam’). 
Such communications are only allowed if the person addressed has given prior 
consent to receive the communications (ie has opted in).189 If the person is an 
existing customer, the company of which he or she is a customer may send him or 
her electronic offers of similar products or services, unless the subscriber has opted 
out of receiving such communications.190 
The Directive (as amended in 2009) also deals with the use of cookies. It requires 
that websites must obtain informed consent from visitors before they store 
information on a computer or any web-connected device.191 It is mostly by using 
cookies that information is stored by a website on the hard drive of a user’s 
computer. Cookies are used for tracking visitors to a site. For cookies that are 
deemed to be “strictly necessary for the delivery of a service requested by the user” 
the consent of the user is not required.192 An example of a ‘strictly necessary’ cookie 
is one that is used to complete a transaction when a user has placed an order (‘add 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
187  Ibid art 2(c) ‘location data’ means “any data processed in an electronic communications 
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to basket’ or ‘continue to checkout’) when shopping online. The browser uses the 
information in the cookie to complete a successful transaction.193 
Social network sites such as Facebook uses cookies for various purposes, including 
authentication of users, to support security features, to make advertising more 
personal, to localise the user, and for analytics and research.194 
(c)  Proposals for reform 
 
On 12 January 2012, the Vice-President of the European Commission announced 
proposals to reform the Data Protection Directive in order to strengthen online 
privacy rights and boost Europe’s digital economy. At the time of the adoption of the 
Data Protection Directive, the Internet was still in its infancy.195 One of the objectives 
of the proposals is to deal with many of the challenges raised by SNS.196  
Although the current framework for data protection in the EU is sound as far as its 
objectives and principles are concerned, it is not implemented in a consistent 
manner in all the EU member states. Reform of the EU Data Protection Directive is 
therefore necessary in order to ensure a more coherent implementation in the 
different member states. The proposal is therefore that the new data protection 
regime will be implemented as a Regulation that will have direct application in all the 
member states.197 
The proposed Regulation is more detailed and stricter than the Directive. Some of 
the old data subject rights are strengthened, and some new rights are introduced. It 
introduces a ‘right to be forgotten’ by strengthening the data subjects’ right to request 
the deletion of personal data. Another new right is that of ‘data portability’. New 
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restrictions are imposed on the processing of data of children under the age of 
thirteen years. Under the proposals, data controllers have to carry out a data 
protection impact assessment where processing operations present specific risks to 
the rights and freedoms of data subjects. A breach notification duty is imposed on 
data controllers, and stronger sanctions are proposed. It is no longer required of data 
controllers to notify the data protection authority of any processing activity before it 
takes place. Instead, new obligations to document data processing activities and to 
appoint internal data protection officers are introduced. The article 29 Working Party 
is replaced by a European Data Protection Board with a broader mandate. The 
provisions regarding the transfer of personal data across borders, has been widened 
to include not only third countries, but also international organisations, territories, and 
processing sectors within the third country.198  
The Regulation has been adopted and will come into effect as from 6 May 2018.199 
 
5.4  UNITED KINGDOM200 
5.4.1  Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a union of previously independent countries: England, 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.201 The UK has three different legal systems. 
England and Wales have a unified legal system and follow English law (also known 
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as common law).202 Northern Ireland applies Northern Ireland law, which is similar to 
English law. The Scottish legal system is a mix of civil law and common law. The 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is the final court of appeal in the UK for civil 
cases, and for criminal cases from England, Wales and Northern Ireland.203 It also 
hears cases of the greatest public or constitutional importance affecting the whole 
population.204 
 
5.4.2  Recognition and development of the right to privacy in English law 
 
In English law, protection of privacy can be found to some extent in constitutional 
law, tort law, and statutory law.  
The UK does not have a written constitution. Statute law, case law, and 
constitutional conventions are the sources of its constitutional law. The UK is 
currently a signatory to the ECHR which protects the right to private life in article 
8.205 The UK adopted the Human Rights Act 1998 to implement the ECHR in UK law. 
It is especially the introduction of the Human Rights Act that has influenced the 
recognition and protection of the right to privacy in English law. 
Traditionally, English common law did not recognise a general right to privacy.206 
Under the influence of the Human Rights Act, the action for the protection of privacy 
has developed under the guise of two equitable wrongs, namely breach of 
confidence, and misuse of private information. The law of confidence has evolved 
immensely within the commercial sphere where it is used to protect trade secrets 
and business information from rivals.207 It has also developed to include other 
situations which are not business-orientated, but relate to personal information or to 
matters of public concern.208  
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206  Burchell Personality Rights 369; also see Collingwood 2012 Computer Law & Security Review 
328. 
207  Warby, Moreham & Christie Privacy and the Media 165. 
208  Fridman Fridman on Torts 528. 
164 
 
 
5.4.2.1  Constitutional law: Human Rights Act 1998 
 
Before the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the ECHR had not been 
incorporated into United Kingdom law and as a result it could not be invoked before 
the UK courts. Furthermore, the UK did not initially accept individual petition to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In 1966 the UK government changed its 
position on the question of individual petition and since that date individuals who 
claim that their rights under the ECHR have been violated by the UK government 
have been able, once they have exhausted their domestic remedies, to take their 
case to the ECtHR in Strasbourg.209 
The provisions of the ECHR have been implemented in the UK through the adoption 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 which came into force in 2000. The Act gives effect to 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR.210 The Act declares that the 
Convention rights “are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any 
designated derogation or reservation”.211 English courts must take decisions of the 
ECtHR into account when determining cases involving a Convention right.212 
Legislation should also be interpreted as far as possible in a way that will be 
compatible with the Convention rights.213  
The ECHR protects privacy in articles 8(1) and 8(2). These two articles are 
incorporated in the Human Rights Act of 1998.214 They guarantee that individuals 
have the right to respect for their private and family lives, their homes, and their 
correspondence.215 Public authorities may not interfere with the exercise of these 
rights, except where this is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic 
                                                            
209  UK Equality and Human Rights Commission “The UK and the European Court of Human 
Rights” Research Report 83 (2012) v-vi. 
210  Human Rights Act, 1998, Preamble. 
211  Ibid s 1. 
212  Ibid s 2. 
213  Ibid s 3. 
214 Ibid Sch 1 part 1 art 8(1) and (2). 
215  Ibid art 8(1). 
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well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.216 
It is notable that article 8(1) specifically guarantees protection for four aspects of an 
individual: private life, family life, home, and correspondence.217 ‘Private life’ includes 
bodily integrity, personal autonomy, personal information, personal identity, and not 
being subjected to surveillance.218 Though some of these concepts are not 
mentioned in the article itself, they have developed through case law.219  
The right protected by article 8(1) is not an absolute right. Article 8(2) provides an 
internal limitation: interference is allowed where it is in accordance with the law,220 is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. An infringement may be justified where the other party exercises his or her 
right to freedom of expression in terms of article 10 of the ECHR.221 
In terms of article 8(2) of the Human Rights Act, the interference that is prohibited is 
between the citizens and the state. This is similar to the approach in the ECHR. 
Thus, this provision has vertical application; as a result this may arguably not cure 
the lacuna of a lack of a privacy tort between citizens in an horizontal application. 
However, since article 8 imposes a positive obligation on the state to respect and 
promote the interests of private and family life, it has been held in case law that the 
                                                            
216  Ibid art 8(2). 
217 Ibid art 8(1). 
218  Bowen “Article 8 and ‘private life’: The protean right” 6-7. 
219  UK Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 83 “The UK and the European 
Court of Human Rights” (2012) 261. Also see echr-online.info art 8. 
220  The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, for example, allows interception of 
telephone calls by appropriate authorities with an interception warrant. 
221  Human Rights Act 1998 art 10: Freedom of Expression 
1. Everyone has the right of freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring 
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the 
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality or the judiciary. 
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individual is entitled to complain to the state about breaches of his or her private life 
committed by other individuals.222 Bowen points out that: “Article 8 … also imposes 
positive obligations on States to take measures to protect individuals from the 
actions of non-State actors …”. These measures include “… establish[ing] an 
effective independent judicial system so that responsibility for conduct infringing 
Convention rights may be determined and those responsible made accountable”. 223 
 
5.4.2.2 Common law: Breach of confidence and misuse of private information 
 
In common law private information has, in certain circumstances, received protection 
from disclosure under the claim for breach of confidence. In order to establish breach 
of confidence, the plaintiff must establish that the information was confidential, that 
is, the information had been disclosed in circumstances that implied an obligation of 
confidentiality.224 This action was subject to three limiting principles.225 
 
 “The principle of confidentiality only applies to information to the extent 
that it is confidential. Once it has entered the public domain, in the sense 
that the information in question is so generally accessible that, in all the 
circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential, then the principle of 
confidentiality can have no application to it. 
 The duty of confidence applies neither to useless information, nor to trivia.  
 Although the basis of the law's protection of confidence is that there is a 
public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by the 
law, nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed by some other 
countervailing public interest which favours disclosure. This limiting 
principle may require a court to carry out a balancing operation, weighing 
the public interest in maintaining confidence against a countervailing public 
interest favouring disclosure”. 
                                                            
222  See McKennit v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 para [9]; Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 
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In Campbell v MGN Ltd,226 the Daily Mirror newspaper had published a series of 
stories about a famous model, Naomi Campbell. These stories related to her 
attending Narcotics Anonymous (this was accompanied by a photograph of her 
leaving a place where Narcotics Anonymous held meetings), including details of her 
undergoing treatment for drug addiction. The claimant had previously publicly denied 
her drug addiction. She admitted during trial that this had been a lie. The Daily Mirror 
claimed that it had acted in the public interests to correct her public denial. Campbell 
admitted that there was a public interest justifying publication of the fact that she was 
a drug addict and was undergoing therapy, but claimed damages for breach of 
confidentiality, and compensation under the Data Protection Act, 1998, (DPA) for the 
publication of additional details. Morland J awarded damages to the claimant in the 
court a quo. This is after the court had found the defendant to have committed a 
breach of confidence and breach of the DPA. This decision was overturned by the 
Court of Appeal which reasoned that the claimant’s celebrity status made the details 
of her attending Narcotics Anonymous ‘newsworthy’. This decision was reversed by 
the House of Lords. 
The House of Lords pointed out that the action for breach of confidence has been 
developed under the influence of human rights instruments and decisions of the 
ECtHR, to embrace private, in addition to confidential, information.227 The values 
enshrined by articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR have become part of the cause of action 
for breach of confidence.228 Under influence of these instruments, it was accepted 
that the privacy of personal information was worthy of protection. 229 
Another factor that influenced this development was an acknowledgement of the 
artificiality of distinguishing between confidential information obtained through a 
violation of a confidential relationship, and similar information obtained some other 
way. 230 
                                                            
226  Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22 para [2]. 
227  Ibid paras [16] and [17]. 
228  Ibid. 
229  Ibid para [46]. 
230  Ibid. 
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The development resulted in the law dispensing with the requirement that there 
should be a pre-existing relationship of confidence. The law now imposes a duty of 
confidence whenever a person receives information in circumstances in which he or 
she knows, or should know, that it is fair and reasonable to regard the information as 
confidential. The action has been developed to protect information in respect of 
which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. This action is sometimes referred 
to as ‘misuse of private information’.231  
However, officially the cause of action remains ‘breach of confidence’. It has been 
pointed out that:232  
In its present form breach of confidence thus embraces two differing forms of 
protection:  
 old-fashioned breach of confidence which upholds confidential relationships and 
the duty of good faith; and  
 misuse of private information (the new element to this cause of action) which 
upholds human autonomy and dignity in respect of private information regardless 
of whether a breach of confidence is involved. 
In order to determine whether information is private, the Court of Appeal in Douglas v 
Hello! Ltd asked:233 
What is the nature of ‘private information’? It seems to us that it must include 
information that is personal to the person who possesses it and that he does not intend 
shall be imparted to the general public. The nature of the information, or the form in 
which it is kept, may suffice to make it plain that the information satisfies these criteria. 
In other words, if a person determines that personal information should not be 
disclosed to other persons, such information should be considered private 
information.  
 
5.4.2.3 Legislation: Data Protection Act, 1998 
 
The Data Protection Act, 1998, came into force in 2000. It repealed the former Data 
Protection Act, 1984. The provisions of the Human Rights Act and those of the 
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ECHR created a legal framework for the development and adoption of the Data 
Protection Act.234 The Data Protection Act gives effect to the Data Protection 
Directive.235 The Freedom of Information Act236 amended the Data Protection Act, 
1998.237 The Freedom of Information Act makes provision for the disclosure of 
information held by public authorities or by persons providing service to them.238 
The Data Protection Act creates a framework which deals with the protection of 
personal data.239 The Act does not apply specifically to a person or an organisation, 
but to any activities involving the ‘processing’ of personal data in the United 
Kingdom, or processing where equipment situated in the United Kingdom is used for 
the processing of personal data.240 Section 1 defines a ‘data controller’ to mean, 
“subject to subsection (4), a person who (either alone or jointly or in common with 
other persons) determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any 
personal data are, or are to be, processed”.241 
The Act sets out eight data protection principles which must be complied with 
whenever there is ‘processing’ of personal data.242 These principles are: 
1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be 
processed unless— 
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and 
(b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 
3 is also met. 
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, 
and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or 
those purposes. 
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
                                                            
234  Act of 1998. 
235  Directive 95/46/EC. 
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4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer 
than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects 
under this Act. 
7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European 
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection 
for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal 
data. 
 
The DPA also creates the office of the Information Commissioner, who is the 
custodian of the DPA. This is an independent authority which has a duty to protect 
the privacy of personal data and a responsibility to ensure access to information.243 
The Information Commissioner may also give clarity on the interpretation of the 
provisions of the DPA.244 However, the Information Commissioner’s interpretation of 
the DPA only has a persuasive effect; conclusive interpretation of the DPA rests with 
the courts.245 
Data Protection Act and SNSs 
The posting of personal information on a SNSs amounts to processing of personal 
data and must therefore comply with the Data Protection Act. In the context of SNSs, 
the Social Networking Providers and users’ of SNSs are data controllers as per the 
definition in the Data Protection Act, in that they “determine the purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data”, as they provide the Social Networking platform.  
The question arises whether individual users of the SNSs are also data controllers 
when they upload personal information about themselves or third parties on their 
individual webpages. The Data Protection Act exempts certain forms of data 
                                                            
243  Information Commissioner’s Office Guide to Data Protection 2010. Also see Freedom of 
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processing from the provisions of the Act. One such exemption, relevant to the 
current discussion, is the domestic purpose exemption found is section 36. In terms 
of this section an individual who processes personal data solely for personal, family, 
or household affairs (including recreational purposes) are exempt from the data 
protection principles and the provisions of Parts II (Rights of Data subjects and 
others) and III (Notification by Data Controllers). This exemption does not apply 
where the website operator processes personal data for ‘non-domestic purposes’, for 
example, where an individual uses a SNS website for running a sole-trader business 
– in other words for corporate or business purposes. In such a case the normal Data 
Protection Act rules will apply to the individual user, and he or she will be treated as 
a ‘data controller’. 
However, there is no clear guidance for the case where an individual user uses his 
or her profile for mixed purposes, that is, for domestic and non-domestic purposes. 
This is probably because, as Garrie et al246 assert, the Data Protection Directive, 
which has been implemented in the United Kingdom through the Data Protection Act, 
was drafted long before the Web 2.0 era, and therefore did not consider issues 
surrounding social networking. The Information Commissioner’s Office advises that 
in such a situation the individual will either have to comply with the Data Protection 
Act whenever he or she uses his or her profile for non-domestic purpose, or 
alternatively register a separate profile. The domestic purpose exemption does not 
cover organisations that use SNSs or online forums; the organisation, therefore, 
must comply with the Data Protection Act in the normal way. Examples would be if 
the organisation: 
 posts personal data on their own or a third party website; 
 downloads and uses personal data from a third party website; or 
 runs a website which allows third parties to add comments or posts about 
living individuals, and they are the data controller for website content. 
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5.4.3 Practical issues when applying data protection rules in the SNSs 
environment 
 
Here I address the question of liability once an infringement of a personality right 
(such as privacy or identity) has occurred on an SNSs. I consider the position in the 
UK specifically. I also discuss the position of a UK Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
where the identity of the user is unknown to the plaintiff, either because the user is 
anonymous, or is using a pseudonym.  
5.4.3.1 Procedural challenges: Wrongdoer and anonymity 
 
A person, whose personality rights have been infringed in the context of an SNS, 
may bring a claim in a court against the wrongdoer if the identity of the wrongdoer is 
known to the claimant. However, if the identity of the wrongdoer is known only to the 
Social Network Provider – for example, where the claimant is posing as someone 
else or using a pseudonym – the positions is more complicated. In such an instance 
it is possible in the UK to seek a special disclosure order – the so-called Norwich 
Pharmacal Order247 – against the Social Networking Provider. A Norwich Pharmacal 
Order is a court order that requires a third party who is (innocently or not) involved or 
‘mixed up’ in the wrongdoing, to disclose documents or information, such as the 
identity of the wrongdoer.248 The purpose of the order is to enable a prospective 
claimant to obtain the necessary information, such as the name of the proper 
defendant, before instituting legal action.249 It is an equitable remedy and it is in the 
discretion of the court whether to grant it or not.250  
Collingwood251 notes that disclosure orders may facilitate the identification of a 
wrongdoer, who may then ultimately be pursued through the courts, but they should 
not be taken lightly, particularly because revealing the details of an individual 
                                                            
247  The order is named after the case in which such an order was first issued: Norwich 
Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133. 
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expecting to rely on the protection of anonymity, clearly involve major data protection 
issues given their intrusive nature. 
In Applause Store Productions Ltd and Firsht v Grant Raphael,252 Mathew Firsht and 
his company, Applause Store, successfully sued for libel and misuse of private 
information. The defendant allegedly created a false Facebook profile in the name of 
Mathew Firsht and linked a false Facebook group (titled ‘Has Mathew Firsht Lied To 
You?’) to the profile. The fake profile and Group page alleged that the Matthew Firsht 
was gay, owed business associates money, and had lied about paying it back. In 
other words, it contained private information and was also defamatory of the plaintiff. 
The claimant obtained a Norwich Pharmacal order against Facebook for disclosure 
of the registration data provided by the user responsible for creating the false 
material, including the e-mail addresses and IP addresses of all computers used to 
access Facebook by the owner of those e-mail addresses.253 Facebook provided the 
claimant with evidence showing that the profile was created on a computer using an 
IP address that matched the defendant’s computer. The court found in favour of the 
plaintiff.  
Sometimes it may be difficult to identify the author of harmful content because the 
perpetrators have used anonymous profiles or public computers to perpetrate their 
wrongful acts.  
In the case of The author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd,254 the court had to 
determine whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that his 
identity would not be revealed to the general public by the Times Newspaper, even 
though the Newspaper had deduced his identity by legal means. The blogger argued 
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of his identity as the 
anonymous author of the blog, and that there was no countervailing public interest 
justifying its publication. The court held against the blogger because the information 
did not have the necessary quality of confidence required, nor did the blogger have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy since blogging is a public activity. 
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In conclusion, one can say that in the right circumstances it is possible to force a UK 
Internet Service Provider to disclose the identity of an anonymous third party who 
has infringed the privacy of a claimant. 
5.4.3.2 ISP liability  
 
Savin255 highlights three essential roles of the ISP: first, they enable the flow of 
information between the users without contributing to the content; second, they act 
as guardians of the users’ identity and anonymity; and thirdly, they are in a unique 
position to prevent or mitigate the damage that may be inflicted by other users’ 
activities.  
Under the repealed Defamation Act256 an ISP was liable for defamatory third-party 
content if it knew, or should have known, of the defamatory content when the service 
provider published it. It is not clear whether the service provider could be liable for 
breach of privacy or identity under the Defamation Act. However, it is arguable that 
the rules applied under the Defamation Act may also be applied in the case of an 
infringement of privacy or identity in the context of SNSs.  
The Defamation Act, 2013, came into force on 1 January 2014. Its introduction 
brought significant changes with regard to the liability of website operators. It 
introduced a defence to shield website operators from damage claims resulting from 
publication of defamatory user-generated content.  
Section 5 provides a defence for a website operator if an action for defamation is 
brought against the operator in respect of a defamatory statement posted on the 
website.257 The defence is applicable if a website operator can show that it did not 
post the defamatory statement on the website.258 The website would not be 
successful in the defence if the claimant shows that: 
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the 
statement; 
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(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the 
statement; and 
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with 
any provision contained in regulations.259 
If the same principles could be applied in respect of postings infringing on privacy 
and identity, the ISP would escape liability if it could show that it was not responsible 
for posting the information, and was not informed by the plaintiff of the infringement. 
 
5.12  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I examined a selection of the most important international documents 
which have influenced national laws on the protection of personality rights (such as 
the right to privacy and the right to identity). I focused on the protection of the rights 
to privacy and identity both as human rights and in private law (tort law or the law of 
delict) within the EU, and more specifically the UK as a member state. The focus 
was on the legislation of the EU and how it has been transposed and applied within 
the UK. I also considered how these laws have been adapted as a result of the 
development of new technologies (particularly the Internet). 
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Chapter 6 
Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
6.1 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter provides a conclusion to this study. It gives a brief summary of the 
study, some conclusions, and then recommendations. 
In the study I sought to investigate whether South African law adequately protects 
the interests that form the object of the right to privacy and the right to identity, 
particularly in the context of SNSs. Other related questions investigated included: 
who should be held responsible for the user-generated content uploaded on SNSs; 
the role of the ISP; and how anonymous defendants should be dealt with. A 
comparative law approach was adopted to conduct the investigation.1 
The focal point of the study was the use of SNSs and certain personality rights 
(namely, the right to privacy and the right to identity) that may be infringed by the use 
of SNSs. I argued that these two rights are affected when users share or 
communicate information, about either themselves or others, on SNSs.2 I showed 
how the right to privacy and right to identity may overlap3 which is why these two 
personality rights were discussed together.  
In order to contextualise the study, the following assumptions were adopted: that the 
Internet is an important medium of communication; that people retain their 
personality rights when using the Internet (and specifically SNSs); and that the law 
must protect people’s rights when they use SNSs. The research was limited to the 
protection of the right to privacy and right to identity in the context of SNSs and the 
delictual perspective was my focus. I further limited the study to the personality rights 
of natural persons.  
                                                            
1  Paragraph 1.3; Chs 4 and 5 above. 
2  Paragraph 3.1 above. 
3  Paragraph 3.6; also see para 3.3.1 above. 
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In order to provide a background, in Chapter 2 I dealt with the concept of SNSs and 
explained their functionality. This provided an historical background to the 
development of SNSs; the nature of SNSs was explained; and a description was 
given of SNSs in general. I also examined the use of SNSs and described the 
functionality and usage of specific SNSs. 
 
Furthermore, in the study I investigated two personality rights (particularly the right to 
privacy and right to identity). In Chapter 3 I turned my attention to the South African 
position. I first considered the common law and the constitutional law position as 
regards the recognition and development of these personality rights, together with 
how they may be infringed. The possible grounds of justification that exclude the 
wrongfulness of infringing conduct were also examined.4 I explored the infringement 
of these personality rights in the context of SNSs and the possible grounds of 
justification applicable in this regard and also addressed the procedural challenges 
where either privacy or identity has been infringed in the context of SNSs. Here I 
addressed the possible remedies available to a plaintiff whose personality rights 
have been infringed through the use of an SNS. I also highlighted that the rights to 
privacy and identity may be interlinked with data protection which means that data 
protection becomes relevant when there is processing of personal information on 
SNSs.5 This discussion focused on the POPI Act in order to address the processing 
of personal information in the context of SNSs.6 I indicated that the POPI Act 
excludes any processing of personal information during the course of a purely 
personal or household activity from its sphere of application. I concluded that it is not 
clear how this exception may apply in the context of SNSs.7 
 
For a comparative law perspective, I looked first at the legal system of the United 
States of America in Chapter 4 and highlighted the recognition, protection, and 
regulation of the rights to privacy identity in the United States at federal level. I here 
considered constitutional law, legislation, common law, and case law as sources of 
the rights I analysed. The common law played an important role with regard to the 
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recognition and the protection of the right to privacy.8 The right to identity does not 
exist as an independent personality right; it is protected under the guise of the right 
to privacy,9 and under the right of publicity.10 From the discussion, it emerged that 
although the United States Federal Constitution (Bill of Rights) does not protect 
privacy explicitly by name, the right to privacy is recognised and protected under the 
United States Constitution as a result of judicial interpretation.11 The right to privacy 
is also protected in terms of legislation; I indicated that the Congress often enacts a 
pieces of legislation to address an imminent threat to privacy. As a result, there is a 
plethora of legislation addressing privacy and focussing on different areas, such as 
law enforcement and government records, data security, consumer data, medical 
and genetic data, and employment.12 I further focused on legislation relevant in the 
context of SNSs.13 I also examined the position with regard to the transfer of 
personal data between the United States and the European Union and focused on 
the Safe Harbour Agreement, the implications of the Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner14 decision on the Safe Harbour Agreement,15 and the newly enacted 
EU-US Privacy Shield.16 
In Chapter 5 I continued with a comparative study, here examining a selection of the 
most important international instruments which have influenced national laws dealing 
with the protection of personality rights (such as the rights to privacy and  identity). 
This discussion was necessary as the Internet and SNSs operate on an international 
platform which allows trans-border communication and processing of personal 
information. In this context, I considered international documents establishing or 
issued under the auspices of the following organisations: the UN, AU, the OECD, the 
Council of Europe, and the EU. South Africa is a member state of the AU,17 UN,18 
and the OECD.19 The discussion briefly looked at the Council of Europe, a structure 
responsible for political cooperation between the democratic European countries, 
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before I turned my focus to the EU. The recognition and development of the right to 
privacy and the right to identity at the level of EU Regulations, Directives and 
Decisions, particularly in the context of SNSs, were investigated. I pointed to the 
important role the EU has played and its immense influence on the development of 
data protection legislation. I also considered the proposed reform package of the 
European Commission – reform which seeks to modernise the rules on data 
protection in light of rapid technological developments and globalisation.20 
In order to show how EU laws apply to member states, I next explored the legal 
position in the UK. Here I once again focused focussed on the protection of the right 
to privacy and identity in constitutional law, common law (tort law), and statutory law. 
I also discussed the applicability of the Data Protection Act of 1988 on SNSs users, 
the liability of ISPs, and the identification of anonymous users. 
 
6.2 CONCLUSION 
 
The study has noted how SNSs have brought convenience or improvement to the 
lives of its users.21 The legal consequences of the use of SNSs have also been 
identified.22 It can consequently be concluded that the law must evolve or adapt in 
line with new technological developments in order adequately to protect society’s 
needs. SNSs provide an important platform for the free flow of information amongst 
users and third parties. The Internet is unique in that a conversation that occurs 
online leaves a digital footprint, in contrast to the physical or offline world where a 
conversation between two people will only be remembered for a short while by the 
parties involved, and no physical trace of it will remain. This does not mean that 
SNSs require unique laws or even new laws which differ from those which apply in 
the ‘real’ world. The existing rules could be adjusted or fine-tuned to make them 
effective in the context of SNSs.  
                                                            
20  Paragraph 5.3.3.2 above. 
21  Chapter 2 above. 
22  Paragraph 3.9 above. 
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On the basis of my discussion in Chapter 3,23 I conclude that the South African 
common law (under the actio iniuriarum) provides adequate protection for the 
interests that form the object of the right to privacy and the right to identity when 
these interests are infringed in the SNSs context. Although SNSs could be 
considered a public space, the boni mores will nonetheless regard the user’s claim to 
a right to privacy (and identity) reasonable if the SNS user used the privacy settings 
on SNSs in an appropriate manner, and did not accept an excessive number of 
‘friends’. 
 
While the study focused on private law, the influence and importance of the 
Constitution on these concepts could not be ignored. The right to privacy and right to 
identity were considered under the Constitution.24 In NM v Smith (Freedom of 
Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae),25 the Constitutional Court emphasised that 
“the precepts of the Constitution must inform the application of the common law.” The 
legal rules forming the basis of the actio iniuriarum should be developed in a manner 
that “recognises both the importance of privacy and the importance of freedom of 
expression.” 26 In my view, the user of an SNS has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the same circumstances under which the boni mores will accept the user’s 
claim to a right to privacy as reasonable. I opine that the actio iniuriarum remains 
relevant and important in offering protection for infringement of privacy and identity in 
the context of SNSs.  
Several pieces of legislation are also important in order to provide adequate 
protection for the interests that form the object of the right to privacy and the right to 
identity in the context of SNSs. These include: the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act,27 the Promotion of Access to Information Act,28 the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related 
Information Act,29 the Protection from Harassment Act,30 and the Protection of 
                                                            
23  Paragraphs 3.2.2.1; 3.2.3.1 & 3.3 above. 
24  Paragraphs 3.1; 3.2.1.2; 3.2.2.2; 3.2.3.2 and 3.3.1 above. 
25   2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) para 31. 
26   Ibid para 47. 
27  Act 25 of 2002; para(s) 3.9.9 and 3.10.2 above. 
28  Act 2 of 2000; para 3.7.1 above. 
29  Act 70 of 2002; para 3.7.2 above. 
30  Act 17 of 2011; para 3.10.4 above. 
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Personal Information Act.31 I conclude that the legislation that is currently in place is 
effective in regulating SNSs. Of course, as the technology advances, these laws 
might need to be fine-tuned. 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the remedies at the disposal of users of SNSs. I concluded 
that apart from the actio iniuriarum, alternative remedies should be considered. A 
take-down notice under the ECT Act, for instance, offers an effective remedy of first 
instance for a person whose privacy or identity has been infringed, provided the ISP 
adheres to such take-down notice requests from users or non-users. If this type of 
remedy could successfully be used, it would help avoid the expensive process of 
litigation.32 An interdict in the context of SNSs provides immediate and effective relief 
to the plaintiff (user or non-user) and minimises the harm to plaintiffs’ (user or non-
user) personality interests (privacy and identity in this instance).33 A protection order 
under the Harassment Act offers another possible remedy which offers speedy legal 
relief in the context of SNSs which may assist in minimising further damage to the 
plaintiff’s personality rights.34 
From the comparative discussion, I drew certain conclusions, for example, that SNSs 
operate on an international platform which allows trans-border communication and 
processing of personal information. Also, the United States does not have 
comprehensive data protection legislation. I therefore concluded that the 
international documents on human rights and data protection which I discussed, 
contribute to the development of the international data protection legal framework 
and continue to influence data protection in the different jurisdictions that have yet to 
adopt data protection laws. It is notable that the EU data protection legislation and 
standards have a major influence in jurisdiction beyond Europe; in South Africa this 
influence culminated the promulgation of the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 
of 2013.35  
As to the question of liability of an ISP for third party content, I concluded that both 
the United States and the United Kingdom provide some form of immunity for the 
ISP. In the United States protection is provided under section 230 of the 
                                                            
31  Act 4 of 2013; para 3.7.3 above. 
32  Paragraph 3.10.2 above. 
33  Paragraph 3.10.3 above. 
34  Paragraph 3.10.5 above. 
35  Paragraphs 3.7.3; 5.3.3.2 above. 
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Communications Decency Act,36 while in the United Kingdom protection is extended 
in terms of section 5 of the Defamation Act.37 
The study posed a question regarding identifying an anonymous user as possible 
defendant. In this regard I concluded that both the United States and the United 
Kingdom have adopted procedures to assist the plaintiff, namely, the John Doe 
proceedings38 and the Norwich Pharmacal Order proceedings respectively.39  
 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
I first offer some recommendations for users of SNSs. Users should take the 
following precautions when using SNSs.  
 Users should acquaint themselves with the terms of use and the privacy policy of 
the relevant SNSs they wish to join. It is also important to check the terms of 
these policies regularly as SNSs may change them at any time. 
 
 Users should set privacy settings to the maximum. Users must be conscious of 
the dangers when sharing personal information on SNSs. They should avoid 
uploading their and other people’s sensitive personal information, and never 
divulge more personal information than is absolutely necessary on any SNS. 
 
 Users should be selective in accepting friends – users who have hundreds of 
friends who have unlimited access to their private information, run the risk that 
their expectation of privacy will not be considered reasonable by the boni mores.  
 
As far as the development of South African law is concerned, I offer the following 
recommendations. 
                                                            
36  Paragraph 4.5.1 above. 
37  Paragraph 5.4.3.2 above.  
38  Paragraph 4.5.2 above. 
39  Paragraph 5.4.3.1 above. 
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 At present the common law protects the right to privacy and identity of SNSs 
users, but courts are encouraged to develop the common law when necessary to 
keep up with any future technological developments that may limit this protection. 
 
 The newly formed Privacy Regulator should take note of new developments in 
the area of SNSs and make recommendations to the legislature about changes to 
the law as necessary. One area that will need her immediate attention is the 
applicability of the household exemption to the users of SNSs. This study 
recommends that the Information Regulator should provide some clarity or 
formulate guidelines to clarify the applicability of the household exemption to 
SNSs users. The proposals of the EU’s article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
could be adopted in South Africa.40 The following factors could be identified as 
indicative of a situation when the household exemption should not be available to 
SNSs users:  
 the personal information is disseminated to an indefinite number of 
persons, rather than to a limited community of friends, family members, 
or acquaintances; 
 the personal information relates to individuals who have no personal or 
household relationship with the person posting it; 
 the scale and frequency of the processing of personal information 
suggest professional or full-time activity; 
 there is evidence of a number of individuals acting together in a 
collective and organised manner; 
 there is a potential adverse impact on individuals, including intrusion 
into their privacy. 
 
 With regard to the procedure for identifying an anonymous user as possible 
defendant, it is recommended that the position in United States and the United 
Kingdom be used to guide future developments in South Africa. I agree with Nel’s 
proposals in this regard, namely that:41 
                                                            
40  Paragraph 5.3.3.2(a) above. 
41  Nel 2007 CILSA 210 ff. 
184 
 
 the discovery procedure used to identify the anonymous user should be not 
be used as a ‘fishing’ expedition; 
 the applicant should not have another alternative remedy available (for 
instance the applicant should have already applied for a take-down notice in 
terms of the ECT Act); 
 the applicant cannot obtain discovery against one person for the purpose of 
bringing action against another person (this would mean an applicant cannot 
apply for discovery against ‘friends’ of the prospective defendant); 
 the court should not come to the assistance of a litigant to identify an 
anonymous user in order to enable him to establish whether or not he has a 
cause of action; 
 in any approach used to identify an anonymous defendant, it is important for 
the procedure to take into account the possible defendant’s right to privacy, 
freedom of expression, and the provisions of the RICA Act.42  
 
 
                                                            
42  Paragraph 3.7.2.2 above. 
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